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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on two interlinked issues. First, 
whether citizens evaluate economic information on the basis of 
what it means to their families or immediate acquaintances 
(pocketbook theory), or what it means to the country, 
irrespective of the impact on their own economic situation 
(sociotropic theory). And second, how far such a distinction is 
related to alternative channels of communication, especially the 
mass media. The study attempts to elaborate the thesis that we 
need to focus on short run influences if we are to understand the 
nature of political support. It is also contended that we need 
to go beyond class models of voting behaviour and explore the 
strengths and weaknesses of the variety of techniques used in 
assessing the impact of fluctuations in the economy. The 
emphasis is on a model incorporating economic fluctuations and 
their appreciation by the electorate; important political events; 
and the role of the mass media.
The study begins with a critical review of some of the 
existing literature, with special reference to class and issue 
voting models. The substantive chapters derive from the position 
developed in this assessment : economic perceptions are
significant even if the earlier models of economic voting are 
deficient. The initial thrust is comparative and tests an 
economic model of Government popularity against data from the 
regional domain. The results confirm the media dynamic behind 
popularity fluctuation. The thesis then develops the notion of 
the importance of general (or "sociotropic") perceptions in 
influencing Government popularity. Econometric techniques are 
employed to test and elaborate existing model constructions. The 
importance of general perception is confirmed, and the following 
analysis explores the structure of these perceptions using dis­
aggregated public opinion poll data. The results specify more 
clearly the nature of the public's perceptual strata. We suggest 
that neither class groupings nor the unemployed have a 
distinctive set of economic perceptions. Furthermore, a group 
of media dependent individuals can be isolated. This dependency 
is unrelated to class, or to employment status, and the dependent 
group share a distinctive set of perceptions which are consonant 
with media influence.
The last section of the thesis explores data generated from 
a panel study conducted in Lewisham, South London. We highlight 
the importance of sociotropic perception, and related 
attributional inferences. We look at volatility in economic 
perceptions and the relationship between personal, local and 
sociotropic attitudes. Subject to the necessary qualifications, 
in conclusion we submit that economic perceptions have important 
rather than a determinant impact on voter preference. This 
impact is part of an incremental process leading to glacial 
shifts in political popularity - a process in which the media 
have a significant place.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The primary thrust of the study is an examination of the 
relationship, if any, between economic conditions, media 
representations of economic trends, and political preferences. 
The inspiration comes from recent developments in voting research 
and the contemporary reappraisal of the influence of the mass 
media. The fusion of these two strands necessitates the use of 
a variety of research techniques, from comparative and time 
series analysis to cross sectional and panel survey methods. It 
is hoped that the results will be of substantive and theoretical 
relevance to the debates on media influence and the integrity of 
the Downsian thesis (Downs, 1957).
The early post-war work on mass communication suggested that 
the media did not directly influence the audience (this 
countering the prevailing orthodoxy of the Frankfurt School). 
The primary function of the media was now seen as reinforcing 
pre-existent and entrenched attitudes, and rallying the faithful 
(Lazarsfeld et al, 1948 ; Berelson et al, 1954 ; Blumler and 
McQuail, 1969). Later studies have confirmed this with respect 
to overtly party-political material (Sears and Chaffee, 1979; 
Davis, 1982; and Sigelman and Sigelman, 1984). Yet even this new 
orthodoxy has been challenged. The most recent literature 
emphasises stronger influence - albeit exerted in a more indirect 
fashion. A number of studies suggest that the media lead the 
public agenda in many respects (McLeod, Becker and Byrnes, 1974; 
McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Shaw, 1979). Noelle-Neumann has 
suggested that structure of media coverage is important. In a
media environment characterised by "consonance” in content 
(.."that is unanimous illumination, unanimous argumentation with 
regard to events, people and problems." pp.81, Noelle-Neumann, 
1981) mass communication channels gain the potential for powerful 
influence as selectivity options are reduced (Noelle-Neumann, 
1972; 1974; 1977).
Evidence has emerged which supports Noelle-Neumann's 
contention. Both Mosley and Adams hold that we can identify 
changes in the public's attitudes which take place in a context 
of (and as a function of) gross alterations in content across a 
varietv of media (Mosley, 1984 ; Adams, 1984). Moreover, it has 
been suggested that the media are strongly influential in 
moulding the opinions of individuals on matters which are beyond 
the range of the individual's personal experience (Klapper, 1968; 
Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur, 1976; Miller, 1983). The media are 
seen as having a particular influence on perceptions of, and 
attitudes towards objects and events beyond the realm of personal 
experience. The significance of this becomes apparent if we look 
at recent developments in the analysis of voting behaviour.
Contemporary work in the field of voting behaviour suggests 
that this area may overlap with the analysis of mass media 
effects. This overlap is most apparent in the research done on 
the relationship between economic conditions and government 
popularity.
In the United States there is an extensive literature on the 
connection between economic indicators and government popularity. 
Kiewiet and Kinder maintain that,
"By this evidence the political consequences of
macroeconomic conditions are both pervasive and
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powerful." (Kiewiet and Kinder, 1981, p.129).
In the British context a similar, though more complex
pattern seems to be evident (Whiteley, 1986). Mosley cites the
work of Goodhart and Bhansali, of Frey and Schneider, and of
Pissarides (Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970 ; Frey and Schneider,
1978 ; Pissarides, 1980) and notes of the rates of inflation,
unemployment and growth,
.."that political popularity is significantly 
correlated with all these indicators of the standard 
of living." (Mosley, 1982 p.3).
It has also been noted that coefficients increase in magnitude
and significance during periods of accelerated deterioration of
economic conditions (Mosley, 1978 ; Alt and Chrystal, 1981).
The relationship between economic conditions and government
popularity (or lack of it) has been explained traditionally in
Downsian terms. Individuals perceive the decline in their living
standards as the product of governmental performance and, on a
rational calculation of their own best interests, vote against
the offending party at election time. On the other hand, Kiewiet
and Kinder (ibid.) report that in the United States at least, a
number of recent studies show that there is a very weak link
between personal economic grievance or difficulty and voting
against the government party in congressional elections.
(Moreover, Converse and Campbell's assertion that the working
class will pursue their section interests - with the middle class
opposing it for the same reasons - is not borne out ; Cook,
1979). In direct contradiction to the Downsian thesis Kiewiet
and Kinder claim that their individual-level data shows, instead,
a strong connection between voter's perception of the national
11
economic situation (their ”sociotropic" perception) and 
subsequent voting behaviour (Kiewiet and Kinder, 1981).
There is now a growing body of comparative research which 
supports the sociotropic thesis (Reed and Brunk, 1984; Alford and 
Legge, 1984; Lewis-Beck, 1983). And Butler and Stokes give an 
analysis of the dual role of personal and 'global' judgements in 
conditioning public opinion and voting behaviour (Butler and 
Stokes, 1974).
If the sociotropic thesis is essentially correct there is 
an intuitively plausible case for suggesting that cues about the 
nation's economic health can only come from the media. This 
notion is reinforced by Kiewiet and Kinder's finding that there 
was a very low correlation between indices of personal well-being 
and perceptions of nation economic trends. For Kiewiet and 
Kinder global perceptions are not extrapolated from personal 
experience (Kiewiet and Kinder, 1981). Kiewiet and Kinder 
(ibid.), and Fiorina note that the strength of the element 
normally associated in media studies with selective perception 
(ie. partisanship) is itself affected by changing sociotropic 
perceptions (Fiorina, 1981). If this sociotropic thesis holds, 
and the media are the source of globally related attitudes, the 
relationship between audience and media may approximate to that 
which Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur feel is a necessary condition for 
powerful influence - "dependency".
Some work has been done in the British context which should 
encourage further examination of the sociotropic thesis and the 
media's role in presenting economic news. Mosley has shown the 
utility of focusing on media representations of economic trends
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(and here the Daily Mirror was focused upon) instead of aggregate
official statistics, ;
.."the proportion of the government's popularity lead 
that can be explained by economic and cycle variables 
rises from about 35% to about 47%. Furthermore, 
inflation, which is a barely significant variable over 
the whole period if official estimates are used, 
becomes highly significant if the Dailv Mirror figures 
are used in the regression." (Mosley, 1982, p.9).
Mosley's results appear, in this instance, to be fully consistent
with the sociotropic thesis, though do not amount to direct
support. Paper reports may simply reflect the effect of the
economy on the lives of people more accurately.
Distinctions in levels of perceptual imagery which are
consistent with sociotropic voting behaviour, are evident in a
number of studies. Dunleavy comments on how perceptions of the
individual's own trade union differ markedly from those on unions
in general (Dunleavy, 1980). Palmgreen and Clarke make the
distinction between the local and national agenda-setting
capabilities of the press (Palmgreen and Clark, 1977). Tyler and
Cook feel there is a useful distinction to be made between
personal and global judgements on the threat of crime (Tyler and
Cook, 1984). And something approaching the personal-global
distinction is carried in much of the Cultural Studies work on
encoding and decoding (Hall, 1980 ; Morley, 1980). More
interestingly Blumler, McQuail and Nossiter highlight the
personal-global form of perceptual distinction in their study of
young voters (one that Kinder and Kiewiet would be all too
familiar with). Individuals may, indeed, have different levels
of perception, but the importance of the respective levels has
yet to be closely examined using individual-level data. One of
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the objectives of our study is to address this issue.
A qualification has to be made here. The communication 
process (and its possible influence on voting behaviour) may 
operate at a variety of differing levels. While Kinder and 
Kiewiet distinguish between national and global perceptions. 
Husbands draws a trichotomous distinction. It is his assertion 
that if we hypothesise an economy-popularity relationship we must 
theorise the contextual as well as the personal and global levels 
(Husbands, 1985). This third, local, dimension is important in 
relation to our study. Kiewiet and Kinder found that sociotropic 
perceptions were not extrapolated from personal experiences or 
grievances. They did not, however, look at the individual's 
perception of the immediate local environment (the predicament 
or otherwise of neighbours and associates) . This is also the 
case in the comparative work on sociotropic voting. Our data 
will hopefully speak to this issue.
The question remains one of how best to address the issues 
which emerge from the growing literature on 'economic voting'. 
Our study employs a range of techniques from cross-country 
comparison, through time series analysis, to cross sectional and 
panel studies. Our own poll takes the form of a longitudinal, 
individual-level panel study following the same group of 
individuals over three separate contacts. This form of approach 
is very much in line with the contemporary appeals for more 
relevant and incisive data collection techniques. Peffley 
(Peffley, 1984) and Miller (Miller, 1986) have also noted the 
need for a careful examination of the role of the media in cuing 
the electorate in terms of economic trends. Moreover, Whiteley
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(Whiteley, 1986) has called for a more thorough examination of 
the influence of short-term economic fluctuations through panel 
data.
In the body of our research we address a number of salient 
questions. Can comparative techniques be used to explore and 
elaborate upon the impact of economic fluctuations? Are time 
series approaches sufficiently flexible to accommodate the 
complexities of attitude change? Do 'pocketbook' perceptions 
influence political preference? Are sociotropic beliefs distinct 
from, or related to, pocketbook and local perceptions? Do 
sociotropic attitudes independently influence political 
preference or behaviour? And finally, are sociotropic beliefs 
extrapolated from perceptions of the immediate environment?
We are also interested in exploring techniques for isolating 
that element of the community which is dependent on the mass 
media for economic information. Attribution of responsibility 
for economic turbulence is also a feature whose significance we 
want to explore. The importance of this attributional element 
has been emphasised by Peffley, Feldman and Lewis-Beck (Feldman, 
1982; Peffley, 1984 and Lewis-Beck, 1986). This notion has a 
bearing on our understanding of the development of partisanship. 
Conover and Feldman have tried to establish a link between 
attribution and affect which bridges this gap (Conover and 
Feldman, 1985). The field is under-explored in Britain, and it 
is our hope that the data we have accumulated will allow us to 
address these issues.
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CHAPTER TWO 
CLASS VOTING AND ITS RIVALS
2.1
Harold Wilson speaking in the mid-nineteen sixties declared 
that, "All political history shows that the standing of a 
government, and its ability to hold the confidence of the 
electorate at a general election depend on the success of its 
economic policy". Professional political analysts have taken a 
slightly different view. Their attempts to explain and predict 
electoral outcomes have focused, in turn, on the class 
composition of the electorate (Butler and Stokes, 1974, 1969), 
or on the individual's issue preferences or ideological 
predispositions (Himmelweit et al. 1985; Budge, 1982; Heath, 
Jowell and Curtice, 1985; Rose and McAllister, 1986). Latterly, 
there has been a renewed interest in the voter's expression of 
economic self-interest (Downs, 1957; Husbands, 1985; and Sanders 
et al, 1987); or in their territorial or geographical 
circumstances (Owens and Wade 1988; Miller, 1977, 1978).
The old orthodoxy that 'class equals party' has been the 
issue round which much of the debate has centred. The classical 
exposition of Butler and Stokes has been challenged by the 
evidence of increasing volatility, the rise of electorally strong 
centre parties and the emergence of alternative theories. The 
strongest contenders have been the 'issue voting' models which 
focus on the electorate's shopping list of issue preferences 
(both economic and political). Current attempts to resurrect the 
class thesis have hinged on an eclectic fusion of structural, 
sociological and attitudinal elements. Heath, Curtice and
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Jowell's approach takes a re-specified class definition and bonds 
it to examination of the electorate's underlying principles. 
Dunleavy and Husbands, on the other hand, take a broadly 
sociological approach and look at the relationship between the 
individual's structural position and their vulnerability to 
ideological indoctrination (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985) . It has 
also been established that at constituency level there is still 
a strong relationship between the individual's class or 
occupational milieu and his or her propensity to vote for the 
natural class party. Last, but not least, theorists have shown 
an interest in the application of sophisticated econometric 
techniques to the time series data on short-term, inter-election 
fluctuations in government popularity. Here the focus has been 
on macro-economic changes and their direct and indirect impact 
on the electorate's own economic expectations (Sanders, Ward and 
Marsh, 1987; Clarke, Mishler and Whiteley, 1990).
Plotting the 'behaviouralist' elements in what is after all 
the study of political behaviour may seem at first a little 
perverse. The behaviour of the electorate at the ballot box is, 
after all, the primary focus of most if not all of the studies 
cited, and the central dependent variable is the voting act. 
However, we hope to establish that there is an important 
difference between the analysis of electoral behaviour per se and 
the behaviouralist approach to the endeavour. We will argue that 
a behaviouralist appraisal of the current literature can clarify 
some of the problems associated with earlier studies. Moreover, 
it can highlight some of the shortcomings of the theoretical 
alternatives and offer a useful research agenda for the future.
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2 . 2
The behaviouralist approach we wish to pursue goes beyond
that described by Dahl as, :
••"attempt to improve our understanding of politics by 
seeking to explain empirical aspects of political life 
by means of methods, theories and criteria of proof 
that are acceptable according to the canons, 
conventions and assumptions of modern political 
science." (Dahl, 1961, p. 767)
It extends to a primary, if not an exclusive focus on the
behaviour, attitudes, cognitions, and emotions of the electorate.
The components can be grouped in different ways. Harrop and
Miller differentiate between 'attention', 'choices'
'perceptions', 'evaluations', 'associations', 'emotions' and
'images'(Harrop and Miller, 1987). Social psychologists would
be more comfortable with cognitions, evaluations and affect - or
more usually cognitions and affect (Zajonc, 1980; Conover and
Feldman 1985). Whatever the analytical distinctions, the
emphasis is on the relationship between what goes on inside the
individual's head and their overt behaviour.
A central element here is an emphasis on the accuracy,
reliability and validity of attitudinal measures. Certainly
within the discipline of social psychology a great deal of effort
has gone into the attempt to discern whether attitudinal
responses reflect underlying cognitive structures. The effort
to distinguish between cognitive structure and experimental
artifact is represented by the search for 'construct validity'
(Miller, 1978, pp.118-119). Furthermore, it is possible to do
this while avoiding the egregious errors of an earlier generation
of theorists who sought to incorporate this form of enterprise
within a structural functionalist framework (Parsons, 1951).
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The approach has a long, if occasionally less than 
distinguished history. It encompasses the analysis of political 
culture, socialisation, mass media effects, community power and 
the modelling of public opinion (Almond and Verba, 1963; Jennings 
and Neimi, 1981; Klapper, 1960; and Noelle-Neumann, 1981 and 
1987). The approach can be usefully contrasted with those 
studies which emphasise real interests, social roles or 
structurally determinate social positions (Jessop, 1974; Parkin, 
1971; Lukes 1974; Clegg, 1989, Cox et al., 1986). One of our 
central themes will be that a number of contemporary voting 
theories fail to make this distinction altogether; do so less 
than clearly; or conflate the two analytical strands in a 
conceptually uncomfortable fashion.
A further distinction will be made between what 
behaviouralists might consider 'circumstantial' as opposed to 
'material' evidence. The former concerns data that relates to 
attitudes, cognitions and emotions either indirectly or obliquely 
(where they are inferred rather than explored). The latter 
denotes the attempt to approach and measure these mental elements 
in a direct and accurate manner.
We decided not to undertake a comprehensive overview of the 
literature in the style of Scarbrough (Scarbrough, 1987), and 
felt it appropriate to focus instead on the landmark texts. We 
wanted to appraise their formative contribution to the discipline 
- in the terms described above. As a starting point we might 
focus on the work of Butler and Stokes (Butler and Stokes, 1969 
and 1974). Their attempt to describe accurately the nature of 
post war electoral behaviour will be appraised in terms of
19
evidential support and conceptual clarity. The focus can then 
turn to the recent literature on class voting and the 
behaviouralist interpretation of the attempts to reestablish the 
model. Again, the emphasis will be on the extent to which the 
data presented underpin satisfactorily the interpretation the 
authors offer.
The emphasis then shifts to those theorists offering 
alternatives. Issue voting models including those of Himmelweit 
and Budge (Himmelweit et al., 1985; Budge, 1982) will be 
critically examined, as will the evidence presented in the 
broader thesis of Rose and MacAllister (Rose and MacAllister, 
1986). That these authors present novel and interesting 
interpretations is not in dispute. What is, however, at issue 
is whether the theories can be considered conceptually plausible 
or evidentially substantial from a behaviouralist perspective. 
The different issue voting theories will be examined in the light 
of the ongoing debate on the substantive and methodological 
significance of the concept of partisanship.
The rational voting model of Antony Downs will be left to 
the following chapter. It has proved fertile in terms of 
research spin offs, but its conceptual underpinnings are rather 
different from those of the conventional voting model. It 
therefore merits separate attention.
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2.3
The early work on the relationship between class and party 
mirrored research done in the United States (Lazarsfeld et al., 
1948; Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960). The 
approach there was on the relationship between occupation, 
partisanship and voting behaviour. Evidence of the ignorance and 
lack of interest of the electorate led these theorists to down­
play the notions of the sophisticated voter making a rational 
choice between party programmes (Schumpeter, 1943). In the 
British context the seminal work of Butler and Stokes, drawing 
on earlier American studies sought to explore in more depth the 
link between social background, occupational class and voting 
behaviour.
The behaviouralist point of departure is quite evident from 
the opening paragraphs of the section on 'The Dominant Class 
Alignment'. They point out that, .."too little attention has 
been paid to the beliefs that link class to party in the voter's 
mind.", and that .."the system of ideas, the attitudes, motives 
and beliefs which lie behind the observed differences [in class 
support for the parties] have been largely neglected." (Butler 
and Stokes, ibid., p.67). The method employed in giving 
substance to the observed association is to examine the 
relationship between partisanship, class self-image and voting 
behaviour. The instruments used to measure these ideational 
elements are the familiar questionnaire items on strength of 
partisan affiliation, self-ascribed class and vote choice. The 
'objective' categorisation of respondents in terms of occupation 
leans towards a structuralist position. Yet Butler and Stokes
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make it clear that this is a form of shorthand only. The 
objective positions reflect the strong relationship between party 
self-image and occupational status {ibid., 1974, pp.78), and the 
respondent's descriptions of class characteristics in terms of 
occupation (p.70). In this sense the objective categories could 
be said to have ample ideational substance.
The relationship between class self-image and the 
respondent's party choice are further explored through the survey 
questions on perceived conflicts of class interest and expressed 
beliefs in class-related norms. A longitudinal dimension is 
given to the thesis by way of literature on political 
socialisation. Familial transmission and communal reinforcement 
of partisan attachments are seen as the root of inter- 
generational stability in voting patterns. The breakdown of this 
process, due in large measure to social mobility, is offered as 
an explanation of 'deviant', 'out-of-class' voting.
The attempt to frame an understanding of class voting in 
terms of the ideas, attitudes and perceptions of respondents 
would no doubt be applauded by behaviouralists. However, it is 
possible to take issue with Butler and Stokes' interpretation of 
the data and to question their conclusions. The first point that 
can be made concerns the strength of the relationship between 
self-ascribed class and political identification. A cross 
tabulation of partisan self-image and class self-image supports 
Butler and Stokes' thesis :
Table 2.1 Partisan Self Image Against Class Self Image
{ibid. p.77) Class Self-Image
Middle Working
Partisan Cons. 79% 28%
Self-Image Labour 21% 72%
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Yet the picture is less clear when we look at 'objective' 
indicators of occupational class and class self-image. With 
Class I as 'Higher Managerial', Class II as 'Lower Managerial', 
Class III as 'Supervisory Non-Manual', Class IV as 'Lower Non- 
Manual', Class V as 'Skilled Manual', and Class VI as 'Unskilled 
Manual' the cross tabulation looks a little more ambiguous : 
Table 2.2 Class Self Image Against Occupational Status 
(ibid, p.78) Occupational Status
I II III IV I V VI
Middle Class 80% 60% 57% 46% 26% 20%
Working Class 20% 40% 43% 54% " 74% 80%
For Classes II, III and IV the relationship is less than clearly 
defined. Individuals are almost as likely to say middle class 
as working class. The looseness does not give warrant for the 
conclusion that, "The close alignment of occupational level and 
class self-image accords well with our evidence that occupation 
is the most important of the elements that characterise the 
classes in the public's mind." (ibid., pp.73).
From the behaviouralist point of view there is a danger here 
of slipping from the use of categories which have ideational 
content to those where the content is less than clearly defined. 
Denver notes the propensity for voting researchers and opinion 
pollsters to use occupation as a shorthand for class (Denver, 
1989). The risk here is of moving from a conceptualisation of 
class as a complex community of ideas, to an abstracted and over­
generalised category. While Butler and Stokes are at pains to 
deny the determinist appreciation of their data, there is a sense 
of movement in the direction of 'objectification' in their 
statement that.
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"Because of the preeminent importance of occupation we 
shall use it in most cases as a measure of class 
location, although we shall often consult the 
individual's image of his own class and occasionally 
turn to other 'objective' influences" (ibid., p73).
Butler and Stokes do, however, go beyond the straight­
forward cross tabulation in fleshing out the substance of class 
perceptions and their relation to party support. They do this 
by means of the analysis of open-ended responses to a number of 
questions. They take the form, 'Is there anything you 
particularly like/dislike about the Conservative/Labour Party?'. 
The responses are coded and grouped into discrete categories. 
These relate to perceptions of politics as class conflict; and 
politics as the representation of rather more diffuse class 
interests. The third category is established in the respondent's 
articulation of 'class norms'.
The reports of the exercise fill only six of the book's five 
hundred pages and comprise the verbatim reports of responses 
deemed typical. As an extension of this exercise Butler and 
Stokes also asked respondents to place the Labour and 
Conservative Parties on a semantic differential scale. The poles 
of the scale represented descriptions of the parties as 'middle 
class' and 'working class'. In their estimation 90% of 
respondents place the Conservatives towards the middle class end 
of the scale and 83% place the Labour party near the working 
class pole. Finally, Butler and Stokes pool responses from the 
open-ended questions to their three models of how class interests 
are manifest :
[see overpage]
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Table 2.3 The Nature of Political Beliefs
Nature of Belief 
Politics as representing 
opposed class interests 
Politics representing simple 
class interests 
Politics as expression of class 
political norms 
No interest-related or normative 
content
Cons.
Middle
Class
Total
13%
12
10
65
100% 
n = 96
Labour
Working
Class
39%
47
5
9
100% 
n = 301
Butler and Stokes feel they have established the nature of 
the perceptual link between class and party. Individuals express 
more or less clearly defined collective interests, and respond 
to class related group norms. For Butler and Stokes the Labour 
Party in particular is associated in the minds of many with the 
working class and their perceived interests. The behaviouralist 
would applaud the way in which the available attitudinal data is 
used to flesh out the concept of 'class' in the class-party 
relationship. What might be disputed is the effectiveness with 
which this is done. There are four substantive, largely 
methodological, criticisms that can be made of Butler and Stokes' 
interpretation. They form a critique of the notion that an 
ideation community underpins their class categories.
The first concerns the use of open-ended questions. Butler 
and Stokes give verbatim reproductions of comments which are 
representative of what they describe as (A) 'opposed class 
interests', (B) 'simple representations of class interests' and 
(C) 'partisan group norms' (ibid. p.83-89). Among these are, 
respectively,
(A) What one man disliked about the Conservative Party : "Their
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representation of unearned capital. Their disregard for 
the working classes. They are solely a money class 
representing high finance, which is detrimental to the 
prosperity of the country and the people".
What one woman thought of Labour : "I don't like their
attitude towards richer people - that they are the ones who 
should pay for all the extras and help that the poor people 
get. "
(B) The reason one woman likes Labour : "Mr. Wilson is a man 
who will stand by his word. They are really out to help 
the working class."
(C) Different respondents note : "I always vote for them
[Labour]. It's the working man's place to vote Labour."
"I feel they [the Conservatives] are more in keeping with 
my station in life."
Yet the analysts here seem less than fully sensitive to the
problems inherent in the categorising, ordering and coding of
data gleaned from unstructured interviews or responses. The
responses they cite do seem to give the genuine flavour of
expressed class perceptions. But it must be borne in mind that
Butler and Stokes only quote a small fraction of those
interviewed. For the category of 'opposed class interests' this
amounts to five respondents. For the 'class norms' section three
abbreviated responses are quoted; for the 'simple representation
of class' element only two.
The room for ambiguity is most obvious in Butler and Stokes'
consideration of the category of 'simple representations of
class'. Two quotes (from the only two individuals cited) are of
interest here. The first from a miner's wife from the Don
Valley; the second a bricklayer's wife from Ayrshire :
(1) [Likes about Labour] "Well , I think we'd be 
better off if they got in. They would do more for the 
working classes."
(2) [Why do working class people mainly vote Labour?] 
"Because they think Labour will do things for them and 
get things to suit their income." (pp.86 & 87)
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It is far from clear in this respect that the utterances conform 
to Butler and Stokes' notion of class solidarity. They see the 
voter's cognitive map embracing a positive, three-way 
relationship between class, party and self (ibid., pp.98). A 
plausible alternative reading from the quoted passages might 
suggest a less class-solidaristic conception. The relationship 
between the individual and his or her class is one of association 
rather than solidarity. They associate themselves with a 
particular group though not necessarily seeing that association 
in term of mutual self interest. The two perspectives can be 
represented graphically ;
Figure 2.1 Class, Party and Self ; Competing Views
Bulter/Stokes Alternative
Party Party
^ \  ^ + /  \  + 
Self —  Class Self - - - - Class
+
Butler and Stokes suggest the voter makes a positive 
connection between him or herself and their party. At the same 
time an empathetic connection is made between self and class. 
The last element in the equation links the individual's class 
with a particular party. An alternative understanding might link 
self and party, and class and party. But the link between self 
and class is altogether less clearly recognised. And if that 
link is tenuous we are left (in the last two verbatim reports 
above) with an instrumentalist appreciation.
The central problem here is that it is almost impossible to 
tell from the verbatim report of a few open-ended responses, 
which of the two models is 'correct'. The first emphasises class
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solidarity. The latter can suggest, or is at least consistent 
with, an instrumentalist perspective in the mind of the voter. 
Here the self-to-class connection is unclear or ambiguous. The 
instrumentalist appreciation of party activity has been studied 
elsewhere (Whiteley, 1983). But with respect to partisan 
affiliation the point being laboured is that the data produced 
by unstructured interviews is notoriously difficult to handle and 
interpret. Butler and Stokes are thus in no sense 'wrong' in 
their reading of reports. Yet in view of the lack of a coherent, 
clear and reproducible coding strategy, one reading or 
interpretation seems as valid as the next.
The difficulties in dealing with this form of data (and, 
indeed, with presenting it with economy of space) also confronts 
researchers in other branches of political science. Lewis, 
working on audience appreciation of news acknowledges that 
ordering unstructured responses reliably and unambiguously is 
extremely difficult (Lewis, 1986). Analysts confronted with the 
problem of making sense of, or ordering diverse and idiosyncratic 
responses are also reduced to quoting large chunks verbatim, as 
Butler and Stokes do. In Morley's study of the 'Nationwide' 
audience, interview responses are extensively reproduced,
.."because of the absence of any adequate method which would 
enable us to formalise and condense the particular responses into 
consistent linguistic and/or ideological categories." (Morley, 
1980, p.163, emphasis original).
Nowhere do Butler and Stokes elaborate the criteria they 
employ in ordering the data used to construct Table 4.9 
(reproduced above) . This is not to deny the reports they
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deliver, but simply to draw attention to the concept of class as 
expressed by the broader sample. There are enough gaps in Butler 
and Stokes's data presentation for us to consider further 
exploration of the construct validity of their conceptualisation 
of class (Miller, 1978) . Here we run into a second difficulty - 
the operationalisation of class self-image.
Butler and Stokes probe class self-image with the question, 
"Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to a particular 
social class?" (asking a randomly selected half sample). They 
report that for the 1964 questionnaire only .."about half"., the 
sample answer in the affirmative (actually exactly half). This 
hardly seems to justify the statement that, "The replies offer 
remarkable evidence of the primacy of 'middle' and 'working' 
class designations" (ibid., pp.68). They go on to prompt this 
half of the overall sample with the question, "Most people say 
they belong to either the middle or to the working class. If you 
had to make a choice, would you call yourself middle class or 
working class?". Not surprisingly the number placing themselves 
in a class category jumps from 50% to 93%, with 7% "don't know".
The other randomly selected section of the sample are asked 
a straightforward prompt question to start off with ("There's 
quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. 
Most people say they belong to either the middle class or the 
working class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of 
these classes?"). The number replying in the affirmative is only 
60% in 1964, although again, with further pressing, only 13% 
refuse a class self-categorisation.
Assessing the relevance of unprompted class self-ascription
29
in the 1963 - 70 series as a whole is quite difficult. The 
picture is complicated by the splitting of samples and use of 
subtly different questions for subsections of their longitudinal 
panel. However, a flavour of the results can be seen from the 
comparison of prompted and unprompted responses :
Table 2.4 Class Ascription ; Prompted Versus Unprompted 
PROMPTED (ibid., 1974, p.477)
Thinking in terms of class 1963 1964 1966 1969 1970
'yes' 66% 60% 66% na. 66%
UNPROMPTED (ibid., 1974, p.477)
Thinking in terms of class 1963 1964 1966 1969 1970
'yes' na. 50% 40% 30% 43%
The responses explored above are used to give substance to 
the concept of class interest. They also served to vindicate the 
use of 'objective' occupational categories as shorthand for a 
collection of concrete, intra-class perceptions. On a close 
reading of results there can be less confidence that Butler and 
Stokes are justified in either respect. The difficulty starts 
with interpreting forced question responses, and the work of 
Asche and Noelle-Neumannn's work is testament to the difficulty 
in distinguishing the socially acceptable from the genuine 
response (Asche, 1952; Noelle-Neumann, 1977). The public, in 
their wish to please, still have the annoying capacity to give 
an answer - any answer - where a non-response might be more 
appropriate.
When we go on to the unprompted questions there are problems 
with the reliability of the responses (in 1964 50% place
themselves in a class; 30% in 1969; and 43% in 1970). What 
validity do we give to the structural integrity of class if
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unprompted self ascription fluctuates between a half and one
third in five years? If we look to other elements in the surveys
we find more difficulty in giving construct validity to the
concept of class. In 1963 - and 1963 alone - a question on class
solidarity asked :
"Some people feel they have a lot in common with other 
people of their own class, but others don't feel this 
way so much. How about you? Would you say you feel 
pretty close to other [mid./work, class] people or 
that you don't feel much closer to them than you do 
people in other classes?" (ibid., 1969, pp.478).
The question is balanced and does not prompt the respondent - 
even if the response categories are convoluted. Only 55% said 
they felt 'pretty close', while 45% said they did not feel this 
way or did not know (34% and 10% respectively) . The respondents 
are not tested on this in later surveys. Butler and Stokes do 
not explore the results beyond the simple presentation of the 
percentages in the appendices. The '55%' might have alerted 
Butler and Stokes to the low incidence of unprompted class self­
ascription (50% in 1964) , but in the event nothing is made of 
this.
Butler and Stokes present what the behaviouralists would 
deem 'material' evidence for existence of class self-awareness. 
The direct focus is upon the expressed attitudes and preferences; 
on the concrete perceptions of the surveyed sample. The problem 
is with the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. The 
responses to open ended questions are presented as self 
explanatory. The criteria for ordering the data are not laid 
before us and ambiguities in interpretation are only cursorily 
explored. This would concern us less than it does if the class 
terms under scrutiny were clear and unambiguous. But attempts
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to gauge the construct validity of class self image suggests 
altogether more difficult attitudinal terrain.
Leaving aside for a moment the question of construct 
validity, it is also important to look at the numbers of 
responses examined. That number will determine the extent to 
which Butler and Stokes' conclusions can be generalised. If we 
look back to their composite Table 4.9 (reproduced at the top of 
p. 10 above) it must be noted that we are only dealing with a sub­
sample. The answers are culled from, .."respondents whom we 
interviewed three times from 1963 to 1966 and who held throughout
the period consistent class and party allegiance (ibid.,
1974, p.91). The sub-sample here amounts to 1163 (ibid., 1974, 
p.432 & 436), of which only 397 are middle class Conservatives 
or working class Labour supporters (amounting to 34.1%). Those 
in both categories giving class based responses number 308, this 
representing only 26% of the sub-sample as a whole.
Butler and Stokes err on the side of understatement when 
they note that,
"Such a categorisation is far from including every 
elector whose vote conforms to the dominant political 
tendency of his class. Many happen to vote 'with' the 
majority of their class for reasons that have nothing
to do with class interests or norms." (ibid., 1974,
p.91) .
They can rescue the class thesis if they are referring here to 
partisan socialisation and reinforcement within the family and 
community. The emphasis is still on the class related 
attachments, but the weight is more on 'circumstantial' evidence. 
Butler and Stokes refer to the strong evidence for inter- 
generational transmission of partisan affiliations. Their 
analysis also tends to suggest that attachments that are not
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class-typical are a function of inter-class mobility (ibid., 
1974, pp.49-58, 101-02). Political socialisation theory was
fairly well developed by the early 1970s and the confidence 
Butler and Stokes have in it is, therefore, not particularly 
surprising. However, subsequent studies have highlighted 
important theoretical and substantive weaknesses in the political 
socialisation material (Kavanagh, 1983).
The critical assault on the socialisation literature has two 
dimensions. The first looks at the accumulated data. Some of 
the earliest, path breaking work was based on secondary analysis 
of data; many of the original experiments were done on students 
(Hyman, 1959). Subsequent studies suggest much weaker
relationships than was originally thought (Jennings and Neimi, 
1981). Research has shown there to be a relationship between 
parental partisanship and earlv childhood affiliations - but this 
is not extended to adult behaviour (MacAllister and Kelly, 1985). 
Critics have also pointed out the deficiencies of 'pair- 
correspondence' (Marsh, 1971) . This is the method used by Butler 
and Stokes, and it involves asking respondents about the partisan 
affiliations of parents. The method has, however, been shown to 
be rather weak. The room for misperception and inaccuracy has 
been shown to be substantial (Marsh, ibid.).
These deficiencies notwithstanding, there are interpretive 
difficulties even where pair-correspondence is established beyond 
dispute. The dilemma faced is the old one of disentangling 
correlation and causation. In the absence of clear and 
unambiguous evidence of familial transmission, a re­
interpretation of pair-correspondence is at least admissible.
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The emphasis is not on the breakdown of socialisation and 
community reinforcement, or indeed, on 'resocialisation' in a 
different location. Here the concept is of endogenous processes 
functioning or failing to function. An alternative
conceptualisation could imply that exogenous variable(s) impinge 
uniformly on the parental and child generations. Social class 
mobility weakens the class-party relationship. But this might 
be due to exogenous influences impacting on the individual 
occupying a different social location. Hypothetically, a menu 
of exogenous influences could be quite extensive. It might 
include the effect of government policy on material wellbeing. 
The impact of event on the development of political principles 
might figure, as could the response to the broader political 
platforms of the parties. All of these have figured in 
contemporary alternatives to the 'class-party' thesis. These 
themes are pursued by Butler and Stokes, but are thought to offer 
little beyond negligible, short-term influences after class 
position is taken into consideration.
The object of the analysis here is not to deny the 'class- 
party' thesis in its entirety. Butler and Stokes quite rightly 
make reference to respondents' ideas of why their parents voted 
for their chosen party. Class issues do figure much more 
prominently here (ibid., 1974, pp.93). For the adult generation 
the notion of class position and solidarity may well have been 
of signal importance. Rather, the object is to highlight some 
of the weaknesses in their conceptualisation of the underlying 
ideational terrain - especially in respect to the postwar 
generation. Class self-identification, perceived mutual
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interests and the reference point of group norms are integral 
elements of the 'class-party' thesis. Their accurate measurement 
has a direct bearing on the evaluation of that thesis. In the 
light of the above criticism it can be suggested that Butler and 
Stokes's class-party relationship cannot be accepted in its 
entirety - at least not in its unadorned form.
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2.4
The 1970s and 1980s have seen the erosion of the 
relationship between class and party outlined by Butler and 
Stokes (Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt, 1977; Franklin, 1985; Sarlvik and 
Crewe, 1983; Whiteley, 1986). A behaviouralist oriented 
interpretation of the decline can be seen in the theorists of 
issue voting (Himmelweit et al,, 1985, Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983; 
Rose and MacAllister, 1986; Budge, 1982). The class party thesis 
has, however, been resurrected by Dunleavy and Husbands, and by 
Heath, Jowell and Curtice (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985; Heath, 
Jowell and Curtice, 1985). The thrust is partly structuralist, 
partly behaviouralist. It is to these authors that we now turn.
The class schema Heath, Jowell and Curtice outline comprises 
five distinctive elements (Salariat, Routine Non-Manual, Petty 
Bourgeoisie, Foremen/Technicians and Working Class). The 
definitions are somewhat different from Butler and Stokes and 
draws heavily on the work of Goldthorpe on social stratification. 
Broadly speaking, the analysts maintain that the root of class 
solidarity remain intact. While the working class is now much 
reduced in size and the class composition of society is more 
complex than it was hitherto, relative class positions are still 
the same. Class interests are still as likely to be structured 
as a function of position in the labour market (ibid., pp.35-38).
Despite the sophisticated nature of their class definition, 
it does not fully succeed in differentiating party support :
(see over page)
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Table 2.5 Heath Curtice and Jowell 'Class' Against Vote
{ibid., p.20) Party Supported
Con. Lab. Alii. Other 
Salariat 54% 14% 31% 1% - 100%
Routine Nonmanual 46 25 27 2 - 100%
Petty Bourgeoisie 71 12 17 0 - 100%
Foremen/Technicians 48 26 25 1 - 100%
Working Class 30 49 20 1 - 100%
The table only seems surprising in relation to the petty
bourgeoisie grouping. Otherwise the differences between the
classes are not particularly striking if we take the Alliance
vote as an 'out-of-class' vote (Crewe, 1986). This central
deficiency of the model is one that also plagues Heath, Jowell
and Curtice's calculation of the 'odds ratio' (Scarbrough, 1987).
The analysts do go on to flesh out their concept with an
exploration of the core principles dominant in the respective
classes and we will return to these below. However, for the 1983
election at least, the relationship between the categories of
class and voting behaviour is nothing like as close as it was in
the 1960s.
Dunleavy and Husbands' seem to employ a more structuralist
approach. The difference in emphasis is apparent in the
following statements. Heath, Jowell and Curtice point out that,
••"the subjective awareness of class interests is
clearly important• However much political scientists
may instruct the classes in their 'objective 
interests', these will be translated into political 
action only if there is some subjective grasp of them^
A class theory of politics must assume class 
differences in attitudes and values as well as in 
objective conditions." (ibid., 1985, p.38; emphasis 
original)•
The behaviouralist tone is fairly evident here and can perhaps
be contrasted with Dunleavy and Husband's statement that,
"People will not necessarily (and perhaps not often) 
articulate the influence of their social location in
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structuring their votes - the phenomenon may be 
objectively apparent to an analyst without being 
explicitly recognized by voters as involved in their 
decisions.(ibid., p.18-19).
The approach here might be said to be Durkheimian in its emphasis 
on 'social facts'. The hoary old question of causation is, 
however, as relevant here as it is elsewhere. There is no need 
to go as far as Taylor-Gooby in criticising the authors for 
obscurantism in this respect (Taylor-Gooby, 1986). However, the 
point is that we cannot assume class interests and perceptions 
from the correspondence of class and voting categories 
(regardless of how intuitively appealing they are as explanations 
of the relationship).
Dunleavy and Husbands frame their concept of class in terms 
of position in a complex web of social production, consumption 
and labour. They go on to bond their theory to what 
behaviouralists might consider to be concrete, attitudinal 
foundations. They hypothesise a complex relationship between 
objective structural position and voting preference. Class 
position conditions receptiveness to dominant ideological 
messages emanating from the mass media. The blandishments of the 
political parties transmitted by the media are of similar 
importance (ibid., pp.19-20 and 110-17) . The partisan alignments 
of voters develop in tandem with issue positions. The latter are 
in no sense the cause of the former; both are a product of the 
complex relationship between structural position, mass media 
'message' and party intervention.
Attempts to confirm the thesis of Dunleavy and Husbands have 
been less than wholly successful. The assertion that structural 
position is closely related to vote is directly challenged by a
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number of authors (Franklin and Page, 1984; Taylor-Gooby, 1986; 
Rose and MacAllister, 1986; Whiteley, 1986). Scarbrough on the 
other hand suggests that Dunleavy and Husbands' 1000-plus sample 
is too small to test the complexity of the thesis : it is too 
small to control for all of the many structural positions 
hypothesised (Scarbrough, 1987, p.229).
The analysis of the attitudinal impact of the mass media 
might also be challenged. Dunleavy and Husbands rightly draw 
attention to the question of the role of newspapers as source of 
political information. However, we might question the 
implication that this confers power on the printed media. 
Barnett confirms that Dunleavy and Husbands are essentially 
correct, but also that the press are the least trusted of media 
(Barnett, 1989). The I.B.A. survey cited shows that the 
tabloids are trusted to give the most accurate news by only 8% 
of the population - as opposed to 67% for television (ibid., 
pp.52-53). Bearing in mind that source characteristics are an 
important focus for study of persuasive communication (McQuail,
1987), the picture - from a behaviouralist point of view - 
becomes a little more confused.
The situation is further complicated by the method Dunleavy 
and Husbands use to test the thesis that the press realise the 
ideational potential inherent in the individual's structural 
position. The focus is on the editorial slant of the papers 
read, the individual's structural position and their voting 
behaviour. There are problems with this approach from the 
behaviouralist perspective. It is apparent from research that 
some individuals are and some are not aware of the political
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stance of their newspapers (Newton in Drucker, 1986). This 
element is not fully incorporated in the analysis, and it is 
difficult to see how this might be achieved.
The focus is on editorial line and structural position of 
the reader. The evidence here - from a behaviouralist position - 
is 'circumstantial' rather than 'material'. Class is defined 
in terms of objective position. The editorial line derived from 
the paper's political support during the general election - a 
technique which can underestimate the diversity and variety of 
material that stimulate the individual in inter-election periods. 
However, Dunleavy and Husbands rightly point out that we cannot 
plot the impact of a single paper on the individual's political 
dispositions,
"Rather our concern should be with the overall level 
of pluralism in the mass media messages to which 
voters are exposed." (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985, 
p.112)
Given this assumption it is surprising that they leave out of 
consideration of those who do not read a newspaper - a group 
constituting 16% of the sub-sample they analyze (ibid., pp.117). 
Furthermore, underplaying the work on the vulnerability rather 
than the power of the press (Miller, 1982) , Dunleavy and Husbands 
go on to look at the difference between the percentage of 
Conservative and Labour votes amongst groups of newspapers 
characterised by their editorial line. There is, however, a 
problem in interpreting the table reproduced below - one which 
also afflicts Heath, Jowell and Curtice's odds ratio :
(see over page)
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Table 2.6 'Class' and Media Exposure Against Vote 
ibid., p.117)
Lab Con All Con (*)
Overall over
Press ExDosure Class Lab
Tory Influence Non-Manual 6% 74% 20% +68 +48
Manual 30 43 27 +13 -14
Mainly Tory Non-Manual 17 54 28 +37 + 9
Manual 26 52 22 +26 + 4
Minimal/None Non-Manual 13 39 48 +26 -
Manual 50 16 34 -34 —
Mixed Influence Non-Manual 25 48 27 +23 —
Manual 49 23 28 -34 —
Non-Tory Infl. Non-Manual 48 22 30 -26 - 4
Manual 71 10 19 — 61 +42
Third party voting tends to confuse the issue. The calculation 
of the Conservative lead over Labour tends to overestimate the 
impact of editorially Conservative newspapers. If we calculate 
the Conservative lead over the non-Conservatives - the right hand 
column marked (*) - the picture is altogether more complicated 
and difficult to interpret^.
In the 'Tory Influence' sector the Conservative over non- 
Conservative lead is markedly reduced for non-manuals and 
reverses for manuals. In the 'Mainly Tory' category the 
Conservative lead over non-Conservatives is negligible in both 
manual and non-manual classes. The situation is a little more 
complicated in the 'Non-Tory Influence' group. The Labour over 
non-Labour lead is both negative and negligible for non-manuals, 
although it is quite pronounced for manual workers.
For the difference (*) in the 'Non-Tory Influence' 
category the calculation is for Labour against non-Labour, 
reflecting the likely balance of editorial encouragement between 
Labour and the Alliance and Conservatives
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The conclusions that can be drawn from the re-analyzed table 
fall far short of clear support for the thesis that class and 
media are conjoined to conditioning vote. Perhaps we could not 
expect a definitive analysis study based on a relatively small 
sample. Dunleavy and Husbands should be applauded for examining 
the role of the mass media - an element conspicuously absent from 
other class oriented work (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1985 and 
Heath et al 1990) . However, bearing in mind Dunleavy and 
Husbands' view of the secondary importance of issue preferences, 
and their focus on 'ideological vulnerability', the ambiguity in 
their results must represent a weakness in the thesis.
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2.5
The class-party relationship can be reestablished if we 
choose to look not at individual level, but at constituency level 
processes. The work of Miller and of Owens and Wade suggest that 
at constituency level the balance of classes (and particularly 
the numbers of those in the middle class) are important in 
determining voting patterns (Miller, 1977 and 1978; Owens and 
Wade, 1988). Indeed, the class composition of the constituency 
is held to be of greater significance than the occupational 
status of the individuals that constitute it.
From a strictly behaviouralist perspective there are two 
problems with this form of analysis. The first is that although 
the studies highlight the predictive validity of class at the 
constituency level, the underlying processes at work are under­
explored. Consensual crystallisation and/or abrasive class 
interaction are consistent with the results, but the processes 
themselves do not figure directly in the studies. Scarbrough 
points out that the examination of underlying processes has been 
hampered by the failure of election studies to focus on local 
occupational, familial or friendship networks (Scarbrough, 1987, 
p.240). As such, the court is still out in terms of individual 
level validation of the findings.
The second problem revolves round the issue of the 
determination of what constitutes the local environment. Miller 
chooses the constituency as the unit of analysis. This is 
scarcely surprising as it allows the use of Census data to sketch 
constituency class profiles. However, the constituency is, in 
behaviouralist terms, a fairly arbitrary unit of analysis which
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need not in any sense correspond to the electorate's self-defined 
notions of the 'immediate' local environment. These
conceptualisations could, hypothetically, range from the 'citizen 
of the world' perspective to a narrow back street parochialism. 
This intuitively plausible notion clouds the interpretation of 
Miller and of Owens and Wade's work.
Psephologists have not, however, focused on class 
categorisations alone (either at individual or constituency 
level). As noted already, Dunleavy and Husbands look at social 
class and vulnerability to ideological manipulation. This is 
analogous to the position taken by Heath, Jowell and Curtice. 
Instead of 'vulnerability' the metaphor is horticultural : social 
positions are 'fertile ground' for the development of groups of 
political values or principles^. The notion of giving 
ideational substance to the concept of class specific or, rather, 
class-related structures is in the tradition of Butler and 
Stokes. The emphasis is behaviouralist; the datum, attitudinal. 
The question remains whether Heath, Jowell and Curtice achieve 
their objective; whether the connection between class and values 
is established beyond doubt.
The initial attempt to flesh out the ideational substance 
of class values takes the form of a cross tabulation of social 
class and responses to five questionnaire items. The items refer 
to nationalisation, redistribution, job creation, trade union 
legislation and private education. The questions were,
(1) 'whether some of the industries that are now
 ^ The analytical distinction between these values and the 
'issues' favoured by Himmelweit et al., Crewe, and Rose and 
MacAllister is difficult to characterise.
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nationalised should become private companies.'
(2) 'whether income and wealth should be redistributed 
towards ordinary working people.'
(3) 'whether the government should spend more money to 
create jobs.'
(4) 'whether the government should introduce stricter 
laws to regulate the activities of trade unions.'
(5) 'whether the government should get rid of private 
education in Britain.'
The results show some signs of grouping, but do seem more
ambiguous than Heath, Jowell and Curtice give credit :
Table 2.7 Heath Curtice and Jowell 'Class' Against Issues
(ibid., p.18)
% Agreeing With 'Right-Wing' Alternative
National. Redistrib. Job Creat. TU Leais. Educ. 
Salariat 50 49 27 64 76
Routine NonMan 37 3 3 17 61 66
Petty Bourg. 60 60 32 71 77
Foremen/Technic. 40 41 20 55 71
Working Class 24 25 10 46 53
Heath, Jowell and Curtice note that, "However, while table 2.2
shows definite class differences in values, it would be quite
wrong to think of society as polarised." (ibid., pp.19). A less
generous reading of the figures is possible. We might suggest
the grounds for support of the notion of 'definite class
differences' are rather weak. The 'petty bourgeois' group do
look quite distinct. However, the differences between the
'Working class' and, especially, 'Routine Non-Manuals' on
nationalisation, redistribution and job creation are less than
startling. On trades union legislation the 'Working Class' do
not look all that different from the 'Foremen and Technicians',
who in turn do not stand out from the 'Routine Non-Manuals'.
Moreover, there are many cells where the division approaches 50
: 50 or 60 : 40. This is so with the Salariat, Petty Bourgeoisie
and Foremen on nationalisation, redistribution and trade union
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legislation; and with the Salariat, Routine Non-Manuals, Foremen 
and Working Class on trade union legislation. On private 
education the Working Classes look quite different from the rest, 
but here too it was split quite evenly for and against.
Heath, Jowell and Curtice do go on to explore the theme of 
class-related values and voting. They do this by looking at 
Conservative and Labour voter's attitudes to six specific issues 
or values ;
Table 2.8 Issues Against Vote 
(ibid., p.109)
% Agreeing with Right-wina Alternative
Conservative Labour
Voters Voters
Nationalisation 66 12
Trade Union Legislation 84 29
Income Redistribution 59 12
Defence Spending 82 37
Private Education 87 43
Job Creation 35 2
A two-dimensional 'ideological position' map is also constructed
(ibid., p.118). One dimension is composed of attitudes for or
against nuclear weapons; the other from attitudes for or against
nationalisation. Heath, Jowell and Curtice note that not only
do Conservative and Labour voters differ markedly on their
acceptance of right-wing alternatives, but they congregate in the
expected quarters of the 'issue' or 'principle' map.
Leaving aside the question of where and through what 
processes the individual develops his or her issue or value 
preferences, this approach - like all other issue approaches - 
is dogged by the problem of partisan interference^. Is the
 ^The work of Sarlvik and Crewe (Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983), 
and of Himmelweit (Himmelweit et al, 1985) suffers in similar 
degree. The latter is also criticised for generalising from a
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individual stating an issue or value position because he or she 
is a partisan and more or less loosely associates that issue or 
value with a party? Or is the individual a partisan because of 
their issue preferences or values? This is particularly 
difficult to tease out with respect to the complex notion of 
values.
It is clear which direction of causation Heath, Jowell and 
Curtice favour. They note that, .."we interpret these questions 
as tapping people's underlying values which they most often take 
for granted , but which nonetheless shape their perceptions and 
evaluations of specific events, personalities and policies." 
(ibid., p.111). The problem is further complicated by the focus 
on the issues of nuclear weapons and nationalisation (although 
they do admit that other questions would do as well). The point 
is (as they also note) that these were chosen .."largely because 
they are the most politicised of the class and liberal issues 
respectively.." (ibid., p.118, emphasis added). Yet it is 
precisely the high profile, highly politicised issues that voters 
can effectively filter in a partisan fashion. The possibility 
remains that the tables in this respect are merely testimony to 
the electorate's more or less clear association of 
nationalisation and denuclearisation with Labour (and of 
denationalization and nuclear deterrence with the Conservatives) .
From a behaviouralist perspective there is more to the 
concept of 'ideology' than the response to five questionnaire 
items can adequately fill. Heath, Jowell and Curtice do not
sample which attrition skewed towards the middle classes 
(Dunleavy, 1981).
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explore the problem in much depth. Nor do those authors with a 
similar line of approach - most notably Sarlvik and Crewe 
(Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983, pp.281-313). They are interested in 
the individual's perception of the parties' position on a range 
of issues. These perceptions are then related to individual's 
personal preferences to show a close association with voting 
intention. However, exactly the same problem surfaces here. 
Do individuals fit their issue perceptions to their partisan 
self-image or does the self-image develop as a function of issue 
preference?
The resolution of the problem can turn either on denying 
the independence of partisanship from voting intention, thereby 
defining it out of existence*, or by examining the construct 
validity of the attitudinal terms themselves. Here the issue or 
'principle' items do not fare particularly well.
Butler and Stokes' work on issue instability and ignorance 
questioned the notion of the impact of issues on voting 
behaviour. In the later work of Crewe and Sarlvik there is also 
considerable evidence of voters' misperception or ignorance of 
the position of parties (Table 9.1, Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983). 
The table is too large to reproduce here, but in four of the six 
issue categories between thirty and fifty per cent of respondents 
either misperceived the party's position or could not offer an 
answer. This is significant, as the survey was done after the 
1979 election, where, for around a month, the electorate had been
* "To a substantial extent, party identification is 
tautological. Demonstrating a high correlation between party 
identification and party vote supports the hypothesis that these 
are but two names for the one thing." (Rose and MacAllister, 
1986, p.132).
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bombarded by party propaganda from the press and televisual 
hustings.
The work of Dunleavy and Husbands with regard to 'non­
attitudes' is also significant. By asking a battery of questions 
on issues, and in some instances reversing the wording, they were 
able to expose a high degree of inconsistency in responses 
(Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985, p.175-79). Again the results 
undermine the notion that attitudinal indices relate 
unambiguously to issue positions or tap 'real' ideational 
constructs. Furthermore, studies of children and young adults 
have shown a lamentable ignorance of politics. What little work 
that has been done on the knowledge of electors suggests that 
they are still not fully in charge of the facts on policy - they 
lack even basic knowledge and show little analytical 
sophistication (Mardle and Taylor, 1987).
On the other side of the coin, partisan identification is 
a variable with strong predictive validity. It is an analytical 
element with utility beyond the immediate realm of voting 
behaviour. The relationship between partisan identification and 
both voting and vote stability is highlighted by Sarlvik and 
Crewe (ibid.). Ninety five percent of 'very strong' identifiers 
voted for their respective parties; the corresponding figure for 
those with a 'strong' partisanship was seventy six percent. The 
'impact' of partisan affiliation on vote stability can also be 
seen in their work. The very strong, and the fairly strong 
identifiers showed pronounced stability in voting preferences : 
93% and 80% respectively voted for the same party in both 1974 
and 1979 (Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983, pp.298).
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Despite the decline in the strength of partisan affiliation 
(Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt, 1977; Crewe, 1984) partisan attachments 
still strongly predict voting behaviour and homing tendencies. 
Heath, Jowell and Curtice note that, "There has been no clear 
increase in hesitancy, volatility or turbulence, and no tendency 
for party identification to become a less powerful influence on 
vote" (Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1988; Heath and McDonald,
1988). This does not sit particularly well with their earlier 
study, but like similar research it is testimony to the 
explanatory power of partisanship (Whiteley, 1986).
The question still remains whether partisanship is actually 
distinct from voter's choice - whether the two are one and the 
same thing. Rose and MacAllister maintain that this is the case 
and so control for political principles, pre-adult socialisation, 
socioeconomic (social class) interests and perception of 
government performance. Not surprisingly they find that partisan 
affiliation is practically redundant as a predictor of voting 
behaviour (Rose and MacAllister, 1986, pp.127-34). Bearing in 
mind what has already been discussed about partisan attachment 
and issues or principles the interpretive problems remain. They 
are compounded when the deficiencies in socialisation theory and 
the measurement of class attachments are considered. They become 
acute for Rose and MacAllister when they note that none of their 
pre-partisan variables account for the Alliance vote. Here only 
partisan identification and government performance (in that 
order) seem to matter (ibid., 1986, p.134). They are forced at 
this point simply to reiterate, rather unconvincingly, that vote 
choice and partisanship are the same thing.
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The notion of an affective partisan screen has predictive 
validity beyond the field of voting behaviour. Its influence is 
invoked to explain the media's inability to alter the perceptions 
and attitudes of viewers and readers (Klapper, 1960 and 1968; 
Sears and Chaffee, 1979; Davis, 1982; Sigelman and Sigelman, 
1984). The root of the selectivity perception thesis in 
cognitive dissonance theory also strongly supports the notion of 
importance of the emotive element in the process (Festinger, 1957 
and 1964).
Finally, if the notion of partisanship is considered to be 
affective in character, the work of Zajonc, and Abelson 
contribute significantly to the construct validity of the term 
(Zajonc, 1980; Abelson et al,, 1982). They note that the 
affective component of the thought process is substantively as 
well as analytically distinct from the cognitive element. In 
favouring individual candidates the affective precedes the 
cognitive; and, indeed, the two elements are thought to be 
handled by geographically distinctive parts of the brain. When 
gauged against the validating support for issue positions or 
values and principles, the affective conception of partisanship 
looks quite convincing. The evidence is dispersed, but 
indicative. Moreover, much of the support would be considered 
by behaviouralists as 'material' rather than 'circumstantial' (in 
the sense that it is grounded on direct attitudinal measurement).
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2.6
From the preceding thematic analysis a number of distinctive 
strands emerge. The class voting thesis that formerly prevailed 
is seen as deficient from the behaviouralist perspective. The 
predictive capacity of the original model is sorely diminished. 
Moreover, its universal applicability and the integrity of its 
attitudinal content were somewhat suspect even in its heyday. 
The different attempts to resurrect the class thesis or draw the 
discipline onto new explanatory ground, share some generic 
problems.
The first of these is the approach to support for 
attitudinal assumptions. Dunleavy and Husbands seem to come 
within a hairs breadth of affirming that it is unnecessary to 
explore the elector's perceived sectoral interests. If it can 
be established that an aggregate level relationship pertains 
which is consistent with the expression of 'real' interests then 
we need go no further. Behaviouralist might consider this 
unacceptable. Attitudinal assumptions are not a secondary 
element in a thesis, but must figure prominently at the core. 
As such they require suitable confirmation - ideally of the most 
direct attitudinal sort.
The problem is not, however, confined to the advocates of 
class or sectoral voting. Budge's work on issue voting has a 
similar feel (Budge, 1982). Though there are attitudinal 
elements they are imported at second hand. He uses the party 
manifestos and relies on the authority of analysts in the British 
General Election Studies to establish an issue agenda. Without 
direct attitudinal support, the issues are then hypothesised to
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have a positive or negative impact on either 'bourgeois' or 
'socialist' parties. The resultant model has predictive validity 
but almost wholly lacks an ideational foundation. From the 
behaviouralist perspective the operation is unsatisfactory.
Some of the studies which reconsider the class-party 
relationship have a more appealing predictive capacity. Miller's 
work on constituency level voting is indicative and should 
stimulate further analysis. Yet without a clear explanatory 
underpinning drawn from reliable and verifiable exploration of 
attitudes, the causal processes at work will remain obscure 
(Scarbrough, 1987).
The last generic problem which afflicts the current voting 
theories concerns the clarity and validity of their respective 
attitudinal elements. The issue voting models have substantial 
predictive capacity, but the questionnaire responses used to 
sustain the thesis lack clear construct validity. The 
interposing variable of partisanship muddies the waters. The 
thesis is substantially, if not fatally flawed without 
confirmation that the survey items tap 'real' rather than 'non­
attitudes'. The partisan element seems to have construct 
validity, but questions remain concerning partisan development, 
stability, and the roots of short-term fluctuations.
Bearing in mind the problems outlined, it seems 
inappropriate to urge some kind of eclectic fusion of approaches. 
Class, sector, issue and value elements can figure comfortably 
in a regression equation. Given the problems outlined above, the 
difficulty in interpreting the results go beyond the construction 
of plausible models based on sustainable assumptions. The
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attitudinal elements that weave the elements together are often 
of a circumstantial nature, and we can be far from certain that 
class, issue or value positions constitute a useful shorthand 
denoting discrete or clear attitudinal clusters.
Many of the problems so far encountered stem from 
difficulties in operationalising the terms employed in the 
respective models. They constitute an impediment to future 
development. If terms like class or sectoral interests are not 
transparent to the analyst, what hope is there for the 
interviewee? 'Issue positions' and 'principles' are equally 
difficult to operationalise. The advocates of economic voting 
models maintain they have a solution to these problems and it is 
to them that we now turn.
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CHAPTER THREE
ECONOMIC VOTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE : THE CASE OF SCOTLAND
3.1
The starting point for many of the economic voting theorists 
is the construction of a set of assumptions concerning the 
individual voter's likely attitudinal calculus. These are not 
drawn exclusively from supportive attitudinal evidence, but are 
deductive and quasi-axiomatic. They form the backbone of a model 
of voting behaviour which has a deceptive clarity and simplicity. 
Anthony Downs was one of the principal architects of the 
"hypothetico-deductive" approach (Downs, 1957). Models developed 
from the 'Downsian' postulates have the apparent virtue that they 
do not place too heavy a burden on the information storing and 
handling capabilities of the electorate. And anyway, at least 
some evidence supports the notion that the electorate is a little 
better informed on economic than on policy or political matters 
(Pickett and Alpine, 1965).
The original model assumes that all individuals are impelled 
to maximise utility, net of any cost. The expected utility in 
voting lies in a likely fortuitous outcome from the election. 
The costs involved are those of observation of the political 
environment, although it is assumed that the individual can draw 
on his or her own financial experience and on the readily 
available information in the mass media. Minor costs are also 
incurred in transporting the individual's carcass to the polling 
booth.
Downs and Robertson also look to party ideology and 
partisanship for low cost means of establishing which party is
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best in the eyes of the voter. The calculus is either, 'The 
party that has benefited me in the past had a particular guiding 
ideology'. Or, 'If this party was the one which benefited my 
father, why should it not benefit me' (Robertson, 1976, p.45). 
Notwithstanding "ideology" or family driven "partisanship”, the 
basic model postulates that the individual will punish an 
incumbent when his or her economic circumstances deteriorate, and 
reward the government if the individual is better off.
The method employed here is more often used in the 
disciplines of economics and econometrics than in political 
science per se (Blaug, 1982). Like econometric theory a heavier 
emphasis is placed on the predictive capacity of the models than 
on their explanatory capacity. Few, however, in political 
science would go as far as Milton Friedman in asserting either 
that exolanatorv power or capacity is irrelevant or that, if 
predictions are accurate we may continue 'as if ' the initial 
postulates concerning behaviour are in some sense true (Friedman, 
1953).
This instrumentalist approach would be acceptable if on the 
one hand the predictive capacity were impressive or, on the 
other, the initial postulates were plausible and hung together 
in a logically coherent and consistent manner. From a 
behaviouralist perspective the Downsian thesis is weak in both 
respects.
The premises can be considered in isolation but the logical 
framework in which they hang can be considered rather weak. The 
problem revolves around the need to square plausible, deductive 
elements concerning rational calculations with patently obvious
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political phenomena in the 'real' world. Downs himself notes 
that if the voters take the time to consider if their respective 
votes will actually make a difference, they will decide not to 
vote at all. The individual voter is one among many; their vote 
cannot be expected to tip the balance; the outcome will pertain 
whether they vote or not - thus voting will mean outlay in costs 
with no assurance of any prospective return whatsoever. These 
initial conditions would leave us with a model that predicted 
that no one would vote at all. With the obvious fact that great 
numbers do indeed vote, Downs is forced to invoke the notion of 
'long-run participation value' (Downs, ibid., p.270). The 
individual realises that if all others so calculate, democracy 
will stagnate and with it the moral and economic health of the 
nation.
The problems with this are many, not least those associated
with the 'free rider' (Olson, 1965). The individual need not be
particularly shrewd to calculate that they can abstain but allow 
everyone else to incur the costs of voting (and in so doing help 
preserve democracy). This does not take us much further since 
if everyone calculated thus we would again be left with empty 
polling booths. The potential for a collapse into an unhelpful 
infinite regress is obvious.
The free rider problem highlights the difficulty of
maintaining a model which is at the same time logically coherent 
and consistent with obvious, known facts. As the initial
postulates multiply, the dangers of collapsing into contortions 
to explain indubitable evidence (eg. of large scale turnout) 
become more tangible and intractable. The situation, indeed,
57
gets more difficult for Downs. In postulating 'long-run 
participation value' the cost burden placed on the electorate is 
increased substantially. How is the voter to decide whether 
democracy is, indeed, a sine qua non for an effectively 
functioning modern economy? Few political scientists could offer 
a transparently plausible answer to that question (one that would 
not involve the expenditure of a great deal of intellectual 
energy to resolve).
Some have tried to rescue Downs from the morass by noting 
that any goal-directed justification for voting is admissible as 
rational (from 'pleasing the wife' to the satisfaction obtained 
from supporting a favoured party - Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). 
The initial postulates (beyond straightforward utility 
maximisation) have again been stretched and, for Laver at least, 
are too permissive and heterogeneous to construct a widely 
generalisable model (Laver, 1978). Anyway, if Riker and 
Ordeshook's assumptions are correct we are left with the problem 
of explaining the difference between turnout between the UK and 
the USA (70-80% and circa 50% respectively). Is the difference 
a function of exogenous influences beyond the utility maximising 
calculus? And if so, which ones?
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3.2
If Friedman's position is taken, we might seek refuge in the 
predictive capacity of the model developed from Downsian 
postulates. We may even attribute the lack of complete fit to 
the difficulties involved in accommodating non-utility maximising 
calculations (perhaps analogous to the "disturbing causes" 
associated with macroeconomic modelling). Downs's work has 
indeed stimulated a great deal of research, typically focusing 
on time series analysis using econometric techniques (Pissarides, 
1980). Relating a variety of aggregate economic indicators to 
government popularity was a method favoured by many analysts.
A number of studies over the last twenty years have lent 
support to Downs' thesis (Goodhardt and Bhanslai, 1970; Mosley, 
1978; Frey and Schneider, 1978; Pissarides, 1980). Mosley notes 
that unemployment rates, inflation and growth rate etc. are all 
.."significantly correlated".. with government popularity 
(Mosley, 1982). Paldam, in an overview of the literature on 
'popularity function', comes to conclude that, .."the V-P 
function should no longer be doubted." (Paldam, 1981, p.194).
In this sense alone we might say that the Downsian 
'hypothetico-deductive' method is vindicated. Problems are 
raised if, however, we move from a predictive to an explanatory 
frame of reference. If a link can be established between 
aggregate fluctuations in the economy and the government's 
popularity, how are these to be explained? The typical Downsian 
answer is to conjecture that voters consider the government's 
oast performance and the likely performance of the opposition (as
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gauged by their past performance). The reward is then given or 
the punishment inflicted.
The attitudinal elements in the original models were, 
however, rather under-explored. In this sense the evidence was 
decidedly circumstantial, and both Kramer and Husbands have noted 
that aggregate statistical relationships are consistent with a 
great many individual level interpretations (Kramer, 1983; 
Husbands, 1985; Feldman, 1984).
Besides, we have the prospect of a bewildering array of 
economic variables impacting on government popularity. Many 
analysts have noted that statistical relationships are unstable 
over time. Variables from prices, inflation and unemployment, 
to balance of payments, exchange rates and growth in real incomes 
are seen to have an effect at some, but not at other times 
(Butler and Stokes, 1974; Miller, 1986; Husbands, 1985; and 
Paldam, 1981).
The danger inherent in speculating on underlying micro-level 
dynamics is evident in the work of Husbands (Husbands, 1985). 
He notes that there is a strong and statistically significant 
correlation between unemployment and government popularity for 
the period between 1966 and 1974. Inflation was likewise 
correlated but at a much lower level. Speculating on individual 
level processes. Husbands employs the notion of 'social 
communalism' to explain the impact of unemployment beyond those 
who were personally or vicariously affected. A concern for the 
lot of others is seen as important {ibid,, p.7). This 
interpretation does not altogether fit the Downsian model but it 
seems necessary given the statistical relationships.
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The period from 1974 to 1979 differs markedly from the 
earlier phase. With unemployment doubling and inflation at its 
highest ever level, Husbands shows that neither variable is 
correlated significantly with popularity. Fluctuations in real 
disposable income are, however, strongly associated with 
movements in government popularity. Husbands is therefore led 
to conclude that individuals were no longer looking outward to 
the broader community at this juncture, but were instead using 
personalised criteria (fluctuations in real disposable income) 
in their judgement of the government.
The complications do not end there. In the period from 1979 
to 1983, despite a decline in real wages , unemployment, in 
conjunction with the 'Falklands Factor', is the only economic 
variable associated with government popularity {ibid., p.9) . The 
inference made by Husbands concerning the individual-level 
processes is not that there has been a return to communalism, but 
that more people are directly affected and react accordingly (by 
punishing the government).
The problems here are evident. The results of Husbands' 
study are consistent with the Downsian thesis in the period from 
1974 to 1983, yet, from a behaviouralist perspective, little 
supportive evidence is offered for Husbands' reading of the 
individual level processes. Speculation on the lurch (somewhere 
around 1973-4) from 'communalistic' to 'personalised' criteria 
for judging government performance is not particularly plausible 
either intuitively, or, more importantly, on the grounds of 
supportive evidence.
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Moreover, some analysts have pointed to the large numbers 
of unemployed people voting for the Conservative government in 
1983. Husbands does note that the swing against the 
Conservatives among the unemployed was 6% (as opposed to 2% for 
the rest of the electorate) . However, it is difficult to sustain 
the Downsian thesis without qualification. Especially where post 
election polls show that, . . "the unemployed were not more 
strongly anti-Tory than others in their class; and half the young 
unemployed did not vote at all." (The Economist. 15 October 1983, 
p. 33). Indeed, the level of support for the Conservatives among 
the unemployed and disadvantaged has been offered as conclusive 
evidence of the poverty of the Downsian model (Heath, Jowell and 
Curtice, 1985, p.162; Scarbrough, 1987, p.233).
Before moving on to British and American analysts who focus 
almost exclusively on behavioural-attitudinal modelling of the 
popularity function, it is perhaps appropriate to look at a model 
which overlaps the econometric and the attitudinal. The model 
chosen is that of Sanders, Marsh and Ward (Sanders, Marsh and 
Ward, 1987). Their initial study concerned the period from 1979 
to 1983 and takes as a point of entry the dispute over the impact 
of the so-called 'Falklands Factor'. The period is of interest 
because both government popularity and leading economic variables 
fluctuated quite markedly. Miller notes that difficulty attends 
the estimation of the impact of the economy on government 
popularity as the two usually trend quite lowly, thus obscuring 
the relationship (Miller, 1986). The 1979 to 1983 period thus 
offers an interesting laboratory.
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3.3
Debate about the contribution of the Falklands War to Mrs. 
Thatcher's 1983 election victory still continues. It has, 
however, been commented - with some justification - that the 
political science community started with the assumption that the 
Falklands war influenced the popularity of the Conservative party 
in the run up to the 1983 general election. This is scarcely 
surprising given that government popularity jumped some sixteen 
percentage points in the course of the military campaign (see 
Fig.l below).
Figure 3.1 ; Government Popularity 1979-83 
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Political scientists have been eager to explain this jump, though 
not always in Downsian terms. Crewe, Dunleavy and Husbands, and 
Clarke at al have attempted to estimate the effect of the 
'Falklands Factor' more systematically, although they differ in 
the weight they assign to it. Crewe, observing the raw opinion
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poll data, felt that the 'Falklands Factor' was worth somewhere 
in the region of 15-16% for the Conservatives (Crewe, 1985). The 
statistical models of Clarke et ai., and of Dunleavy and Husbands 
also suggested a pronounced Falklands War effect (Clarke et al,, 
1986; Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985).
Sanders et al.'s iconoclastic article offers a very 
different explanation of fluctuations in government popularity 
around the time of the Falklands War (Sanders et ai. 1987). 
Based on a re-specified model they hold that it was, broadly 
speaking, the Conservative government's handling of the economy 
that was responsible for the reversal of its downward slide in 
popularity (somewhere around December 1981 or January 1982).
The calculations of Sanders et ai. lead them to construct 
a model specifying the direct and indirect effects of economic 
trends on the Conservative Party's popularity. The most 
important element in the model is the public's expectations of 
likely future trends :
Figure 3.2
Consumer Durable Exchange
Expenditure (t-12) Rate (t-12)
Taxation \  I
Index (t-1) -------- Personal Government
Expectations (t) ■ ' Popularitv
Short-Time 
Working (t-1)
Interest PSBR (t-1) Unemployment(t)
Rates (t-1)
In their estimation a marked deceleration in unemployment, 
reduced Public Sector Borrowing Requirement and a promising 
trend in the pound's exchange rate against the dollar influenced 
government popularity directly. They do, however, have the 
strong suspicion that, "... the effects of these variables were
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probably mediated by the speculative and interpretative endeavour 
of the mass media” (p.297). In contrast, a pronounced growth in 
consumer durable expenditure, a reduction in short-time working 
and a decrease in both tax and interest rates are held to affect 
popularity indirectly through the public's positive expectations 
concerning likely future trends - through 'consumer confidence'.
Here the thrust seems - at least in part - to be Downsian. 
Past economic fluctuations impact upon the individual, generate 
expectations and thus enter the utility maximising calculus of 
the voters (Downs, 1957) . The notion here is that the voting 
public either rewards or punishes the government for fluctuations 
in the economy which have benefited or hurt them. What is 
unusual about the findings of Sanders et al. is the conclusion 
that virtually all of the Government's rise in popularity in 1982 
should be attributed to these economic factors; and that the 
Falklands War was worth scarcely 2-3% for the first few months 
after the conflict, and little thereafter.
The 'heretical' nature of this thesis has prompted a 
counterblast from Franklin (Franklin, 1987). He claims that if 
we look at a large number of objective economic indicators and 
then lag them by a variety of time spans we can scarcely fail to 
find some kind of correlation between some of these indicators 
and government popularity. This criticism is particulary pointed 
bearing in mind that previous economic models have shown an 
unstable relationship between a variety of economic variables and 
popularity. Franklin also enquires why the lag between exchange 
rate alterations and government popularity should be as long as 
twelve months.
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Sanders et al. have responded to these criticisms by 
pointing out that their model is derived from the wealth of 
research on the economy and its influence on voting behaviour 
(Sanders et al., 1988). They also suggest that the lag on 
exchange rate fluctuations is plausible as it takes about one 
year for their effects to 'work through the economy ' and have 
an impact on the lives of individual voters. In the case of both 
criticisms Sanders et al. feel their model is fully in accordance 
with a 'Downsian-driven' analysis of popularity fluctuation, one 
which emphasises objective economic trends and speculative 
inference on their individual level impact.
Perhaps the most illuminating aspects of the controversy 
consist in the methodological lessons which may be drawn. 
Franklin warns that we must avoid the 'broomstick' approach to 
data collection. By this is meant the unsystematic or random 
accumulation of data with no clear conception of how it is tied 
together. However, Sanders et al. counter strongly that their 
study does not constitute such an exercise; their thesis is 
articulated to macro-level theorising with a long pedigree.
On an equally important methodological point Franklin draws 
our attention to the fact that the great majority of respondents 
in a number of surveys approved of the government's handling of 
the Falklands war. In essence, then, Franklin is correct in 
pointing out that if, as he mentions, almost everyone approves 
of what the government is doing, how are we to gauge the effect 
of 'approval' (measured in aggregate) on the government 
popularity? Where are our control conditions? The answer from 
Sanders, Ward and Marsh is quite simple in this case. If we
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control for fluctuations in the economy before, during and after 
the Falklands War, the 'Falklands Factor' is reduced to a few 
percentage points.
An analogous methodological problem confronts students of 
mass media impact. The dilemma confronts Miller in his work on 
the media and the Falklands War (Miller 1983) . He points out 
that if everyone is reading or watching similar media output on 
an issue (say the Falklands War), or aware of that output through 
others, then how are we to distinguish the influence of one 
particular newspaper or medium. He maintains that we must look 
at distinctively different media environments within the same 
political domain (eg. Scotland and England within the United 
Kingdom). The digression is not simply incidental. The 
systematic difference in media environments across a similar 
population may give us a laboratory in which to test the impact 
of otherwise of political communication (in 'aggregate'). 
Moreover, it can in one sense allow the analysis of the 
comparative impact of economic fluctuations.
Miller maintains that the impact of the distinctive tenor 
of the Scottish mass media explain aggregate fluctuations in 
popularity at the time of the Falklands - fluctuations that are 
quite different from those in the United Kingdom as a whole. In 
this sense the model contrasts starkly with that of Sanders et 
al. The fortuitous conjunction of a number of factors makes 
Miller's case study of the Scottish experience of the Falklands 
War particularly relevant with regard to the debate on the 
general impact of the 'Falklands Factor' and the integrity of the 
econometric model of popularity function. However, the thrust
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has to be comparative and speculative, rather than systematic and 
statistically orientated.
First, the war was neither a wholly English nor a peculiarly 
Scottish affair. Scottish and English troops fought together. 
The Belgrano was sunk by a Clyde based submarine. The Scots as 
well as the English would, ultimately, pay for the war through 
taxes. In this sense we have an issue on which the capacity for 
systematic difference across conditions (Scotland-England) is 
reduced. Second, a limited amount of comparable economic data 
are available through which we can examine or test the model that 
Sanders at al. construct for the United Kingdom as a whole.
Most of the factors to which Sanders at al. allude show the 
same trends in Scotland that they do in Great Britain as a whole. 
To all intents and purposes for Scotland and England 'exchange 
rate' and 'PSBR' are indistinguishable.
Figure 3.3 : Comparative Unemployment
Source : SCOTTISH ECONOMIC BULLETIN (JUNE 1988) P.2 3
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Moreover, if we look at unemployment (Fig.2 above) we see that 
for Scotland as a whole the trajectory is very similar to that 
of the UK. A sharp upswing is evident after 1979 followed by 
deceleration 1981-83. The "direct" elements of Sanders et al.'s 
popularity equation are very much in evidence in Scotland.
With regard to the 'indirect' elements again, 'taxation' and 
'interest rate' trends are the same for Scotland as they are for 
the U.K. It should be noted here that interest rate fluctuations 
may have a differential effect on Scotland due to the relatively 
high percentage of publicly owned homes (49% in Scotland to 31% 
in England - Dickson, 1988, p.361). However, the aspect of 
primary importance is the effect of interest rates on 'consumer 
expenditure' which is at the centre of Sanders et al.'s thesis. 
Here the difference in effect may be less marked.
The data for earnings and consumer expenditure are not 
directly available, but if it is possible to infer anything from 
comparative data, then Fig.3.4 is interesting :
Figure 3.4 : Earnings
SOURCE ; SCOTTISH ECONOMIC BULLETIN (JUNE 1988) P . 2 3 
Average Weeklv ; Scotland as a Percentage of U.K.
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It suggests that, for Scotland, weekly earnings began - after 
1980 - to creep toward the national average. In this sense the 
general trend of degeneration after 1979 followed by upswing is 
again apparent. The data on Scottish 'consumer expenditure' is 
also interesting as this, for Sanders et al., is primarily 
associated with their 'economic expectation' index :
Table 3.1 Consumer Durable Expenditure ; Scotland as % of U.K. 
SOURCE : SCOTTISH ECONOMIC BULLETIN (JUNE 1986) P.53
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
96.4% 95.9% 94.6% 94.3% 95.2% 96.8%
The contours of the fluctuations in consumer expenditure closely 
match those of the UK as a whole. Moreover, in relative terms,
we see a downward plunge from 1979 to 1981 followed by a closing
of the gap. However, overall, the contours of the fluctuations 
in consumer expenditure closely match, within a few percentage 
points , those in the U.K. as a whole.
Sadly we do not have available a discrete, disaggregated 
index of 'economic expectation' or 'short-time working' for 
Scotland. However, as Miller points out, sustained upswing in 
the government's popularity simply did not occur around the time 
of the Falklands War. He notes that, "on the basis of MORI polls 
the Falklands Factor was only half as strong in Scotland as in 
England; on the basis of a much greater number of Systems Three 
polls the Falklands Factor was entirely non-existent in Scotland" 
(ibid. p.23). In essence Miller is correct, but Fig.3.4 below 
shows the complexity of popularity fluctuations. We do see a 
distinctive, though less steep, upswing around the end of 1981. 
However, the beginning of the upswing precedes the consumer
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expenditure 'surge' by all of two months (it is evident from 
October 1981).
Figure 3.4 Government Popularity : U.K. and Scotland 
SOURCE : GALLUP & SYSTEM THREE SCOTLAND 
June 1979 to May 1983
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Yet in a comparative rather than statistical analysis it may 
be uncharitable to quibble about one or two months either way. 
Of much greater significance is Miller's observation that at the 
time of the Falklands the upward trend in Scotland is less 
prominent than in the UK as a whole, and it is followed by a 
sharp downturn in September 198 2 to almost pre-surge levels. 
Where the popularity gain in the U.K. over April-July is sixteen 
points, in Scotland the Conservative Party experience a drop of 
one percent.
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3.4
The primary implication of the data for the work of Sanders, 
Ward and Marsh is that the intuitively plausible link between 
economic factors, expectations and popularity, and the direct 
connection between some primary economic indicators and public 
mood appears to be weakened. It might, of course, be held that 
there is a systematic difference across conditions (something in 
the 'Scottishness' of those living north of the Solway) that 
explains the differing trends in government popularity (Lewis and 
Potter, 1970). However, this requires us to consider what 
exactlv this is and how it might be incorporated into an 
individual level explanation which Downs would find familiar. 
The Downsian axioms are universally applicable or they begin to 
lose their self-evident relevance to an easily generalisable 
model.
And moreover, if we recall, the Falklands War was not an 
exclusively Scottish or English issue. If the issue was closer 
to home (say a dispute over North Sea oil or over a settlement 
in Northern Ireland) then the implicitly different dimensions of 
Scottish political culture would pose problems for a straight, 
cross-condition comparison (Dickson, 1988). But, to repeat, the 
Falklands was a British national issue; one in which the families 
and dependents of Scottish and English soldiers shared a deep 
concern.
The comparison of the different explanations of the dynamics 
of the 'Falklands Factor' highlights the problems endemic to 
studies of the aggregate analysis of the relationship between 
economic trends and government popularity. The work of Sanders,
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Ward and Marsh is, in behaviouralist terms, a step beyond the
earlier work. It directly incorporates at least one attitudinal
element (in its inclusion of the economic expectations variable) .
Husbands' study (Husbands, 1985) shows that inferring aggregate
shifts in thought patterns from objective aggregate indicators
is fraught with difficulty. Sanders and his co-authors not only
look at aggregate economic indicators, but clearly incorporate
an attitudinal indicator of public opinion.
The model of the ideational dynamics underlying the
statistics is still, however, contentious. The problem is with
'expectations'. Sanders, Ward and Marsh are right to say that
because two questions are on the same survey script they need not
interfere with one another (ibid, p.296) - we will have more to
say on this point later. But they may still find difficulty in
defending themselves against an alternative reading of the
statistics. For Sanders et ai. the ideational dynamics
underlying the statistical relationships is something like:
'the economy is doing much better, thank God; in all 
expectations it will be the same in the future; the 
government is primarily responsible; the government 
gets my vote if there is an election tomorrow'•
This is necessarily a caricature, but it is an instructive one.
It fits well with the Downsian thesis of a fairly direct causal
connection between economic fluctuations and government
popularity. But as current research in Britain and the United
States shows, this connection is complex and may be mediated by
the effects of attribution and vary according to level of
perception. Theorists have identified at least three levels :
the personal (here Downs is preeminent); the contextual or local
level (highlighted by Husbands and echoed in some research in the
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United States); and the theorists of 'sociotropic' voting (most 
notably Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981).
Questions which might be asked at this juncture include : 
is the voter thinking of his or her own wellbeing (their 
'pocketbook' perception) or about the national economic situation 
(their 'sociotropic' perception, Kinder & Keiweit, 1981)? This 
thesis on sociotropic voting is supported by a good deal of 
comparative research. Reed and Brunk have undertaken work in 
Japan where the contours of economic development provide a 
laboratory where 'pocketbook' and 'sociotropic' models should 
yield strikingly different predictions concerning voting patterns 
(Reed and Brunk, 1984). Alford and Legge have carried through 
similar work in Germany (Alford and Legge, 1984), and Lewis-Beck 
in France (Lewis-Beck, 1983).
We might also ask to whom do voters attribute responsibility 
for economic upswings or downturns (Lau & Sears, 1981; Tyler, 
1982; Peffley, 1984 and Peffley & Williams, 1985)? Feldman has 
demonstrated that perceptions of personal circumstances do not 
enter the party preference equation because American cultural 
values hold the individual and not the Government responsible for 
personal wellbeing. He speculates that this may be the reason 
why personal circumstances fail to register as significant in 
recent studies (Feldman, 1982). On the same theme, and in a 
broadly comparative analysis of research in Western Europe, 
Lewis-Beck emphasises the importance of attribution (Lewis-Beck, 
1986). In the four countries observed (Britain, France, Germany 
and Italy) perceptions of personal circumstances fail to impinge 
on political preferences unless the government is held
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responsible for those circumstances. He also notes that
perceptions of national economic trends have a weak influence
unless associated with attribution of blame to incumbent 
government.
And lastly, where do we get our information on trends and
causal attribution (Mosley, 1984; Benton & Franzier, 1976; Behr
and Iyengar, 1985)? This research suggests that the media have
a role to play in influencing perception of the economy, and
setting the agenda on the causes and cures of economic ills.
Bearing in mind the weight of this comparative analysis, an
alternative reading of the situation and its ideational dynamics
might well be:
'the government has done well in the Falklands and the 
economy has improved. This reflects with credit upon
them. Surely a government that can pull us out of a
war can be 'expected' to continue to pull us out of 
the economic ditch; therefore, the government will get 
my vote if there is an election tomorrow
This again is a caricature, but it highlights the difficulty we
face in teasing out causal connections at the individual level.
The object here is to show that an 'expectations' question on a
survey can be contaminated by more than merely its physical
location on a survey script. It is not the object to show that
the media were whollv responsible for the contours of public
opinion at the time of the Falklands war and thereafter. Rather,
it is sufficient to point out that the media might have an
elliptical influence; an influence in conjunction with a variety
of other factors (including discussion with others; personal
experience; and vicarious learning).
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The problem here is with controlling for the impact of 
confounding variables. This is evident from Sanders' statement 
that,
"What we found quite simply, was that our 'Falklands 
Factor' measure - a measure virtually identical to 
that employed by previous researchers who had observed 
a 'Falklands effect' on government popularity - added 
almost no explanatory power to our statistical 
models". (Sanders, 1988, p.29, emphasis original).
What is meant here, at least what is implicit, is that the 
respective 'effects' are virtually coextensive. This presents 
us with a difficult methodological problem, the resolution of 
which is anything but 'quite simple'. Sanders, Ward and Marsh 
do note in the original article that, "we conclude that the 
Falklands effect explanation is based largely upon a spurious 
theoretical interpretation of an empirical coincidence". 
(Sanders et al. 1987, p.282). However, if the comparative 
analysis of Scotland and the United Kingdom shows anything it is 
that an aggregate statistical model can be consistent with a 
number of individual level interpretations, and that these need 
and deserve further exploration.
Of equal importance at this juncture is the point that the 
plausibility of Miller's alternative model is reinforced by the 
manner in which it can be integrated with existing media effects 
research. This research is firmly behaviouralist in character. 
Klapper, the doyen of 'weak media effects' theory, himself 
acknowledges that a context of 'dependency' with regard to 
overseas news is one in which the impact of media content is 
considered more likely (Klapper 1960 and 1968; Ball-Rokeach and 
De Fleur 1976). The object of media attention is beyond the 
direct experience of most of the audience; the mechanisms of
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selective perception are less effective. The breadth of 
anti-government coverage evident in Scotland during the Falklands 
war tends toward what Noelle-Nuemann described as "consonance". 
This similarity of content across a variety of media outlets is 
also associated with ability to influence (Noelle-Neumann and 
Mathes, 1988).
The ability to integrate Miller's thesis with existing 
material contrasts in some respects with Sanders et al,s' model. 
The most damaging criticism levelled at Sanders et al. in this 
instance comes from Lawrence Freedman. He cites Gallup Polls 
which show that the economic fluctuations which should (according 
to the model) have reflected well on the government, in fact made 
the public less favourably inclined toward the Conservatives. 
He notes that the economic situation made a large number of 
voters feel less favourable towards the government (a number 
significantly greater than whose who became more favourable - 
Freedman,1987).
At this point it might be appropriate to make the almost 
trivially self-evident point that statistical models are, of 
necessity, a simplification of an otherwise complex universe. 
However, if the model is incompatible with attitudinal data that 
specify (from beyond its confines, but with some validity) the 
contours of this complexity, we might have to consider carefully 
our variable specifications. Otherwise, the only alternative 
position open to us is that of Milton Friedman. That of 
maintaining the convenient, if unsatisfactory, fiction that 
people behave 'as i f  they are making Downsian calculations.
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This is relevant with respect to Lawrence Freedman's 
critique of Sanders et al.'s thesis from existing but necessarily 
unintegrated poll data on the public's attitude to prevailing 
economic conditions. It has to be borne in mind that Gallup's 
"personal expectations" used by Sanders et al. is only one 
'disembodied' element of the extraordinarily complex unity of 
public opinion. Yet this cuts both ways and relates as much to 
the data Freedmans cites as it does to the model of Sanders et 
al.
We argue that it is evident from the comparison of the 
Scottish and English experience of the Falklands war that an 
appreciation of the dynamics of government popularity requires 
a great deal more emphasis on integrated individual-level data 
analysis. Moreover, if the mass media were, indeed, at least 
partly responsible for the trajectory of government popularity 
in Scotland, then it would seem that they too should figure - in 
a more integrated fashion - in our estimations.
If the comparison we have undertaken is considered valid 
then the 'Falklands Factor' may be seen to have retained at least 
some of its plausibility. However, we cannot concur with 
Franklin when he asserts that, .."Dr. Johnson once said : 'Sir, 
I know my will is free and there's an end to it'. Most of us 
'know' with almost equal certainty that the Falklands War 
affected our view of Mrs. Thatcher and her government; and it 
will need to be a persuasive piece of survey analysis that 
convinces us we are wrong." (Franklin, 1987, p.28). This makes 
the study of politics look more like theology than science.
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3.5
If we take a behaviouralist position, the next question to 
be addressed is, why do Sanders et al, employ aggregate 
government statistics to 'explain' their main predictive 
variable, "personal expectations"? And why are personal
expectations the only attitudinal element in their model other 
than the dependent variable, "government popularity"? Aggregate 
statistics are not only open to manipulation by the government 
(eg taxation index and, more obviously unemployment - Miller,
1986), they can be fairly poor indicators of the likely effects 
at the individual level. And they are, of necessity, aggregated 
and averaged, and inadequately reflect the impact on individual 
households - though they might be relevant to a broader climate 
of experience and opinion.
A further complication lies in the interpretation of the 
aggregate level relationships between economic fluctuations and 
government popularity. A great deal of literature in the USA and 
elsewhere suggests that the individual's personal finances may 
not be the datum for calculations on the merits of the 
government. Rather, global, or so-called "sociotropic" 
perceptions, are believed to have an independent impact. Indeed, 
some studies suggest that personal economic experiences have 
absolutely no bearing on judgements of the government (Lau and 
Sears, 1981). The plot thickens with the notion that attribution 
of responsibility, whether it be at the personal or global level 
of perception, is a necessary condition for perceptions to impact 
on voting (we need look no further than the research already 
cited).
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This leaves a number of issues outstanding with respect to 
the model of Sanders et al. Why, in their reliance on stepwise 
procedures, do they chose the 'personal expectations' index? In 
their initial search for a model they note that the bivariate 
correlation between personal expectations and government 
popularity is 0.79 (a great deal higher than the thirty or so 
other variables they test). The variable here is prospective in 
character despite the weight of research emphasising 
retrospective judgements (Norris, 1986; Hibbs, 1982; Hibbing,
1987) . This is significant as the "general retrospective" time 
series shows a bivariate correlation with government popularity 
of 0.77. Fig.3.5 shows a comparison of prospective personal 
perceptions and general retrospective attitudes.
Figure 3.5
Comparison of Personal Prospective (Top) & General Retrospective 
Perceptions ; SOURCE : GALLUP 
June 1979 to May 1983
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The general retrospective variable is the classic "sociotropic" 
element which figures in much of the literature on the impact of 
global perceptions.
This measure does not figure at all when Sanders, Ward and 
Marsh come to specify the variables to be included in their 
stepwise regression model. The position can be defended on the 
grounds that general or global perceptions are be extrapolated 
from personal experience. In this sense global perceptions may 
be an artifact. However, there is a considerable amount of 
evidence that the two levels of perception are distinct and that 
global perceptions are not an epiphenomenon of those at personal 
level. In the United States Kinder and Kiewiet have shown that 
the two levels of perception are, indeed, independent of one 
another (Kinder and Kiwiet, 1981). Abramowitz et al. (ibid.) 
note that among those who attribute responsibility to government 
for economic conditions, personal and national level perceptions 
are quite distinct. Palmgreen and Clarke have suggest that 
individuals have distinctive local and national political agendas 
(Palmgreen and Clarke, 1977). Moreover Tyler and Cook 
distinguish personal and global perceptions of the threat of 
violence (Tyler and Cook, 1984).
In Britain a diverse body of research suggests that 
individuals have fairly discrete levels of perception. Mosleys's 
work on the media and government popularity lends oblique support 
to the notion (Mosley, 1984). Dunleavy shows that individuals 
draw a distinction between personal experience of trade unions 
and global judgements (Dunleavy, 1980). Some of the work on
young voters is more directly relevant. Blumler, McQuail and
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Nossiter looked at open-ended responses concerning issue
preoccupations, and undertook a dimensional analysis of the
associations between them. Cluster analysis showed seven main
groups, two of which relate to the area of economics :
••"bread and butter problems with more or less 
tangible implications for the citizen's immediate 
circumstances and prospects (prices, taxes, jobs, 
etc^); preoccupations with the underlying viability of 
the economy (balance of payments, economic growth 
etc^^^" (Blumler, McQuail and Nossiter, 1975)•
Sanders et al proceed some way in this direction in saying that
the media may have a role in cuing the public on trends in
unemployment, exchange rates and PSBR (the direct impact
variables unrelated to personal expectations).
Sanders et al. do not pursue the question of causal
attribution. This is understandable as the Gallup data they use
do not afford them a reliable time series (and there would be no
easy way this might be incorporated in their analysis anyway).
They might be rescued by Furnham who notes that in his study of
attitudes towards unemployment, almost everyone in his survey
felt the government (or governments) were at least in some way
responsible for past economic events (Furnham, 1982)1.
1 This contrasts with a Financial Times survey that 
suggested that people on the whole did not blame the government 
for unemployment (Visser and Wijnhoven, 1990)
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3.6
What room does this leave us for re-specifying the model in 
a way behaviouralists would find acceptable? From the Gallup 
Political Index we can construct a number of prospective and 
retrospective time series which might be of use. These include
(1) . A Global Retrospective Variable (GR) : "Do you consider
that the general economic situation in this country in the 
last 12 months has .
(2). A Global Prospective Variable (GP) : "Do you consider
that the general economic situation in the next 12 months 
will..".
(3). A Variable related to whether the respondent thought they 
had more left, after paying for all the staples, than they 
did last year (STAP) : "When you've paid all the things you 
can't get out of paying , for example, rent rates, fares 
etc., would you say that the amount left in your pocket is 
more than a year ago, the same or less".
(4). A Personal Prospective Variable (as used by Sanders et 
al.) - (P) ; "Do you consider that the financial situation 
of your household in the next 12 months will.."
(5) . A Personal Retrospective Variable (PR) : "In the last 12
months has the financial situation of your household..".
The empirical question is, can these variables be organised 
in such a way as to substitute for aggregate statistics as a 
predictor of Sanders et al.'s important independent variable 
(personal expectations)? We can draw here on the rather limited 
literature on the sources of prospective evaluations (from within 
the disciplines of political science and macroeconomics). The 
result would be a behaviouralist model even if, in a predictive 
sense, it was not a better one.
The existing material on the sources of economic 
expectations is rather sparse. The focus is on expectations of 
inflation and unemployment (not personal expectations in the
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general sense). However, a few useful generalisations can be 
made. Contrary to Sanders, Ward and Marsh, the work of both 
Conover and Fiorina suggests that partisanship has an strong 
influence on expectations (Fiorina, 1981; Conover et al., 1987). 
In the British context we can only hypothesise that this would 
mean Conservative partisans would see the future in a rosier 
light than non-Conservatives. Sadly, the aggregated Gallup data 
available does not allow us to explore this avenue. It should, 
however, be taken into consideration, and we return to the issue 
later.
The other generalisations do concern variables whose impact 
we might try to measure. In predicting economic trends Fiorina 
emphasises respondent's perception of the government's oast 
performance on inflation and unemployment. As interesting, he 
notes that respondent's general retrospective perceptions 
influence expectations of inflation and unemployment directly. 
He also notes that it influences expectations indirectly via 
evaluation of the government's past performance {ibid., p.l45- 
48) .
In the generation of expectations of inflation Hudson and 
Lark emphasise the respondent's perception of how well they are 
managing their own income at the time of the survey. This echoes 
the work of Conover et al. In a panel study they highlight the 
importance of immediate personal experience and past evaluations 
of inflation and unemployment trends {ibid.). Gramlich notes 
that current and past inflation rates predict individual's 
expectations of inflation, but the focus is on aggregate 
statistics and not on retrospective perceptions (Gramlich, 1983) .
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He also notes that Republican incumbency and the existence of 
wage control legislation are also significant.
Thus what we have are a combination of prospective and 
retrospective elements associated with expectations. Following 
Fiorina we might look at a model featuring general retrospective 
(GR) and personal retrospective predictors of personal economic 
expectations:
PE (Personal Expectation) = a + b(GR) + b(PR)
The hypothesis to be tested is that past experience influences 
expectations. The general retrospective element is included as 
a follow-up to the research on "sociotropic" voting.
A further model might be established following Conover, 
Gramlich, and Hudson and Luke. This would emphasise a global 
retrospective element, a personal retrospective variable (using 
either CURR or PR) and a factor relating to immediate personal 
experience.
PE = a + b(GR) + b(PR) + b(CURR)
An auxiliary set of questions revolve around the comparison 
of aggregate statistics and individual level perceptions. To 
what extent do aggregate statistics relating to year on year 
inflation match perceptions of price increases? If the former 
is a better predictor of government popularity than the latter, 
ought it to be considered a 'sociotropic' element that reflects, 
not the hardship of individual experience, but a mediated form 
of reality? This can only be done on a small scale due to the 
lack of appropriate Gallup data.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TIME SERIES APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC VOTING 
4.1
The model of government popularity which Sanders et al. 
produce is sophisticated and multifaceted. They review the 
econometric literature on popularity function, and the material 
on the Falklands War in particular. They allude to mis- 
specification and embark on a theoretical exploration which 
highlights the likely impact of both the general economic 
situation and pocketbook influences. At this point a great deal 
of emphasis is placed on economic expectations. They offer a 
menu of likely influences on popularity which include real 
economic fluctuations and, crucially, general and personal 
economic perceptions (both prospective and retrospective). They 
go on to isolate those variables which show the same decline- 
recovery pattern as government popularity in the period. The 
likely candidates for inclusion in a model ie. those showing a 
decline-recovery pattern and high bivariate correlation with 
popularity include ;
TAX & PRICE INDEX TAX INDEX EXCHANGE RATES
SHORT-TIME WORKING CONSUMER DURABLE EXPENDITURE
RETAIL SALES GENERAL RETROSPECTIVE PERCEPTIONS
PERSONAL RETROSPECTIVE PERCEPTIONS 
PERSONAL PROSPECTIVE EXPECTATIONS
The prime question is why do Sanders et al. then start with 
a stepwise regression analysis using only 'real' economics 
variables and two prospective perception questions? ("Employing 
an analogue of the SPSS stepwise procedure and using as
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predictors all the variables in categories 2 and 4 dî Table I, 
we estimated a large number of equations which provided 
alternative operationalisations of the basic 
'expectations/objective economic performance' model." ibid. 
p.295) The regression model produced by this technique isolates 
variables for personal expectations (PE), PSBR lagged six months 
(PSBR-6)f unemployment (UN), exchange rates lagged twelve months 
(EXCHANGE-12) . The question at this juncture is, why (when 
modelling Government popularity) do general and personal 
retrospective perceptions not figure in the model? Sanders, Ward 
and Marsh note that "..none of the other variables identified in 
categories 2-5 of Table 1, either lagged or unlagged, furnished 
a significant parameter when added to this 'best' equation." 
(ibid. pp.296). It is unclear in this respect if a forced entry 
method was used after the initial equation was specified, or 
whether a further stepwise regression was performed including all 
the initial variables plus the retrospective perception elements 
(lagged or unlagged).
The forced entry method of regression is explored in the 
table below. The model incorporates the elements that Sanders, 
Ward and Marsh specify (personal prospective perceptions, PSBR 
lagged 6 months, exchange rates lagged 12 months^ and 
unemployment unlagged). To this model were added the general and 
personal retrospective perceptions that were not included in the 
original stepwise equation :
(see over page)
We would like to thank David Sanders for providing the 
raw data for lagged exchange rate. Due to the truncated nature 
of the data set we could not calculate this ourselves.
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Table 4.1 Sanders et al Model with Additional Attitude Indices
January 1980 - June 1983
STAND. REGRESS. 
VARIABLE t - STAT COEFFICIENT^
General Retrospective 2.08 0.30
Personal Retrospective -0.37 -0.04
Personal Prospective 2.42 0.33
Exchange Rate (lagg 12) 3.71 0.42
Unemployment 3.75 0.35
PSBR (lagg 6) 2.3 0 0.17
Dependent = Popular. R-Sg. = 0.88 n = 42 D-Watson = 1.77
As we can see, the personal retrospective element clearly fails 
to reach significance and its coefficient shows the wrong sign. 
However, the same cannot be said of the general retrospective 
variable. The parameter has the predicted sign; it is also 
significant at the 2% level (though not at the 1%) . The path 
coefficient (the standardized regression coefficients) show that 
this variable's contribution to the model is comparable with that 
of personal expectations and greater than that of unemployment. 
The results seem to be at odds with the Sanders, Ward and Marsh 
conclusions.
The size of the t-statistic is important here given the 
degree of multicollinearity evident in the model. An examination 
of the correlations between the independent variables highlights 
the problem. The correlations between personal retrospective 
perceptions and both general retrospective and personal 
prospective perceptions are fairly modest.
Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix ; General Retrospective. Personal 
Retrospective and Personal Prospective Perceptions
General Retro Personal Retro Personal Pros 
General Retro 1.00
Personal Retro 0.53 1.00
Personal Prosp. 0.86 0.68 1.00
^. Otherwise known as the 'beta-coefficient'.
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The problem lies with the correlations between personal 
prospective perceptions and general retrospective perceptions. 
At 0.85 this is large and ought to be considered in the light of 
the distorting impact of multicollinearity. As Schreoder et al 
point out,
"While regression coefficients estimated using 
correlated independent variables are unbiased, they 
tend to have larger standard errors than they would 
have in the absence of multicollinearity. This in 
turn means that the t ratios will be smaller. Thus it 
is more likely that one will find the regression 
coefficients not to be significant than in the case 
where no multicollinearity plagues the data." 
(Schroeder et ai., 1986, p.72)
The effects of multicollinearity are obviously relevant in a
context in which elements in a model are dropped as a function
of failing to achieve significance.
The inclusion of a general retrospective element in an
aggregate model seems appropriate, even given Sanders, Ward and
Marsh's stated preference for parsimony and limited
multicollinearity. The other three criteria they give for
judging a model (intuitive plausibility, maximised R-squared and
significance of the parameters) would seem to be met.
Notwithstanding problems with significance testing (associated
with multicollinearity), the inclusion of a general retrospective
element is not obviously intuitively implausible. Besides, the
R-squared for the model in which it is included is 0.88 which
compares favourably with that of Sanders, Ward and Marsh of 0.87
(though this would be expected simply as a function of increasing
in the number of independent variables). Finally, to Sanders,
Ward and Marsh's list of desirable features in a model might be
added the support of evidence from other studies. In this
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instance it is clear from the evidence presented in the preceding 
chapter that general retrospective perceptions figure prominently 
in a number of recent studies on government popularity in the 
United Kingdom and the United States.
The inclusion of the Falklands Factor dummy variables into 
a model of Government popularity (which includes general as well 
as personal elements) still, however, fails to make an impact. 
R-squared is unchanged and with a t-statistic of 0.84 it fails 
to achieve significance. The model still suggests that the 
Falklands Factor was worth little to the Conservative Government 
and that economic factors still predominated.
The problems of model respecification are further
highlighted if we take the initial Sanders, Ward and Marsh model
(personal expectations; PSBR; unemployment; and exchange rate);
remove the prospective variable; and substitute, in turn, the
attitudinal elements that were left out of the stepwise
procedure. This was done as a substitute for reproducing a
stepwise regression including retrospective general and personal
perceptions. The original data base has, sadly, been modified
and truncated and as a result that particular option was
excluded. If, however, the personal retrospective perceptions
variable is substituted for the personal prospective variable,
the R-squared is reduced at 0.81 (c.f. Sanders, Ward and Marsh
at 0.87) : Table 4.3_____ Original Model with Personal
Retrospective Replacement
January 1980 - June 1983 STAND. REGRESS.
t - STAT COEFFICIENT
Personal Retrospective 2.03 0.21
Exchange Rate (lagg 12) 5.06 -0.57
Unemployment 0.80 -0.06
PSBR (lagg 6) 3.02 -0.26
Dependent = Popular. R-Sq. = 0.81 n = 42 D-Watson = 1.70
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At t equal to 2.03 the variable is significant at the 2% level, 
though the path coefficients show a relatively modest 
contribution towards popularity. On the other hand the 
'unemployment' parameter fails to achieve significance.
The situation is, however, quite different if we take the 
general retrospective variable and enter it in the equation in 
the place of personal prospective perceptions.
Table 4.4 Original Model with General Retrospective Replacement 
Januarv 1980 - June 1983
STAND. REGRESS.
VARIABLE t - STAT COEFFICIENT
General Retrospective 4.08 0.52
Exchange Rate (lagg 12) 3.99 -0.42
Unemployment 4.2 3 -0.34
PSBR (lagg 6) 2.73 -0.21
Dependent = Popular. R-Sq. = 0.86 n = 42 D-Watson = 1.67
Here the R-squared is 0.86 (comparable to Sanders, Ward and 
Marsh's 0.87). The general retrospective variable easily 
achieves significance and the path coefficients show it to have 
by far the strongest contribution towards Government 
popularity^. This is in marked contrast to the Sanders, Ward 
and Marsh model where exchange rate outshines the personal 
prospective variable (see below) :
STAND. REGRESS
VARIABLE t - STAT COEFFICIENT
Personal Prospective 4.51 0.44
Exchange Rate (lagg 12) 5.59 -0.49
Unemployment 3.81 -0.19
PSBR (lagg 6) 2.53 -0.25
Dependent = Popular. R-Sq. = 0.87 n = 42 D-Watson = 1.70
The residuals from the model did not correlate 
significantly with any of the SWM economic variables. The 
correlations were done on variables lagged between one and six 
months (the maximum lag allowable given the truncated nature of 
the data base).
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The alternative model featuring general retrospective 
perceptions seems to perform favourably in comparison with 
Sanders, Ward and Marsh's. The comparison extends to the 
separate analysis of economic downswing (July 1979 to December 
1981) and economic upswing (January 1982 to June 1983) in the 
period under consideration. The table below highlights the 
degree of similarity:
Table 4.6 General Retrospective Model : Upswing and Downswing
Gen. Retro. 
Unemployment 
Exchange Rate 
PSBR
R-squared
STANDARDIZED 
COEFFICIENTS 
WHOLE PERIOD 
(n = 42)
0.52
-0.34
-0.42
- 0.21
0.86
STANDARDIZED 
COEFFICIENTS 
DOWNSWING 
(n = 24)
0.20
- 1.02
0.28
-0.09
STANDARDIZED 
COEFFICIENTS 
UPSWING 
(n = 18)
0.42 
—0 .05 
-0.47 
-0.18
0.850.82
Like the Sanders, Ward and Marsh model the coefficients (with the 
possible exception of Exchange Rate) remain fairly consistent in 
terms of their signs*. The R-squared for the three segments are 
also similar (as Sanders, Ward and Marsh report for their model - 
see below) . Again the period is from January 1980 to June 1983. 
Table 4.7 Original Model : Upswing and Downswing
STANDARDIZED 
COEFFICIENTS 
WHOLE PERIOD 
(n = 42)
Personal Pros. 0.44
Unemployment (t) -0.25
Exchange Rate (t-12)-0.49 
PSBR (t-6) -0.19
R-squared 0.87
STANDARDIZED 
COEFFICIENTS 
DOWNSWING 
(n = 24) 
0.28 
-0.76 
0.01 
-0.15
0.85
STANDARDIZED 
COEFFICIENTS 
UPSWING 
(n = 18) 
0.68 
-0.17 
-0.17 
-0.24
0.85
There are obvious methodological qualifications that have
*. The model passes the Chow Test with an 'F-statistic lower 
than that of the SWM model.
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to be acknowledged in this form of exploration. The forced entry 
replacement of different variables in a model already derived 
from stepwise procedures is no substitute for full stepwise 
analysis using all variables considered to be relevant. However, 
the technique does highlight the point that general retrospective 
perceptions can at least be modelled along the lines of personal 
prospective perceptions without drastically modifying the 
explained variance or robustness. The findings are significant 
in the sense that they suggest we do not place too much emphasis 
on just the one attitudinal indicator. The Sanders, Ward and 
Marsh model is parsimonious, but its emphasis on prospective 
perceptions does not sit well with the wealth of research on the 
significance of retrospective evaluations. The initial model 
which Sanders, Ward and Marsh develop is, indeed, the model of 
statistical rectitude and parsimony, but the consideration of a 
retrospective and, particularly, a general retrospective feature 
adds a new dimension of causal complexity. Needless to say the 
causal explanations associated with a complex model embracing 
retrospective and prospective elements at both national and 
personal level, are markedly different from those featuring only 
prospective evaluations and the 'real' economy.
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4.2
It was conjectured at this point that the means for 
calculating the respective attitudinal elements may actually 
impact on the regression equation estimations and add to an 
otherwise complicated approach. Presented with the monthly 
Gallup aggregates shown below Sanders, Ward and Marsh added the 
'improved ' elements together, added the 'deteriorate' elements 
together, and subtracted one from the other to give a single 
figure for that month. We speculated that simply aggregating the 
positive and negative tails might distort the value. 
Individual's experience of marked improvement or deterioration 
might well influence perceptions of the Government more 
forcefully than modest changes. Following Cathrine Marsh (Marsh, 
1989, p.305), in all such questions we, therefore, calculated 
very optimistic responses x2 and left mildly optimistic as they 
stood (likewise for pessimistic elements). Using Marsh's 
example, the table below shows how different summary results can 
be calculated :
GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION. DECEMBER 1984
MARSH
18 — 85 = ”67
GOT A LOT BETTER 1 x2 2
GOT A LITTLE BETTER 16 xl 16
STAYED THE SAME 21
GOT A LITTLE WORSE 33 xl 33
GOT A LOT WORSE 26 x2 52
DON'T KNOW 4
SWM
GOT A LOT BETTER 1
GOT A LITTLE BETTER 16
STAYED THE SAME 21
GOT A LITTLE WORSE 33
GOT A LOT WORSE 26
DON'T KNOW 4
17 - 59 = -42
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The resultant recalculations, for the time period under 
consideration, highlight some interesting features. Firstly, the 
weighted indices show the same decline recovery shape as the 
unweighted used by Sanders, Ward and Marsh. The correlation 
between the respective indices and government popularity are also 
comparable :
Table 4.8 Bivariate Correlation : Economic Perception and
Government
(n = 48)
General Retrospective 0.77 (*)
Weighted General Retro. 0.82 (***)
Personal Retrospective 0.67
Weighted Personal Retro. 0.66
Personal Prospective 0.79 (*)
Weighted Personal Prosp. 0.80 (***)
A point to note, however, is that the weighted general 
retrospective variable is more closely correlated with Government 
popularity than the weighted prospective variable (***). This 
is reversed for the unweighted variables where personal 
prospective is more closely correlated with popularity than 
general retrospective (*) . We will return to this point below.
The analysis of the impact of the weighted attitudinal 
indices proceeded along the lines of the exploration already 
undertaken. Again the full stepwise procedure was not an option 
we could pursue. However, the forced entry method embodying the 
variables in Sanders, Ward and Marsh's original model was 
employed using weighted instead of unweighted indices. The first 
step was to duplicate Sanders, Ward and Marsh's model including 
personal prospective perceptions (weighted) along with lagged 
PSBR and exchange rate, and including the unlagged unemployment
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variable. The results are remarkably similar to those generated 
using the unweighted variable. Again the period covered runs 
from January 1980 to June 1983 :
Table 4.9 Weighted and Unweighted Original Model
t-STAT________  PATH
Weighted Personal Prosp. 3.60 0.40
Exchange Rate (t-12) 5.14 -0.50
(n = 42) Unemployment 3.23 -0.23
PSBR (t-6) 2.28 -0.18
R-squared = 0.85 Durbin -Watson = 1.77
Unweighted Personal Prosp. 4.51 0.44
Exchange Rate (t-12) 5.59 -0.49
(n = 42) Unemployment 3.81 -0.19
PSBR (t-6) 2.53 -0.25
R-squared = 0.87 Durbin-Watson = 1.70
Path coefficients are similar, all variables are significant and 
R-squared at 0.85 is comparable, if smaller, than the original. 
By these criteria the weighted model has less explanatory value, 
although the Durbin-Watson statistic would suggest that 
autocorrelation is not a problem (while for the unweighted the 
statistic falls into the 'uncertainty' region).
As with the initial experiment, the original model is 
extended to include weighted personal and general retrospective 
perceptions. The results are presented below :
Table 4.10 Weighted and Unweighted Model With Added Attitudinal
t-STAT PATH
Weighted General Retrospective 1.98 0.34
Personal Retrospective 0.22 -0.02
Personal Prospective 1.54 0.25
(n = 42) Exchange Rate (t-12) 2.87 -0.37
Unemployment 3.05 -0.31
PSBR (t-6) 2.21 -0.17
Dependent = Popular R-Sq. = 0.86 D-Watson = 1.90
(see over page)
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Unweighted General Retrospective 2.08 0.30
Personal Retrospective 0.37 -0.04
Personal Prospective 2.42 0.33
(n = 42) Exchange Rate (t-12) 3.71 -0.40
Unemployment 3.75 -0.35
PSBR (t-6) 2.30 -0.17
Dependent = Popular. R-Sg. = 0.8 D-Watson = 1.77
The model again roughly compares with the original 
unweighted specification, and it is evident from the Durbin- 
Watson statistic that again autocorrelation is not a significant 
problem. Path coefficients show, among the attitudinal 
variables, the general retrospective element contributing most 
to Government popularity (this being expected given its closer 
correlation with popularity than the weighted personal 
prospective index). However, it is obvious that only one of the 
weighted attitudinal elements achieves significance (general 
retrospective) , and then only at the 5% level. This in 
conjunction with the R-squared of 0.86 (cf. 0.87 unweighted) 
might lead us to conclude that weighting adds nothing of 
explanatory value to our model. The problem of multicollinearity 
is still an issue. Weighted general retrospective, and weighted 
personal prospective perceptions are even more closely correlated 
than their unweighted counterparts (0.88 and 0.85 respectively). 
Again the danger is that the t-statistic is artificially lowered. 
It might also be noted that the coefficient for the weighted 
personal retrospective has the wrong sign and is not significant.
The next step was to duplicate the procedure employed above. 
Sanders, Ward and Marsh's personal prospective variable is 
dropped, and weighted personal and general retrospective elements 
are added to the three economic variables. The results are 
presented below :
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Table 4.11 Weighted Personal Retrospective Model
STAND. REGRESS. 
VARIABLE t - STAT COEFFICIENT
Personal Retro, (weight.) 1.35 0.15
Exchange Rate (lagg 12) 5.20 -0.62
Unemployment 0.74 -0.06
PSBR (lagg 6) 3.12 -0.27
Dependent = Popular. R-Sg. =0.80 n = 42 D-Watson = 1.55
Personal retrospective fails to achieve significance and the 
model has a comparatively low R-square (0.80). However, the 
individual inclusion of general retrospective perceptions is more 
successful :
Table 4.12 Weighted General Retrospective Model
STAND. REGRESS. 
VARIABLE t - STAT COEFFICIENT
General Retro, (weight.) 3.83 0.53
Exchange Rate (lagg 12) 3.16 -0.37
Unemployment 3.84 -0.29
PSBR (lagg 6) 2.73 -0.21
Dependent = Popular. R-Sq. =0.85 n = 42 D-Watson = 1.77
Mirroring the model which includes the unweighted variable, the 
weighted general retrospective element is significant, shows a 
dominant contribution to the dependent variable, and the model 
has a respectable measure of explained variance (R-squared of 
0.85). Still, with R-squared less than the original model, one 
of the Sanders, Ward and Marsh criteria for acceptance of the 
weighted model is not met. Though, again, it is important to 
note that when the Falklands variable was added to the equation 
in no instance did it reach significance or add other than 
modestly to R-squared.
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4.3
There are a number of tentative conclusions that can be 
drawn from the analysis already conducted. As Sanders, Ward and 
Marsh rightly note, model specification is crucially important. 
However, in force entering global and personal retrospective 
variables into an equation derived from stepwise procedures, 
Sanders, Ward and Marsh may be too hasty in dismissing the 
general retrospective variable. In using significance as a 
criterion for accepting or rejecting the model where it is 
included, multicollinearity is a problem which clouds 
interpretation. General retrospective perceptions do achieve 
significance, and this in a context where it is highly correlated 
with other attitudinal variables. As with all problem of 
multicollinearity it is virtually impossible to tease out which 
variable is the more important in determining government 
popularity, but it seem overly hasty to dismiss general 
retrospective perceptions and focus entirely on prospective 
evaluations.
The model which Sanders, Ward and Marsh present does still 
show a degree of multicollinearity, but the more pressing issue 
concerns the variables left out of the model. The personal 
retrospective variable is, in interpretative terms, the most 
troublesome. Why does it fail to figure statistically and 
interpretatively in the models outlined. Statistically, the 
variable is superfluous. High R-squared statistics are achieved 
without it. The problem arises in accounting for the omission 
in Downsian terms. Downs suggests that the voters look to the 
past as a guide to the future. The calculus is straightforward
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and intuitively plausible; other than wishful thinking what 
alternatives sources do the public have at their disposal? We 
intend to return to this issue in the next section, but for the 
mean time it seems as appropriate to flag the importance of 
explanatory cohesion as it does to stress statistical propriety.
The experiment with weighted variables further confirms the 
difficulties associated with multicollinearity and the 
sensitivity of models to the correlation between independent 
variables. With the weighted general retrospective variable more 
highly correlated with popularity than the personal prospective 
variable, the tables are effectively turned and the retrospective 
component seems to come to the fore as a more dominant 
explanatory element. This apart, the use of weighted variables 
did not add statistically to the explanatory capacity of the 
model (with R-squared smaller than for unweighted models). In 
this context, although the weighting of variables seems 
'intuitively plausible' (to use Sanders, Ward and Marsh's phrase) 
the experiment was not a success and was thereafter abandoned.
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4.4
A further point concerns the manner in which Sanders, Ward 
and Marsh go on to develop their model. They speculate that it 
may be possible to model personal expectations as the dependent 
variable using a stepwise procedure on the objective economic 
time series data already employed. Having performed the
regression with personal prospective attitudes as the dependent 
variable, they feel that a number of 'real' economic variables 
explain or, rather, predict the fluctuations in personal 
expectations. The resultant model includes consumer durable 
expenditure (lagged 12 months), a taxation index (lagged one 
month), short-time working (lagged one month) and interest rates 
(lagged one month). R-squared is a respectable 0.76 and all 
variables achieve significance. Adding a Falklands dummy
variable to the equation does not increase R-squared and
furnishes a non-significant coefficient.
Sanders, Ward and Marsh feel at this point they have 
established a plausible and statistically sound explanation for 
government popularity. The four variables listed above impact 
upon individual's expectations about their personal financial 
position in the future. These expectations, possibly in
conjunction with media cued perceptions of unemployment, exchange 
rates and PSBR, adequately explain government popularity. At no 
point do we need to include a Falklands Factor; if the Falklands 
War made a contribution it was essentially a limited one.
But the explanatory problem outlined in the previous section 
remains. Why do personal retrospective perceptions not figure 
in the model of personal prospective perceptions. The objective
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economic elements used to predict personal expectations are 
lagged by twelve months or less. Yet the underlying thesis is 
Downsian in character, and the personal retrospective question 
is framed in a 12 month context ("In the last 12 months has the 
financial situation in your household"...). So the question 
remains, if 'real' economic trends impact on the individual, why 
do personal retrospective perceptions not figure statistically 
in the model? Why have recourse to surrogate measures of 'real' 
economic impact when people's relative perceptions of their past 
and present lot should, it would seem, tap this directly. Surely 
an individual's perception of their circumstances should offer 
a better indication of the direct impact of broader macroeconomic 
fluctuations than aggregated government statistics.
To explore this line of reasoning we sought to develop a 
model of personal prospective perceptions which would incorporate 
only attitudinal variables. On the 'intuitively plausible' 
assumption that the 'real' impact of macro-economic fluctuations 
would and should register through individual's perceptions of 
their immediate position, the economic statistics elements were 
dropped completely. What we are left with are a series of 
variables that relate to personal and general perceptions, and 
to the individual's immediate economic circumstances.
The variables chosen included personal retrospective 
perceptions, general retrospective perceptions, general 
prospective perceptions and a variable which we felt might mirror 
or plausibly shadow "consumer durable expenditure". We felt this 
was appropriate as this variable was, statistically, the largest 
economic contributor to personal prospective perceptions in
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Sanders, Ward and Marsh's model. The question asked was, "When 
you have paid all the things you cannot get out of paying, for 
example, rent, rates, fares etc. would you say that the amount 
left in your pocket is more than a year ago, the same or less?". 
The resultant perception can plausibly register the income the 
individual can either save or spend.
The other three variables were included to cover the other 
eventualities. Backward looking perceptions of the personal and 
global situation, and attitudes towards the future of the 
national economy. The assumption here is that expectations must 
come from somewhere; they are not conjured out of the air. The 
attitudinal calculus was, 'both the country and myself have been 
doing well. The country is doing well too. I have more money 
to save or spend on consumer durables. I can therefore expect 
that the same will be true in the future'. The associated 
popularity element might well be, 'any government that presides 
over such situation deserves my vote'.
The model does not perform particularly well (see table 
below):
Table 4.13 Alternative Attitudinal Model
STANDARDISED
(n = 48) REGRESSION
t-statistic COEFFICIENT
General Retrospective 2.10 0.34
General Prospective 2.66 0.38
Personal Retrospective 4.00 0.49
'Pay-over-staples' 0.32 -0.03
Depend. = Personal Prospective R-squared = 0.82 D-Watson = 1.13
R-squared is a respectable 0.82 and compares favourably with 
Sanders, Ward and Marsh's objective model (0.76). However, with 
the Durbin-Watson statistic 1.13 and n = 48 autocorrelation 
becomes an issue. The model also shows signs of
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multicollinearity. General retrospective and general prospective 
perceptions are closely correlated (at 0.78). Personal 
retrospective perceptions and the 'pay-over-staples' variable are 
similarly correlated (0.77). The 'pay-over-staples' element
fails to achieve significance and has the wrong sign, while 
general retrospective perception just fails to achieve 
significance at 1% level. While the model is based on
assumptions with explanatory plausibility, it is unsatisfactory 
in statistical terms.
The problem may, yet, lie in the choice of time periods. 
The retrospective elements take as their point of reference the 
previous twelve months. As such, for the first ten to twelve 
months or so of the Conservative administration, the indicator 
may be contaminated by perceptions relevant to the last Labour 
Government. In order to deal with this issue the model outlined 
above was reapplied to the time span after the first year of the 
Thatcher administration. In this context the retrospective 
elements should accurately reflect evaluations of the 
Conservative Government alone. The results are reported below:
Table 4.14 Time Restricted Attitudinal Model
June 1980 - June 1983
STANDARDISED
(n = 37) REGRESSION
t-statistic COEFFICIENT
General Retro. 1.72 0.38
General Prospective 1.17 0.23
Personal Retro. 3.55 0.41
'Pay-over-staples' 0.31 0.03
Depend. = Personal Prospective R-Sq. = 0.87 D-Watson = 1.2 6
On R-squared the model performs slightly better. However, all 
but the personal retrospective parameter fail to achieve 
significance. Multicollinearity is obviously still an issue, and
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we chose to deal with this by dropping one or other of the 
personal and global elements. General prospective and 'pay-over- 
staples' were dropped. These variables showed the smallest 
contribution to the model above and were closely correlated with 
their personal or global counterparts. All combinations of 
global and personal variables were tried though particular 
attention was paid to the correlation of residuals with time, 
maximised R-squared and appropriate Durbin-Watson statistics. 
The choice of personal retrospective perceptions and general 
retrospective evaluations was vindicated. It maximised R- 
squared, kept Durbin-Watson within the relevant bounds and 
minimised correlation of residuals with time. The results are 
outlined below :
Table 4.15 Truncated Attitudinal Model
STANDARDISED
(n = 37) REGRESSION
t-statistic COEFFICIENT
General Retrospective 8.18 0.63
Personal Retrospective 5.2 3 0.40
Depend. = Personal Prospective R-Sq. = 0.86 D-Watson = 1.38
The model performs fairly well in comparison with Sanders, Ward
and Marsh. R-squared is higher (cf. 0.76). The residuals are,
however, more highly correlated with time (0.16 compared to 0.05 
in the Sanders, Ward and Marsh model). Yet the model does win 
out; not only in parsimony, but in terms of its explanatory 
plausibility. If, as Sanders, Ward and Marsh suggest, objective 
economic fluctuations impact on the individual, it seems wholly 
appropriate to measure this directly (via the personal 
retrospective variable). The inclusion of a general economic 
variable reinforces the work already done both in Britain and the 
United States on the impact of global evaluations. The model
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seems to confirm that both elements do make an independent 
contribution, and judging by path coefficients, the general 
retrospective variable is dominant^.
The development of the Sanders, Ward and Marsh model still 
leaves us with a number of anomalies. The model might now look 
something like this :
Figure 4,1 : Alternative Attitudinal Model
UNEMPLOYMENT
GENERAL 
RETROSPECT.
PERSONAL
RETROSPECT.
PROSPECTIVE
PERCEPTIONS
POPULARITY
\
■ PSBR
EXCHANGE (t-6)
RATE (t-12)
The situation is complicated by Sanders, Ward and Marsh's
reference to the role of the mass media in facilitating the
influence of PSBR, unemployment and exchange rate.
"The three measures of the objective state of the 
economy...all furnish negative coefficients. Although 
we are unable to demonstrate it here, our strong 
suspicion is that the effects of these variables were 
probably mediated by the speculative and 
interpretative endeavour of the mass media." (Sanders,
Ward and Marsh, ibid., pp297)
Here, it would seem, is a 'sociotropic' understanding of the
underlying dynamics. The focus is not on the immediate, tangible
^. The inclusion of a Falklands dummy adds little to the 
model and yields a parameter that fails to achieve significance.
(n = 37) R-squared = 0.87
Durbin-Watson = 1.42
t-statistic 
General Retrospective 3.89
Personal Retrospective 5.18
Falklands Dummy 0.41
STANDARDISED
REGRESSION
COEFFICIENT
0.58
0.40
0.05
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impact on people's lives that these 'real' variables symbolise, 
but on their expression as cues in a broader 'unreal' or 
rhetorical, battle of information. Much the same is said of 
general retrospective perceptions (or so called 'sociotropic' 
evaluations). If the analytical distinction is firmly drawn 
between personal experience and mediated appreciation then it 
seems appropriate, given the analysis of prospective evaluations 
outlined above, to try to model government popularity as 
parsimoniously as possible, using only those variables which 
relate to personal experience and global evaluation.
The model tested below seeks to do just that. The general 
retrospective variable is used as is the personal retrospective 
element. On top of this we added the Falklands War dummy 
variable and a variable for the arrival of the SDP on the British 
political scene. The inclusion of these elements is justified 
on the grounds of their perceived importance in Mrs. Thatcher's 
first term. They constitute the two most significant political 
phenomena in the 1979 to 1983 parliament. The first constituted 
one of the most direct and tangible threats to the Government of 
the period. The second was, arguably, the most significant 
alteration in the party system in the post war period (as well 
as being symptomatic of a broader Opposition malaise).
The results of this form of modelling are presented below:
Table 4.16 Economic Attitude and Political Event Model
STANDARDISED
April 1980 - June 1983 REGRESSION
(n = 39) t-statistic COEFFICIENT
General Retrospect. 2.92 0.50
Personal Retrospec. 1.27 0.15
Falklands War 2.14 0.38
S.D.P. Formation 3.06 -0.3 6
Dependent = Popularity R-Sq. = 0.82 D-Watson = 1.57
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As with previous models incorporating retrospective elements the 
time span under scrutiny begins just under one year into the 
administration (since the questions are framed in year long 
perspective). The correlation between general retrospective and 
personal retrospective elements may still present problems of 
multicollinearity. Yet, at r = 0.57 this is less of a problem 
than with other models we have considered. So the personal 
retrospective variable's failure to achieve significance should 
perhaps be treated with less caution. On the whole, though, the 
model performs quite well. The general retrospective element is 
comfortably significant as is the SDP variable. Somewhat 
surprisingly the Falklands War variable is significant at the 2% 
level (though not at 1%). The R-squared value at 0.82 is lower 
than the original Sanders, Ward and Marsh calculation (0.87), but 
is comfortably within range. At -0.06 the residuals from the 
model are not highly correlated with time. Nor are the residuals 
significantly correlated with any of the 'objective' economic 
indicators which Sanders, Ward and Marsh use. The highest 
correlation between residuals and the economic variables was for 
Money Supply at r = 0.25*.
*. When this variable was entered in the model it merely 
increased R-squared from 0.82 to 0.83, but furnished a parameter 
that fell short of significance (t = 1.59).
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4.5
Thus far the primary technique employed has been OLS
regression, and in this we mirror the emphasis of the original
Sanders, Ward and Marsh study. However, other authors have used
different techniques. Clarke and Whiteley's analysis of macro
economic performance and government support favours Box-Jenkins
(Clarke, Mishler and Whiteley, 1990). On the other hand. Peel
et al use a form of lagged endogenous variable model to forecast
government popularity into mid-1992 (Peel, Sandu and Byers,
1990), as do Holden and Peel (1985). Indeed, Sanders, Marsh and
Ward have explored in some detail the advantages and
disadvantages of the respective techniques (Sanders and Ward,
forthcoming) . They note that while OLS is appealing in the sense
that the results are easy to interpret in causal terms, there are
still problems associated with serially correlated error. In
reviewing the competing alternatives they reach some tentative
conclusions. They note that any technique must allow the
translation of model parameters into some form of individual
level decision calculus. This essential element,
.."renders the lagged endogenous variable 
method the most appropriate of the class of 
Autoregressive, Lagged Endogenous Variable 
and Box-Jenkins techniques for analysing 
Government popularity data." (ibidf.)
With this in mind we sought to examine our model using the lagged
endogenous technique.
We looked first at the. model we had developed using simple
OLS :
= (General Retrospective) + (Personal Retrospective)
+ (Falklands) + (S.D.P.)
This was augmented by the inclusion of the lagged endogenous
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variable giving the final specification :
Yt = (Yt_i) + (GR) + (PR) + (Falklands) + (S.D.P.)
The question wording on the general retrospective and personal
retrospective questions was backward regarding so we felt it
appropriate to drop some data points (as these might be
contaminated by perceptions of the previous Government). This
in effect means n = 39^. The results are presented below ;
Table 4.17 Economic Attitude, Political Event and Lagged
Endogenous Variable Model
Variable_____ Parameter t-stat______ Stand. Rea. Coeffic.
Y(t-l) 0.51 4.07 0.49
Gen.Ret. 0.19 4.17 0.60
Per.Ret. -0.07 0.78 0.09
S.D.P. -3.61 2.48 0.25
Falklands 0.43 0.19 0.03
Dependent = Government Popularity R-Sq. = 0.88
The Personal Retrospective Perception and the Falkland Factor 
variables signally fail to achieve significance. If we judge by 
the standard regression coefficient. General Retrospective 
Perception, of the remaining three variables, makes the strongest 
contribution to Government popularity (stronger than the lagged 
endogenous variable). The model compares favourably with the 
Sanders, Ward and Marsh specification with an R-Square of 0.88 
and autocorrelation is largely absent®.
The realisation that we can successfully model popularity 
using general retrospective attitudes and political events led 
us to take one last shot at re-specifying the model. Given the
^. We extended the time period marginally to start 10 months 
into the Conservative Government.
®. Lagrange Multiplier Statistic suggests no first or second 
order autocorrelation. Residuals are normally distributed and no 
heteroscedasticity is evident.
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wealth of literature on attribution, the object was to tie in not 
only the economy in general, but the Government's place in 
managing economic affairs. The data set we had at our disposal 
offered us a question which would suit this purpose : "Do the 
Government's policies for tackling the economic situation give 
you the feeling that they are or are not handling the situation 
properly". A variable was constructed from aggregated responses 
to this question.
The 'Handle' variable is not as unambiguously 'sociotropic' 
as the General Retrospective one previously employed, but it is 
sufficiently close for our needs. We tried to model Government 
popularity without the lagged endogenous variable included and, 
as expected, ran into problems with first and second order 
autocorrelation. The model was thus re-specified including the 
lagged popularity variable, the final result looking like this: 
= Yt_i + Handle + Personal Retro. + Falklands + S.D.P. 
The results are shown below^ :
Table 4.18 Lagged Endogenous Model Incorporating 'Handle'
Variable
Variable_____Parameter t-stat______ Stand. Reg. Coeffic.
Y(t-l) 0.35 2.90 0.34
Handle 2.22 4.44 0.53
Per.Ret. -0.02 0.30 -0.03
S.D.P. -1.86 1.27 -0.13
Falklands 2.36 1.25 0.17
Dependent = Government Popularity R-Sq. = 0.89
The results look remarkably similar to those of the previous 
model. The personal retrospective element performs badly; again
^. Again the Lagrange Multiplier Statistic suggests no first 
or second order autocorrelation. Residuals are normally 
distributed and no heteroscedasticity is evident.
Ill
failing to achieve significance. The difference lies in the 
failure of the remaining political event variables to achieve 
significance. Again the nominal sociotropic element seems to 
dominate the equation, if we judge from the standardised 
regression coefficient.
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4.6
What lessons can be drawn from the re-analysis of the 
original Sanders, Ward and Marsh model? Certainly there is a 
central difficulty in modelling popularity which relies heavily 
on 'objective' economic data. The statistics reflect economic 
changes and fluctuations, but are in a sense epiphenomenal. They 
are often aggregated, averaged and relativised, and are likely 
to constitute only a rough guide to the concrete experiences of 
individual citizens. The problem in modelling popularity with 
aggregate economic data lies in their dual existence. However 
rough, they are reflections of what is happening in the 'real' 
economy. Yet they have another incarnation as government 
statistics, which in themselves make news. This is true of 
consumer spending, budget tax increases and is certainly the case 
in relation to unemployment, interest rates, retail sales, 
balance of payment figures and exchange rates. In this 
manifestation they have the potential to affect judgements on the 
state of the countrv or the buoyancy of the national economy.
The questions addressed in this chapter concern the 
relationship between these statistics and aggregated individual 
perceptions. To a lesser extent they concern the form of 
statistical technique employed in the analysis. The original 
Sanders, Ward and Marsh model focuses on the impact of personal 
prospective evaluations on government popularity. Retrospective 
elements seem to have been entered subsequently, but dropped 
after failing to achieve significance. Thereafter they are 
disregarded. A difficulty then arises in explaining the forces 
that generate such evaluations. Retrospective variables are not
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considered, though the explanatory framework is couched in terms 
of the impact of past, 'real' economic fluctuations on current 
evaluations of the individual's prospects.
Inclusion in the model of unemployment, PSBR lagged six 
months and exchange rates lagged twelve months further 
complicates the picture. Sanders, Ward and Marsh speculate that 
media representations may explain the impact of these variables. 
However, in defending themselves against the charge of simply 
employing a stepwise technique on many variables (in a form of 
broomstick exercise), they justify the retention of lagged 
variables by virtue of their delayed impact on people's actual 
lives.
The attempt to model prospective perceptions using a 
combination of retrospective variables was intended to tease out 
the contribution of global and personal perceptions to 
evaluations of the future. The relative success of the model is 
testimony to the difficulty in sorting out the underlying causal 
processes. The combination of general and personal elements 
(with the former dominant) seems to explain personal prospective 
evaluations more adequately than Sanders, Ward and Marsh. 
Explained variance is higher, the model is more parsimonious 
(using two rather than three causal variables), and, in relying 
on personal retrospective perceptions, it addresses more directly 
the issue of actual (or perceived) impact rather than inferred 
impact (via aggregate economic statistics).
The relative success of this form of modelling leaves us 
with some further conundrums. The first concerns the place of 
the retrospectively driven evaluations in Sanders, Ward and
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Marsh's broader model of Government popularity. The way Sanders, 
Ward and Marsh explain the model (in terms of the mass media and 
impact on personal lives) led us to consider whether a simpler 
model using only retrospective elements and political event 
variables might not be more effective in explaining Government 
popularity. This led us to construct a model using personal and 
general retrospective variables in tandem with a Falklands dummy 
and a variable mirroring the establishment of the Social 
Democratic Party. The results of this exercise left us with a 
structure that meets some, though not all of Sanders, Ward and 
Marsh's criteria for a good model. They focus on intuitive 
plausibility; maximised R-squared; significance and robustness 
of all parameters; and avoidance of collinearity. To this list 
might be added parsimony, explanatory clarity and support from 
parallel studies.
We would submit that the model we explored has as much 
intuitive plausibility as that of Sanders, Ward and Marsh. The 
coefficients of the lagged endogenous and sociotropic variables 
have the expected sign and are significant. On R-squared the 
model does not score as well. At 0.82 it is lower than Sanders, 
Ward and Marsh (cf. 0.87). This touches on an issue flagged 
already concerning the propriety of emphasising predictive 
capacity over explanatory lucidity. It might be suggested that 
what our model loses in explained variance it makes up for in 
parsimony and clarity. We might speculate that the effects of 
change over time (in both the personal and global spheres) are 
registered by the individual and impact directly on Government 
popularity (or indirectly via evaluations of future prospects).
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CHAPTER FIVE
CROSS SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF GALLUP SURVEY : OCTOBER 1981 
5.1
The focus here is on cross sectional analysis of a single 
representative Gallup survey. The survey is from the series 
which form the substance of Sanders, Ward and Marsh's study - 
namely the Gallup Political Index. The Index runs as a monthly 
digest of public opinion. It incorporates a variety of questions 
- some asked consistently over a long period, others as one-off 
elements paid for by sponsors. We are more interested in the 
former as they are the building blocks from which Sanders, Ward 
and Marsh constructed their original model. The aggregated 
responses form the base for the monthly elements in Sanders, Ward 
and Marsh's time series analysis. The particular month chosen 
was October 1981. This was chosen partly for convenience (the 
data is readily available from the E.S.R.C. Archive at Essex), 
partly for the questions included (including those on the economy 
and on partisanship).
The survey was conducted at a time when the fortunes of the 
Conservative Party were at a low ebb. The economic upswing had 
not yet materialised and unemployment had only just begun to show 
a slight levelling off. Conservative popularity was approaching 
but had not yet reached its nadir. Asked who they would vote 
for, 25.5% said Conservative - slightly higher than in July and 
August of that year, but not as low as December. The month was 
chosen as it represented a low point in Conservative fortunes and 
preceded the upturn in the economy and Government popularity. 
If the economy does impact on personal or global perceptions we
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might expect this to show most markedly at such a time. The 
period was also chosen to precede the Falklands War.
The questions we wished to ask of the 1084 respondents were 
many. What were the relationships between the different levels 
of perception (personal and global - prospective and 
retrospective)? Were evaluations differentiated by class? How 
were these forward and backward looking perceptions related to 
the individual's current financial position? If the Downsian 
thesis is sustained, assumptions concerning these relationships 
need to be explored. Answers we hoped would also help elaborate 
the Sanders, Ward and Marsh model.
We wanted to look at the role of partisanship in structuring 
the relationship between levels of perception, and, indeed, the 
perceptions themselves. Bearing in mind the controversy 
surrounding the conceptualisation of partisanship (and its role 
in structuring perception) we wanted to explore its impact at the 
individual level. The debate is also germane to the appreciation 
of the Sanders, Ward and Marsh model. There is still a question 
mark over the role of partisanship in shaping perceptions rather 
than vice versa - this being particularly relevant to the 
personal prospective element of Sanders, Ward and Marsh's model. 
We wanted to look at the relationship between perceptions, voting 
preference and partisanship (though the cross sectional nature 
of the data precludes an approach couched unambiguously in terms 
of cause and effect).
With some qualifications we were, however, able to look at 
the relationship between vote in 1979, intention to vote at the 
time of the survey, and economic perceptions. In this context
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we felt that it might be argued that changes in intention and 
alterations in perception of personal or global circumstances are 
a little less difficult to conceptualise in terms of cause and 
effect.
We wanted to go on to look at the unemployed. As a group 
of particularly disadvantaged individuals we wanted to see if 
their perceptions of their lot and their views on the Government 
differed significantly from those of the rest of the population. 
Were they particularly pessimistic, disinterested or optimistic? 
Were they more or less likely to vote against the government as 
a function of the decline in their standard of living. Did they 
have a particularly jaundiced view of the national economy? 
Despite the fact that the unemployed are less likely to actually 
vote in elections, we felt that this numerically large element 
of the public merited attention in their own right. They are 
also a group on whom we hoped we might test the raw Downsian 
'pocketbook' thesis.
Lastly, our intention was to look at the structure of 
economic responses on the questionnaire, with a view to assessing 
how levels of perception relate to one another. From the 
analysis we hoped to determine what sources individuals drew upon 
to give those perceptions substance.
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5.2
The aggregated perceptions of the sample in October 1981 
were distributed as follows :
Table 5.1 Aggregate Economic Perceptions ; Oct. 1981
General Personal General Personal
Retrosp. Retrosp. Prospect. Prospect.
LOT BETTER 0.2 2.6 0.9 1.7
LITTLE BETTER 5.9 8.5 19.1 11.6
THE SAME 9.0 31.9 23.1 40.4
LITTLE WORSE 28.5 29.8 24.6 27.3
LOT WORSE 53.7 25.5 25.2 13.7
DON'T KNOW 2.6 1.8 7.1 5.4
Clearly the sample had fairly grim memories of the past, both in
personal and national terms. Looking to the future there seems
to have been more optimism - especially if the focus is on
national wellbeing. The distribution here is more evenly
balanced between optimism and pessimism. We wanted to look
beneath these surface features at the relationship, if any,
between the different levels of perception.
First we thought it appropriate to look at the relationship
between class and economic perception. The question was, do the
respective classes have distinctive attitudinal profiles when it
comes to economics? Our results are set out below ;
Table 5.2 Aggregate Economic Perceptions Against Class
General Retrospective Perception by Class
A B Cl C2 D E
BETTER 7% 12% 8% 4% 4% 5%
SAME 13 14 11 8 7 9
WORSE 73 72 80 85 87 83
D/K 7 2 2 4 2 3
n 15 122 259 344 214 129
General Prosoective Perceotion bv Class
A B Cl C2 D E
BETTER 53% 30% 25% 17% 11% 18%
SAME 20 26 27 21 23 18
WORSE 20 37 42 55 59 52
D/K 7 7 5 7 7 12
n 15 122 259 344 214 129
119
Personal Prospective Perception bv Class
A B Cl C2 D E
BETTER 13% 13% 20% 11% 12% 8
SAME 67 50 43 34 40 41
WORSE 20 34 33 47 43 47
D/K 0 3 4 7 6 4
n = 15 122 259 344 214 129
Personal Retrospective Perception bv Class
A B Cl C2 D E
BETTER 7% 14% 14% 11% 10% 6
SAME 80 41 32 29 29 31
WORSE 13 43 53 58 58 63
D/K 0 2 2 2 2 1
n = 15 122 259 344 214 129
We have to be wary about small numbers in the 'A' category, 
but otherwise we can say something about the distribution. It 
is clear that there are not huge differences across the classes 
on any of the economic issues. The largest differences are not 
those across the Cl - C2 divide. Here the break is between 
categories B-to-D and category E (though in many instances the 
difference is not large). It would seem there is no clear class 
community of ideas on the economy, personal or global.
Our second focus was on the relationship between prospective 
and retrospective elements of perception at both the national and 
personal levels. The question was, are individuals consistent 
in their appreciation of trends in the respective spheres? The 
answer is a qualified 'no'. First we looked at consistency in 
retrospective perceptions (personal and national) . 'Consistants' 
were defined by their responses on a five point scale on both 
personal and global questions. Responses available to those 
questioned were that, things had got, 'a lot better', 'a little 
better', were 'the same'; had got, 'a little worse' or 'a lot 
worse'. A 'don't know' category is also included. The
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categories were collapsed into 'better' , same', 'worse' or 
'don't know', and 'consistents' were those who gave the same 
response on both questions^.
Of the 1082 respondents who could be coded, scarcely 54.3% 
were categorised as retrospectively consistent ("Cramer's V" in 
this instance 0.11). Crosstabulating prospective perceptions 
(comparing general prospective and personal prospective 
perceptions) 48.7% of the 1083 who could be coded were consistent 
(Cramer's V 0.25). We did recognise that there might be an 
overlap in the two groups. Retrospective 'consistents' may also 
be prospectively consistent. However, individuals may be 
consistent in retrospective perception, but inconsistent 
otherwise; they may have the same prospective view but different 
retrospective perceptions. Thus we felt it important to isolate 
the groups independently. Finally we looked at those who were 
consistent across all four levels of perception (those whose 
general, prospective and their personal and global appreciations 
were all the same). Of the 1082 who could be coded, only 23.8% 
were consistent across all questions!
What can be made of these figures? It would appear that 
individuals are far less consistent in their perceptions than 
might be imagined. Prospective perceptions are more closely 
associated than retrospective, though it could not be said there 
was an overwhelming overlap. The relationships are not
This is a rather more strict interpretation of 
'consistent' than might be arrived at by simply comparing raw 
responses. It was felt that survey measures are insufficiently 
precise to categorise as inconsistent someone who says their 
personal circumstances have got 'a little better' while the 
perception of the general situation is that it is 'a lot better' 
(Worcester, 1991).
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particularly close. It would seem that levels of perception in 
a very substantial proportion of the sample are independent of 
one another. To this it might be added that where the 
individuals share the same perception at global and personal 
level the inference cannot be held that one element is 
necessarily extrapolated one from the other. The most that can 
be said is that there exists the possibility that this is the 
case.
The implication for the modelling at aggregate level are 
important. It might have been possible to justify dropping the 
general prospective or general retrospective variables by making 
the assumption that they were, in a sense, derivative. An 
individual may think that the general situation in the country 
had deteriorated or was about to. Yet he or she could 
conceivably have extrapolated from their perception of their own 
position. Personal experience is still the locus of opinion 
formation. If economy of effort is of the essence, as the 
rational choice theorists would have us imagine, this might be 
a defensible assumption (utility is, after all, maximised net of 
cost). However, if we look at expressed opinions, we find that 
a large section of the electorate are actually inconsistent. The 
assumption in this sense is challenged.
Do the retrospective 'consistents' we identified have any 
distinctive social characteristics? The group were isolated from 
those with inconsistent perceptions and compared on such criteria 
as, employment status, social class, self-ascribed social class, 
age and gender. Those consistent on their retrospective 
perceptions were more likely to be over thirty five than under
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A B Cl C2 D E
26% 41% 51% 56% 57% 68%
73 59 49 43 43 31
(dp=10%), and fractionally more likely to be male. There is an
upward graduation in consistency from social classes A/B to E :
Table 5.3 Consistency Against Class
CONSISTENT 
INCONSIST.
Clearly the lower down the socio-economic scale, the more likely 
is consistency. A similar pattern is evident with respect to 
self-ascribed class as we move from 'Upper Class' through to 
'Working Class'. The reason for this is far from obvious, but 
may be a function of education or sophistication in appreciation 
of the complexity of the economic environment. It is also likely 
that individuals in non-manual occupations were still comfortably 
well off even in the depth of a recession they could not be 
unaware of. Conversely, those further down the socio-economic 
ladder are not only badly off themselves, but are similarly aware 
of national economic deterioration.
The most obvious socio-economic variable that distinguishes
consistents from inconsistents is employment status. The table
below highlights the features of the relationship :
Table 5.4 Retrospective Consistency Against Employment Status
Retrospectivelv Consistent
EMPLOYED HOUSE
SELF-EMP P/TIME UNEMPL. RETIRE. WIFE STUDENT 
CONSIST. 48% 54% 70% 63% 51% 48%
INCONSIST. 51 45 29 36 48 51
The retired were more likely to be consistent, and the unemployed
much more likely to be consistent than the other socioeconomic
groups. However, if we look at the perceptions themselves it is
clear that it is only on their personal retrospective perceptions
that the unemployed seem to be out of step with the other groups
(and here the difference is not startling) ;
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Table 5.5 General Retrospective Perception Against
Employment Status
General.
Retro. EMPLOYED/ HOUSE
Percept. SELF-EMP P/TIME UNEMPL. RETIRE. WIFE STUDENT
"GOOD" 5% 9% 4% 4% 6% 7%
"SAME" 10 9 3 11 6 5
"WORSE" 81 75 88 81 84 84
"D/K" 2 4 4 2 2 1
There appears to be a degree of consensus across groupsi on the
nature of the global situation (though a lesser degree of
consensus is evident when we look at personal retrospective
perceptions) :
Table 5.6 Personal Retrospective Perception Aaainst
Employment Status
Person.
Retro. EMPLOYED/ HOUSE
Percept. SELF-EMP P/TIME UNEMPL. RETIRE. WIFE STUDENT
"GOOD" 15% 13% 7% 4% 11% 5%
"SAME" 35 26 20 31 32 42
"WORSE" 48 60 69 62 54 48
"D/K" 1 - 3 1 2 3
Not surprisingly the unemployed and retired are in this respect 
more likely to say their personal situation has deteriorated than 
their employed counterparts.
If we turn our attention to the individuals who are 
consistent on their prospective perceptions some similarities are 
evident. Males tend to be fractionally more consistent than
females; age is associated with neither consistency nor
inconsistency. Gradation by class is far less pronounced than 
it was for individuals who were retrospectively consistent. The 
table presented below gives the details :
Table 5.7 Prospective Consistency Against Class
CONSISTENT
INCONSIST.
A B Cl C2 D E
33% 48% 43% 52% 47% 53%
66 51 56 47 52 46
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À similar patternless distribution is reproduced for class self­
ascription categories. Likewise, prospectively consistent 
respondents were not as conspicuously differentiated by 
employment status as those who were retrospectively consistent;
Table 5.8 Prospective Consistency Aaainst Employment Status
EMPLOYED HOUSE
SELF-EMP P/TIME UNEMPL. RETIRE. WIFE STUDENT 
CONSIST. 46% 51% 56% 51% 45% 47%
INCONSIST. 53 48 43 48 54 52
It is clear that prospectively consistent respondents were not
differentiated by their socio-economic characteristics.
Finally if we look at those respondents who were consistent 
on all economic perceptions (some 258 souls or 23.8% of the 
sample), we find roughly comparable results to those obtained if 
only retrospective consistents are isolated. Those over thirty 
five are marginally more consistent; males are very fractionally 
more consistent than females; and the working classes tend to be 
more consistent (judged by either objective or self-ascriptive 
criteria).
On the whole it would appear that in terms of socio-economic 
criteria there is little that startlingly differentiates 
'consistents' from those who show independent levels of 
perception. However, a point worth commenting upon is that the 
lower down the class ladder an individual is placed or places 
themselves, the more likely they are to have consistent views on 
retrospective perceptions and are more likely to have consistent 
views across all prospective and retrospective perceptions. The 
Gallup data does not allow us to determine whether this is a 
function of education or of other social or psychological 
features.
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5.3
If there are few socio-economic characteristics which 
differentiate consistents from inconsistents, are there any 
political or psychological attributes which do? We obviously 
wished to focus on the voting behaviour of the respondents. 
Likewise we wanted to determine whether those voting intentions 
differed from their reported 1979 vote (whether they were stable 
in their political preferences).
Both approaches have their difficulties. The variable on 
'voting intention' was constructed from a combination of 
responses. A traditionally structured question ("If there was 
a general election tomorrow"..), followed by one probing those 
not stating a preference (If "Don't Know". "Which party would you 
be most inclined to vote for?"), was used to code all 
respondents. Vote preference was coded for a response to either 
of these questions, which left only 11.3% in the "Don't know" 
category. A variable for 'change in preference' was constructed 
using a combination of contemporary 'vote intention' and reported 
voting behaviour in 1979.
There are two difficulties with these variables : the first 
concerns memory; the second absolute numbers. The question, "For 
which party did you vote [in the 1979 General Election]?", 
excluding "Didn't vote", produced 41% for the Conservatives, 45% 
for Labour and 11% for the Liberals. This is clearly at odds 
with the actual result (43.9% Conservatives, 36.9% Labour and the 
13.8% Liberals - Leonard 1991, p.200). The difference may be a 
function of flawed memory or, given the poor performance of the 
Government at the time, embarrassment. The second problem is
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with absolute numbers. Having removed those who had 'moved'
between non-Government parties, and leaving aside those who could
not be coded as a function of not having voted in 1979, the
numbers are small : Table 5.9 Movement to and from the Government
No. %
AWAY FROM GOVERNMENT 165 15.2
NO CHANGE 519 47.9
TO THE GOVERNMENT 7 0.6
LEFT UNCODED 214 17.7
NON-GOVERNMENT CHANGE 179 16.5
When, in particular, we have so few individuals changing
preference in favour of the government, we have to be wary of
interpreting without qualification.
Notwithstanding the problems presented by these issues, it
is clear from our analysis that consistency was clearly related
to party preference. Dropping the "Don't Knows" and the few who
voted for non-mainstream parties the results are as follows^ :
Table 5.10 Retrospective, Prospective and Overall Consistents
By Vote
Retrospective 'Consistents'
CON. CENTRE LAB.
CONSISTENT 36% 58% 61%
INCONSIST. 63 41 38
Prospective 'Consistents'
CON. CENTRE LAB.
CONSISTENT 39% 49% 53%
INCONSIST. 60 50 46
'Consistent' Across All Economic Perceptions
CON. CENTRE LAB.
CONSISTENT 8% 27% 30%
INCONSIST. 91 73 69
It is clear that opposition party supporters have a clear
tendency to consistency. The relationship is most pronounced for
those consistent across all levels. Given the state of the
^. All cells contain twenty or more cases.
127
economy at the time and the balance of perception skewed toward 
the negative, it is perhaps not surprising that the Conservative 
party supporters display least consistency. The relationship 
could represent the expression of underlying partisan attachments 
(a theme we will return to in the next section) . It may also 
reflect the nature of Labour's so-called natural constituency, 
which, coming from the lower socio-economic groupings, might be 
expected to both feel the pinch of the recession and be aware of 
its national ramifications.
The relationship between consistent and altered voting 
intention is a little more difficult to appreciate given the 
difficulties already outlined:Table 5.11 Retrospective,
Prospective and Overa11
Consistents By Vote Movement
Retrospectively Consistent
AWAY
FROM TO
GOVERN. UNCHANGED GOVERN
CONSISTENT 58% 53% 57%
(96) (278) (4)
INCONSIST. 41 46 42
(68) (241) (3)
Prospectively Consistent
AWAY
FROM TO
GOVERN. UNCHANGED GOVERN
CONSISTENT 50% 47% 57%
(83) (247) (4)
INCONSIST. 49 52 42
(82) (272) (3)
Consistent Across All Perceptions
AWAY
FROM TO
GOVERN. UNCHANGED GOVERN
CONSISTENT 28% 22% 14%
(47) (119) (1)
INCONSIST. 71 77 85
(118) (400) (6)
The results of the analysis of this relationship are
128
presented above^. With reservations it is possible to say that 
little distinguishes those who moved away from support for the 
Government from those who were unchanged , in terms of their 
consistency - at any level. However, the numbers in the cells 
relating to those who had moved towards the Government prevent 
us from making generalisations with any confidence.
Setting aside the social and political characteristics of 
'consistents', we can move on to a more important aspect of their 
dispositions - partisanship. The question is, what is the 
relationship between the strength of partisan attachment and 
consistency in perceptions of the economy?
One prediction that might be made could be that the more 
partisan the individual, the more likely that he or she would be 
consistent across perceptions. The obvious partisan dynamic 
would be that Conservative partisans would be less inclined to 
think their personal situation was or would be bad, and that this 
would extend to appreciation of past and present global 
perceptions. Cognitive dissonance would drive the individual 
towards consistency. The reverse would be true of non-
Conservative partisans being less likely to think the 
Conservative Government was associated with prosperity - be it 
at personal or national level (prospectively or retrospectively) . 
We attempted to test this hypothesis using the survey responses 
available to us. Unfortunately the Gallup questionnaire has a 
separate question for strength of partisanship ("Do you consider 
yourself close to any particular party? If so, do you feel your
^. Cell frequencies are placed in parenthesis; percentages 
are for columns, and have been truncated.
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self to be very close to this party, fairly close or merely a 
sympathiser?" - our emphasis).
The structure is not typical of partisan question wording, 
but is we feel sufficiently close to the essence of the partisan 
probe to allow for analysis along these lines. In this instance 
the partisan question responses were dichotomised ('very close' 
/ 'fairly close' - 'merely sympathiser' / 'not close' / 'don't 
know'). The results are somewhat surprising and are outlined 
below,^4
Table 5.12 Retrospective, Prospective and Overall Consistents
By Partisanship
Retrospectivelv Consistent
PARTISAN NON-PARTISAN
CONSISTENT 55% 54%
INCONSIST. 44 46
c. 100 c. 100
Prospectivelv Consistent
PARTISAN NON-PARTISAN
CONSISTENT 49% 48%
INCONSIST. 50 51
c. 100 c. 100
Consistent Across All Perceptions
PARTISAN NON-PARTISAN
CONSISTENT 24% 23%
INCONSIST. 76 76
c. 100 c. 100
It is quite clear that partisanship does not push the individual
towards consistency at any level. This might be understandable
if we are focusing on consistency across all economic
perceptions; it might be hypothesised that it would take a strong
partisanship indeed to force consistency across all levels. This
notion is less easy to sustain in relation to retrospective or
No cell contains less than 55 cases.
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prospective consistency in isolation. The effects of
partisanship (in terms of consistency at least) are, in this 
respect, negligible.
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5.4
Cognitive dissonance does not appear to drive the individual 
towards consistency, but we might enquire whether it does 
influence the way the economy is perceived at the various levels. 
We examined the relationship between economic perceptions and 
voting intentions. The question was ; are individuals of a 
Conservative disposition less likely than others to view the 
national situation or their own personal circumstances in a 
negative light? To determine if this is the case we collapsed 
the voting responses into Conservatives (with Conservative 
intentions stated initially or offered when probed), 'Floating 
Voters' (those without an initial preference, and stating none 
when probed) and 'non-Conservatives' (intending to vote other 
than Conservative, or likely to when probed) . Voting preferences 
were then crosstabulated against each of the retrospective and 
prospective variables, tapping perception of change or likely 
change over a twelve month period. The results are presented 
below; the percentages represent columns, and the column totals 
are in parenthesis :
Table 5.13 Economic Perceptions Aaainst Partisanship
CON FLOAT. non-CON.
GOT BETTER 18.3 5.2 2.8
STAY THE SAME 22.9 9.6 5.1 Cramer's
GOT WORSE 58.7 85.2 92.1 = .26
100 100 100
n = 1055 (218) (115) (722)
Personal Retrosoective Perceptions
CON FLOAT. non-CON.
GOT BETTER 16.8 10.9 9.6
STAY THE SAME 45.1 27.7 29.2 Cramer's
GOT WORSE 37.9 59.8 59.9 = . 13
100% 100% 100%
n = 1064 (226) (119) (719)
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General Prospective Perceptions
CON FLOAT. non-CON.
GETTING BETTER 52.4 16.2 12.9
STAYING THE SAME 24.1 29.7 24.3
GETTING WORSE 23.6 54 . 1 62.8
100% 100% 100%
n = 1006 (212) (111) (683)
Personal Prospective Perceptions
CON FLOAT. non-CON.
GETTING BETTER 23.2 11.3 11.6
STAYING THE SAME 55.0 44.3 38.5
GETTING WORSE 21.8 44.3 49.9
100% 100% 100%
n = 1026 (220) (115) (691)
Cramer's V 
= .29
Cramer's V 
= .16
The closest relationship is that between voting intention 
and general prospective perception, and it is comparable with 
the association between voting intention and general 
retrospective perception. The patterning of the latter is quite 
striking and is not reproduced in any of the other 
crosstabulations. Almost all the 'floating voters' and 'non- 
Conservatives' had a negative view of the national economy! This 
contrasts with the Conservatives who, while pessimistic on the 
whole, were more balanced in their appreciation. The association 
between voting and the sociotropic measures is closer than that 
recorded for either personal perception variables. Personal 
retrospective perceptions are least closely associated.
The term 'association' is used advisedly in this context as 
the causal relationship between the variables cannot be addressed 
with the cross-sectional data available. The problem of 
reciprocal causation, in the guise of partisan misperception, 
tends to cloud the issue. Though we have established that 
partisan attachments do not lead to consistency across levels of 
perception, it may yet influence those perceptual levels independently.
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To test this we crosstabulated a conjoined vote intention 
variable with the 'strength of partisan attachment' responses to 
produce a hybrid. Those with Conservative voting intentions were 
divided into two categories. Those who suggested that they had 
a 'very close' or 'fairly close' attachment to party 
("Conservative partisans"), and those who were 'merely
sympathisers', 'not close' or 'did not know' ("Conservative 
Articulated"). The same procedure was used for non-Conservative 
voting intentions. Finally, those who stated no intention, 
initially or when probed were coded, for convenience, as 
"Floating Voters". Cases were distributed fairly evenly across 
groups :
Table 5.14 Aggregate Partisan Attachment
CONSERVATIVE PARTISANS 5.9%
CONSERVATIVE ARTICULATED 15.0%
FLOATING VOTERS 11.3% (n = 1084)
NON-CONSERVAT. ARTICULATED 53.8%
NON-CONSERVAT. PARTISANS 13.9%
While the test is not ideal, it is the best the data will
afford. The results show that a measure of partisan attachment
is associated with an individual's economic perceptions®:
Table 5>15 Economic Perceptions Aaainst Partisanship
General Retrospective Perceptions
Cons. Cons. non-Con. non-Con.
Partisan Articul. Float. Articul. Partisan
BETTER 25.4 15.5 5.2 3.0 2.0
SAME 27.0 21.3 9.6 5.4 4.0
WORSE 47. 6 63.2 85.2 91.6 94.0
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(63) (155) (115) (571) (151)
[Cramer' V = 0.27] n = 1055
®. Percentages are represented by column.
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Personal Retrospective Perception
Cons. Cons. non-Con. non-Con.
Partisan Articul. Float. Articul. Partisan
BETTER 19.0 16.0 10.9 9.6 9.5
SAME 39.7 47.2 27.7 29.9 26.5
WORSE 41.3 36.8 61.3 60.5 63.9
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(63) (163) (119) (572) (147)
[Cramer's V = 0.13]
General Prospective Perceptions
BETTER
SAME
WORSE
Cons.
Partisan
57.4
27.9
14.8
Cons. 
Articul. 
50.3 
22.5 
27.2
Float. 
16.2 
29.7 
54 .1
non-Con.
Articul.
13.1
25.6
61.4
non-Con.
Partisan
12.2
19.4
68.3
[Cramer'
100%
(61)
S V = 0.29]
100%
(151) 
n = 1006
100%
(111)
100%
(544)
100%
(139)
Personal Prosoective Perceotions
BETTER
SAME
WORSE
Cons.
Partisan
21.3
52.5
26.2
Cons. 
Articul. 
23.9
56.0
20.1
Float.
11.3
44.3
44.3
non-Con. 
Articul. 
12.2
37.8
49.9
non-Con.
Partisan
9.0
41.0
50.0
[Cramer'
100%
(61)
S V = 0.17]
100%
(159)
n = 1026
100%
(115)
100%
(574)
100%
(144)
The percentages run in the expected direction, though there are 
some hiccups in the personal retrospective and personal 
prospective crosstabs. Again, the relationship is strongest for 
general prospective and general retrospective perceptions and 
weakest for the personal variables. As the association between 
variables was similar to that for voting alone we felt that the 
two exercises measure the same underlying features. However, we 
were glad to discover the crosstab on partisanship turned out as 
expected.
The importance of these results lies in their significance 
for macro-economic modelling. Sanders, Ward and Marsh are right 
in stating that autocorrelation is a problem for this type of
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exercise. In statistical terms this can be dealt with by the
inclusion of a lagged endogenous variable (in this instance
popularity lagged by one month). This can be justified on
explanatory grounds in terms of the inertia of public opinion.
Sanders and Ward suggest that,
"The inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable 
itself can be interpreted as denoting the elector's 
prior disposition to support the Government; the 
exogenous variables to denote, obviously the 
hypothetical economic and political influences of 
Governemnt popularity." (Sanders and Ward, 1991, p.27)
Exogenous factors do not impact on a tabula rasa, but affect an
active population already animated by historical partisan
commitments. The explanatory utility of the lagged endogenous
variable becomes obvious in this respect. It can, with some
justification, represent the inertia of glacially moving
partisanship.
However, if our results are taken at face value, the 
underlying features begin to look more complicated. In the realm 
of reciprocal causality which we inhabit, partisanship might 
affect perception; or perception may, in turn, affect the 
strength of partisanship. If either explanation is prioritised 
it would seem appropriate that we seek confirmation that the 
relationship actually obtains at the individual level. Judging 
from our results it seems easiest to argue dual causation for the 
sociotropic elements. On the other hand the closer we get to no 
relationship between perception and partisanship, the more 
difficult it is to argue either option.
The analysis presented above highlights the complexity of 
the individual level processes at work in the formation of 
political preferences. We might hypothesise that economic
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perceptions can affect and be affected. But the different levels 
of perception may vary independently of one another. The 
partisan element in the equation may operate with different or
varying degrees of intensity ^  those different levels. If
either or both of those levels of perception have an important 
impact in individual's overall appreciation of the government's 
handling of the economy - the picture is doubly complicated.
The models we constructed in the previous chapter laid
emphasis on general level perception as well as personal level
circumstances. And, indeed, the former tended to weigh more 
heavily in the balance. Yet how do we tease out the independent 
'impact' of the different levels of perception if individuals are 
as likely to maintain a uniform perception of personal and 
national circumstances as they are to differ? How do we assess 
the relative importance of each level of perception; which is 
more dominant?
We tried to approach the problem by focusing specifically 
on individuals who had diametrically opposed perceptions at the 
two levels. We isolated individuals who held the belief that 
their personal position was getting better while the national 
situation was deteriorating. We did the same for those who 
considered that the national situation was getting better while 
their own personal position was getting worse. These two groups 
together numbered some 97 individuals out of 1083 (around 9%) 
when we focused on national and personal retrospective 
perceptions. When we turned our attention to prospective 
perceptions the groups numbered 76 out of 1083 (some 7%). The 
numbers were small, but, we felt, enough for our purpose.
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What we attempted was to code each individual separately. 
So, when focusing on retrospective perceptions in isolation, 
those with 'better' personal responses but 'worse' national 
responses were coded '1'; while those with 'worse' personal 
perceptions and 'better' global perceptions were coded '2'. 
Bearing in mind the issue of reciprocal causality, we 
hypothesised that if personal perceptions were more important in 
the formation of political perception (a Downsian or pocketbook 
hypothesis), then cell frequencies in a crosstabulation with 
voting intention should look like this :
' 1 ' ' 2 '
Conservative HIGH LOW
non-Conserv. LOW HIGH
The important feature here is the column distribution. Those 
coded '1' have a positive appreciation of their own environment, 
but negative about the global situation. As global appreciations 
count for nought in this conjectured model, they will wholly fail 
to 'impact on' vote choice. We hypothesised that if personal 
perceptions were dominant the individuals should fall 
predominantly in the top-left quadrant. Conversely those coded 
'2' have a negative view of home life but a positive perception 
of the national situation. Again, if the personal perceptions 
count for everything and global perceptions for nothing in this 
stylised model, they should group in the bottom right quadrant, 
but only if the Downsian or pocketbook calculus is at work.
The hypothesised distributions will look very different if, 
however, something other than the straight Downsian mechanism is 
at play. If the global element is dominant the distribution of
138
individuals should be the mirror image of the one suggested 
above. Individuals coded '1' have a negative global outlook, but 
a buoyant personal view; those coded '2' vice versa. If global 
calculations are dominant to the exclusion of pocketbook 
perceptions the negative global perception should push those 
coded '1' into the bottom left quadrant and those coded '2* into 
the top right :
' 1 ' ' 2 '
Conservative LOW HIGH
non-Conserv. HIGH LOW
The model is necessarily abstract and simplistic and the causal
arrangement is left intentionally unspecified, but it has the
attraction of being clearly able to distinguish the relative
significance of a sociotropic or a pocketbook element.
The results of this exercise are reported below* :
Table 5.16 Opposite Retrospective Economic Perception Aaainst
Vote
Retrospective Perceptions
' 1 ' ' 2 '
Conservative 25.6% 68.4%
(20) (13)
non-Conserv. 74.4% 31.6%
-(58).- - m __
100% 100%
The responses for prospective perceptions show similar patterns: 
Table 5.17 Opposite Prospective Economic Perception Aaainst Vote
Prospective Perceptions
Conservative 30.0% 55.6%
(12) (20)
non-Conserv. 70.0% 44.4%
■(28).,. (16)
100% 100%
Cell frequencies are reported in brackets.
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The shape of the distributions seem to approximate to the second 
model outlined above - the model featuring national or global 
perceptions. The shape of the distribution is more pronounced 
with respect to the retrospective cluster of perceptions, but it 
is evident in both. In assessing the relative importance of the 
global aspect of perception we have to recall that in our 
hypothetical model an equal column distribution would mean no 
particular priority.
True, the distribution could merely be a further reflection
of partisanship. However, the exercise was conducted simply to
show the relative significance of the respective levels of
perception. It was not undertaken as an attempt to assess the
causal relationship between the actual perceptions at those
levels and the individual's vote preference. Doubt will
obviously remain, and in order to address the issue the same
exercise was undertaken with a view to framing the exploration
in more appropriate causal terms. The focus was still on column
distribution for the groups isolated; however, attention turned
to 'change' (meaning in this context a difference between 1979
vote and current preference). We had already coded individuals
according to the difference or lack of difference between their
vote in 1979 and their present preference. This was now used as
a 'dependent' variable: Table 5.18 Opposite Economic Perception
Aaainst Movement to and from Government
'1' '2'
TO GOVERNMENT 1.9% 7.6%
(1) (1)
STABLE 78.8% 84.6%
(41) (11)
AWAY FROM GOVT. 19.2% 7.6%
(10) (1)
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'1' '2'
TO GOVERNMENT - 7.1%
— (2)
STABLE 76.9% 85.7%
(20) (24)
AWAY FROM GOVT. 23.0% 7.1%
(6) (2)
Sadly the numbers in cells are particularly small and we have an 
empty cell. The number is less than the original complement as 
some individuals were left uncoded (as they did not or were 
unable to vote in 1979). The distributions are scarcely 
symmetrical and this in conjunction with the difficulties in 
interpreting the 'change' variable outlined at the beginning of 
the chapter, mean that the results are inconclusive. Stability 
seems to be the most evident feature.
What we can do is look at the relationship between the 
different levels of perception (both retrospective and 
prospective) and change to or away from the government. The 
results are presented below ; Table 5.18 (cent.)
General Retrospective 
AWAY FROM GOVT.
STABLE 
TO THE GOVT.
Results for prospective perceptions show a similar pattern.
Table 5.19 Aggregate Economic Perceptions Aaainst Movement
to and from Government
Personal Retrospective
BETTER SAME WORSE
19.6 22.8 24.5
(9) (18) (135)
78.3 75.9 74 . 6
(36) (60) (412)
2.2 1.3 0.9
(1) (1) (5)
BETTER SAME WORSE
AWAY FROM GOVT. 19.5 23.5 24.5
(15) (53) (95)
STABLE 79.2 75.5 74.1
(61) (171) (283)
TO THE GOVT. 1.3 0.9 1.0
(1) (2) (4)
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General Prospective
BETTER SAME WORSE
AWAY FROM GOVT. 16. 3 26.2 26.5
(25) (43) (87)
STABLE 80.4 72.6 73.5
(123) (119) (241)
TO THE GOVT. 3.3 1.2 -
(5) (2) —
Personal Prosoective
BETTER SAME WORSE
AWAY FROM GOVT. 20.3 20.7 27.8
(16) (62) (78)
STABLE 77.2 78.3 71.5
(61) (235) (201)
TO THE GOVT. 2.5 1.0 0.7
(2) (3) (2)
The limited numbers of individuals moving towards the government 
make these tables difficult to interpret with any clarity or 
certainty. If an effect is evident, and the reciprocal causality 
issue still hovers in the background, it is quite modest in size. 
The strongest relationship appears to be between general 
prospective perceptions and movement, but the empty cell and low 
cell frequencies mean we can deduce little from a reading of the 
distributions. There are also problems in gauging the accuracy 
of respondent's recollections on how they voted in the 1979 
Election.
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5.5
If clear causal interpretations are denied us, it might be 
appropriate to look at other tests of the pocketbook theory at 
least. One test might be to look at particularly disadvantaged 
groups. The unemployed, one such disadvantaged group, are a 
particularly interesting segment of the population. As a group 
they suffer disproportionately as a function of their personal 
predicament. In absolute terms they are worse off than the bulk 
of the population, though we need to be aware that their position 
may be comparable to some low paid employed people. 
Qualifications notwithstanding, the Downsian thesis might, in 
some respects, lead us to expect that the group will have a 
particularly jaundiced view of the government. We wished to 
explore the reactions of the unemployed in as far as they relate 
not only to their personal position, but to wider political and 
global perceptions. We wanted to know whether they were inclined 
to punish the Government. Is the Downsian thesis sustained in 
an unambiguous fashion? Do the unemployed have a particularly 
bleak view of the national situation and are their views about 
economic prospects coloured by their experiences?
We took our sample and dichotomised by employment status. 
Students, housewives and the retired were groups which did not 
fit into a work/non-work pattern and so were excluded. We felt 
that these excluded groups had few unambiguous common features 
between them, so we declined to focus on them as a separate unit 
of analysis. This left the unemployed contrasted with those who
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were 'employed', 'self-employed' or were 'working part-time'?. 
On a range of perceptions the unemployed as a group did not seem 
to differ significantly from the rest. This was the case at all 
levels of perception :
Table 5.2 0Aaareaate Retrospective Perceptions Aaainst Employment 
Status
General 
Retrospective
Personal
Retrospective
UNEMPL. EMPLOY UNEMPL. EMPLOY
BETTER 4.1 6.6 —2 7.1 14.7
(4) (35) (7) (78)
SAME 3.1 10.5 20.4 32.9
(3) (56) (20) (175)
WORSE 88.8 80.2 +8 69.4 51.3
(87) (426) (68) (273)
D/K 4.1 2.6 3.1 1.1
(4) (14) (3) (6)
-7
+18
The unemployed were less likely than the employed to suggest 
their personal situation had got better; though considerably more 
likely to state that it had deteriorated. This is scarcely 
surprising given the rigours that unemployment brings. Perhaps 
it is surprising that the difference should be so small in this 
respect.
If the same exercise is performed for prospective
Perceptions Aaainst
perceptions, a similar pattern emerges 
Table 5.21 Aggregate Prospective
Employment Status
General Prospective Personal Prospective
UNEMPL EMPLOY UNEMPL. EMPLOY
BETTER 15.3 21.4 -6 15.3 15.0 0
(15) (114) (15) (80)
SAME 20.4 22.9 26.5 38.5
(20) (122) (26) (250)
WORSE 61.2 49.2 +12 49.0 41.2 +8
(60) (262) (48) (292)
D/K 3.1 6.4 9.2 5.3
(3) (34) (9) (28)
7^ All the tables set out below were also calculated for
a dichotomised sample which pitched only the 'employed' and 
'self-employed' against the 'unemployed'. The results were 
closely comparable for all crosstabulations.
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On general prospective perceptions the difference is of the same 
order as that for personal retrospective perceptions. There is 
little difference between the employed and the unemployed on 
their view of future personal trends.
Not only was there little difference in perception at the 
various levels, but we found that the unemployed were equally as 
consistent or inconsistent in their view of economic prospects 
(ie. matching general and personal prospective perceptions). On 
the other hand, as we might expect from our earlier analysis of 
consistency and employment status, there was a difference on 
retrospective consistency®:
Table 5.22 Retrospective Consistency Aaainst Employment Status
Retrospectivelv Consistent
UNEMPL. EMPLOY
CONSISTENT 70.4% 50.3%
INCONSIST. 29.6 49.7
100% 100%
So the unemployed were more likely to be consistent in their
retrospective perceptions. This might seem plausible given that
as a group they were more likely to have perceived personal
deterioration, while the economy at the time had been performing
particularly badly.
We also wanted to established whether, in terms of the
intention to vote or movement since 1979, the unemployed were
different from their employed counterparts*:
(see over page)
®. No cell contained less than thirty cases.
*. The second table on change excludes those who were left 
uncoded due to not voting in 1979 or who moved between opposition 
parties.
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Table 5.23 Employment Status Aaainst Movement to and form
Government
UNEMPL. EMPLOY UNEMPL. EMPLOY
CONSERV. 8.2 22.9 -14 AWAY FROM 25.0 23.0
(8) (122) (12) (80)
FLOAT. 15.3 10.2 STABLE 75.0 74.5
(15) (54) (36) (250)
NON-CON. 76.5 66.9 +10 MOVED TO —  1.8
(75) (356) (6)
The results are important in one sense. It is clear that the
unemployed are not particularly distinctive in their appreciation
of past events or future trends. It is equally clear that the
unemployed do favour parties other than the Conservatives. But
they are not obviously more anti-Conservative than their employed
counterparts. There is a tendency for the unemployed to be more
likely to prefer non-Conservative to Conservative than the
employed, but it is clear rather than pronounced. It may simply,
or indeed not so simply, 'reflect' their position on either
general prospective perception or personal retrospective
appreciations. On these there was a modest difference between
'employed' and 'unemployed'^®.
In this context it may be inappropriate to use change in 
voting for the Conservatives against change in employment status 
as a barometer of economic voting (without examining their 
economic perceptions). Heath et al. do compare persistence in 
Conservative voting among the employed and among those who became 
unemployed (Heath at al., 1985 p.162). 85% of those remaining
in work stayed loyal to the Conservatives; 74% of those who 
became unemployed also remained loyal! They note:
Again this held true when we dropped the potentially 
ambiguous 'part-time' workers from the 'employed' category - 
comparing unemployed with employed and self-employed.
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"It is perhaps rather remarkable that only a quarter 
of former Conservatives who had suffered unemployment 
defected to one of the other parties. We believe that 
this is powerful testimony to the greater importance 
of values compared with personal wellbeing on shaping 
people's votes." (ibid, p.162)
Our analysis suggests that this form of approach may be a poor
test of economic voting (even if personal perceptions were the
sole attitude of interest). While the unemployed are almost
certainly not a homogenous group, they do not appear to differ
significantly from those who were employed in their perception
of change over the previous twelve months. Since the Downsian
thesis is premised on the appreciation of change it is important
that changing perceptions be empirically identified rather than
inferred from employment status alone. Only when this is done
can the unemployed
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5.6
If the available data affords us a test bed for an 
unreconstructed Downsian thesis, it may also offers us the 
ability to isolate those individuals who are most likely to be 
'dependent' on the mass media for global or forward looking 
economic cues^l. The technique used involves determining which 
individuals have general perceptions (forward or backward 
regarding) which are not, or are unlikely to be, extrapolated 
from their personal experience. Here the assumption is that if 
individuals do not extrapolate their perceptions from their own 
experience, a case might be made that they are the product of 
media cues. An obvious counter-case might hold that individuals 
may instead rely on personal contacts for information. While 
this is consistent with the much criticised mass media "Two-Step- 
Flow” theorising (Katz and Lazersfeld, 1955; Gitlin, 1978), 
evidence from Dunleavy and Husbands' study of the 1983 election 
suggest that personal contact is not as important as we might 
think. To the question, "What is your most important source of 
political information", only 3% answer that the main source is 
personal contact. Issues of questionnaire interpretation 
notwithstanding, a case might plausibly be made in defence of the 
assumption that those whose general prospective perceptions 
differ from both their personal retrospective and prospective 
perceptions, are in some sense dependent on the media for cues. 
The logic of the case can be shown diagrammatically:
(see over page)
. To highlight that the term dependency is used 
provisionally we will continue to place it in inverted commas.
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Figure 5.1 The Logic of General Prospective Dependency 
'Dependent' on Media for General Prospective Perceptions 
General General
Retrospective Prospective
I
(different) AND (different)
Personal ^  Personal
Retrospective Prospective
The assumption is that individuals do not derive their general
prospective perceptions from their personal circumstances. If
individuals use neither personal retrospective beliefs nor
personal prospective expectations to judge what might happen to
the economy in the future, there may be a case for assuming they
are more likely to be potentially 'dependent' on the mass media.
Focusing on general retrospective attitudes a similar logic
is at work. We want to isolate those who are not extrapolating
from past personal experience to perceptions of the general
situation. Nor are past perceptions contaminated by personal
optimism or pessimism (wishful or otherwise) ;
Figure 5.2 The Logic of General Retrospective Dependency
'Dependent' on the Media for General Retrospective Perceptions
General General
Retrospective Prospective
(different) AND (different)
Personal Personal
Retrospective Prospective
We felt that in the light of Sanders, Ward and Marsh's work it
was important to consider whether whose we considered potentially
'media dependents' had any distinctive features. We focused on
some socio-economic features, but the obvious question was
whether they had particularly rosy or pessimistic views of the
149
economy.
It is clear that there was a rather large group of
individuals who were either retrospectively or prospectively
'dependent' on the media (as we have defined i t ) :
Table 5.24 Prospective and Retrospective Dependency
General General
Retrospective Perceptions Prospective Perceptions
'Dependent' : 34.3% 'Dependent' : 36.7%
'Independ.' : 65.7% 'Independ.' : 63.3%
Did these individuals have any distinguishing features? It is
equally clear from our analysis that in neither group was there
any relationship whatsoever between 'dependency' and age or
gender. For both groups there was a tendency for 'dependency'
to be associated with higher status occupations :
Table 5.25 Prospective and Retrospective Dependency Against Class
General Prospective Perceptions
 A B Cl C2 D E
'Dependent' 66 42 42 33 31 35
'Independ.' 33 57 57 66 68 64
General Retrospective Perceptions
 A B Cl C2 D E
'Dependent' 60 46 38 32 30 21
'Independ.' 40 53 61 67 69 78
Clearly the higher the class the more likely the individual's
perception of the national economy is likely to be 'media
dependent'. Yet for general prospective 'dependency' the pattern
was not strictly uniform.
There was a fairly weak relationship between strength of
partisanship and 'dependency' for either group. But 'dependency'
is related to vote preference :
. The form of calculation means there may be overlap 
between groups. An individual can be 'dependent' in one 
dimension, 'independent' in another.
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Table 5.2 6 Dependency Against Partisanship
Conservative Floating non-Conserv
'Dependent' 48.9% 37.7% 32.7%
'Independ.' 51.1 62.3 67.2
100% 100% 100%
General Retrospective Perceptions
Conservative Floating non-Conserv
'Dependent' 50.7% 36.1% 28.9%
'Independ.' 49.3 63.9 71.1
100% 100% 100% 
Conservatives on the whole are more likely to be 'dependent' than 
other groupings. This is significant when we go on to look at 
the relationship between 'dependency' and actual perceptions of 
the national situation (either retrospective or prospective). 
In this context controls on party support seemed appropriate.
We hypothesised that with the media dominated by 
Conservatively inclined material^* we might expect 'media 
dependents' to be more optimistic and less pessimistic than 
'media independents'. The notion here was of a prevailing 
climate of opinion rather than ideational dominance.
To test this we crosstabulated our 'media dependency' 
variable with general retrospective and general prospective 
perceptions. Having found that 'media dependents' in both cases 
were more likely to be Conservative we decided to control for 
vote preference to see if any differences between perceptions 
were merely a function of partisan misperception. The results
Especially in the realm of printed material, and, if the 
Glasgow University Media Group are to be believed, in televisual 
output too (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976, 1980 and 1982) . 
Though compare this with Harrison's diagnosis (Harrison, 1985).
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are presented below^* :
Table 5.27 General Retrospective Perceptions Against
Dependency ; Controlling for Partisanship
General Retrospective Perceptions
ALL
CON 
'Depend.'
BETTER
SAME
WORSE
D/K
'Indep.
'Depend.' 'Indep.'
NON-
'Depend.'
•CON 
'Indep.'
11.1
(41)
8.9
(33)
73.3
(272)
6.7 
.(2,5) ,
FLOAT 
' 'Depend.'
3.4
(24) 
7.7 
(65) 
87.1 
(619) 
0.4 
. (9)..
'Indep.'
B 22.6 12.5 6.8 2.6 5.7 1.5
(26) (14) (3) (2) (12) (8)
S 13.9 30.4 11.4 7.7 5.7 4.8
(16) (34) (5) (6) (12) (25)
W 56.5 56.3 65.9 88.5 84.0 93.5
(65) (63) (29) (69) (178) (487)
D/K 7.0 0.9 15.9 1.3 4.7 0.2
(8) (1) (7) (1) flO) (1)
Table 5.28 General Prospective Perceptions Aaainst Dependency
; Controlling for Partisanship
General Prospective Perceptions
ALL 'Depend.' 'Indep.'
BETTER 34.3 11.8
(136) (81)
SAME 19.1 25.4
(76) (174)
WORSE 31.7 60.3
(126) (413)
D/K 14.9 2.5
(59) (17)
CON FLOAT NON-CON
'Depend.' 'Indep. ' 'Depend.' 'Indep.' 'Depend.' 'Indep.'
BET 62.2 36.2 28.3 6.6 22.5 6.9
(69) (42) (13) (5) (54) (34)
SAM 9.9 34.5 21.7 30.3 22.9 22.5
(11) (40) (10) (23) (55) (111)
WOR 19.8 24.1 30.4 60.5 37.5 68.8
(22) (28) (14) (46) (90) (339)
D/K 8.1 5.2 19.6 2.6 17.1 1.8
(9) (6) (9) (2) (41) (9)
'Floating Voters' are defined as those who offered no 
original preference, and who responded 'Don't Know' when probed. 
Cell frequencies are in parenthesis; percentages are for columns.
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The uncontrolled results for general retrospective perceptions 
are not particularly startling (though the difference in 
percentages are as we would expect). There is a slight tendency 
for the 'dependent' to be more optimistic and less pessimistic, 
but it is not particularly pronounced. When we control for party 
preference the situation does not change markedly with regard to 
non-Conservatives and Conservatives. At dp=10% (percentage 
difference) the Conservatives were more likely to think the 
national situation had got better (though there was no difference 
in pessimism) . Non-Conservatives are less likely to think things 
had got worse (dp=9%). The only thing worth drawing attention 
to is the distribution for floating voters. Here 'dependents' 
are noticeably less likely to have considered that the national 
situation had deteriorated^^. The findings are consistent with 
mass communication effects research. Robinson, and Blumler and 
Gurevich suggest that the politically uncommitted are more 
vulnerable to press 'manipulation' than partisans (Robinson, 
1974; Blumler and Gurevich, 1982). Floating voters do not 
necessarily see events through the partisan prism.
We felt that the results might be a function of too 
stringent a test of 'dependency'. We recalculated general 
retrospective 'dependency' by isolating only those whose general 
perceptions differed from their personal evaluations (personal 
prospective perceptions were ignored) :
(see over page)
. dp=22.6%. It is appreciated that in these
circumstances 'dp' does not give an unambiguous measure of 
association, but it does give a rough guide.
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Table 5.29 General Retrospective Perceptions Aaainst Less
Stringent Dependency : Controlling for
Partisanship
General Retrospective Perceptions : Dependency Less stringent
ALL 'Depend.' 'Indep.'
BETTER 10.8% 2.0%
(53) (12)
SAME 10.8% 7.6%
(53) (45)
WORSE 73.0% 90.2%
(360) (531)
D/K 5.5% 0.2%
(27) _ .,(11
CON FLOAT NON-CON
'Depend.' 'Indep. ' 'Depend.' 'Indep.' 'Depend .' 'Indep.'
B 23.6 7.2 7.0 1.5 5.1 1.1
(34) (6) (4) (1) (15) (5)
S 18.1 28.9 14.0 4.6 6.5 4.1
(26) (24) (8) (3) (12) (25)
W 52.1 63.9 64.9 93.6 84.9 94.6
(75) (53) (37) (61) (248) (417)
D/K 6.3 —— 14.0 — 3.4 0.2
(9) — — (8) — (10) (1)
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The results were similar if a little more exaggerated. The 
Conservatives begin to show some signs of an effect while for the 
floating element the impact is increased (though we must be wary 
of the small cell frequencies).
The results for general prospective perceptions are a little 
more surprising. The original crosstab shows a distinctive 
pattern. The 'media dependent' are much more likely to be 
bullish about the future of the economy (dp=25%). Alternatively, 
'dependents' are much less likely to consider that things will 
get worse (dp=29%). The results are altogether more pronounced 
in the prospective context, and if we look at the tables on the 
controls, it is clear that they survive the exercise. They are 
not, in this sense, simply a function of partisan misperception. 
Indeed, the crosstabs show that the relationship is more
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pronounced in some of the control conditions. The difference 
between 'dependents' and 'independents' among the floating voters 
and non-Conservatives is quite striking when we look at 
pessimistic impressions (dp=3 0% and dp=31% respectively). 
Likewise, the Conservative 'dependent' were much more inclined 
to be optimistic than their independent counterparts (dp=26.0%).
The results here are quite significant and we were anxious 
to see whether a similar pattern was evident when we looked at 
personal prospective impressions. Again we looked at and 
compared personal retrospective perceptions with personal 
prospective impressions. The rationale behind this was fairly 
simple, and similar in many respects to that for the isolation 
of general 'media dependents'. If individuals did not 
extrapolate from their past experience (ie. things have got worse 
in the last twelve months, so it is likely they will get worse 
in the next; or things got better, so they are likely to continue 
in that vein) we assumed that their perceptions were more likely 
to come from other sources. Among these the media might be one 
plausible origin. With these assumptions clearly in mind, and 
while aware of their weaknesses, we sought to determine whether 
so called 'media dependents' differed from their 'independent' 
counterparts^*.
The calculations show that the numbers who are 'dependent' 
for prospective impressions are larger than for other levels of 
perception :
Table 5.30 Personal Prospective Dependency
Personal Prospective Perceptions 
'Dependent' : 43.3%
'Independ.' : 56.7%
We examine our assumptions more closely in chapter six.
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This group was not, however, distinguished by socio-economic 
class or voting preference (they were as likely to be 
Conservative as non-Conservative and Floating; they were as 
likely to be A/B as D/E) . As with the other groupings there was 
no relationship between 'dependency' and either age or gender. 
Likewise, there was absolutely no relationship between 
'dependency' and strength of partisanship. The picture somewhat 
changes if we look at the relationship between 'dependency' and
prospective perceptions themselves^? : 
Table 5.31 Personal Perceptions Aaainst
ALL
CON
BET
SAM
WOR
D/K
29.9
(32)
50.5
(54)
13.1
(14)
6.5
(7)
Dependency : Controlling for Partisanship
'Depend.' 'Indep.'
BETTER 20.7 7.7
(97) (47)
SAME 48.8 33.9
(229) (208)
WORSE 21.1 56.2
(99) (345)
D/K 9.4 2.3
(44) (14)
FLOAT NON-CON
'Indep.' 'Depend.' 'Indep.' 'Depend.' 'Indep.'
15.8 12 . 0 9.7 18.9 5.0
(19) (6) (7) (59) (21)
55.8 58.0 29.2 46.8 28.4
(67) (29) (21) (146) (120)
28.3 20.0 56.9 24.0 64.0
(34) (10) (41) (75) (270)
———— 10.0 4.2 10.3 2.6
(5) (3) (32) (11)
Despite some low cell frequencies and one empty cell the 
structure is quite apparent. As we would expect if our 
hypothesis was correct, the one-way crosstab is skewed in the 
expected direction. Most obviously, 'dependents' are much less 
likely to think things will get worse than independents 
(dp=35.1%).
Percentages are for the columns; cell frequencies are 
below in parenthesis.
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The two-way tables suggest the picture is more complex 
(though no less interesting). The results survive control and 
in some important instances the results are actually exaggerated. 
Conservative 'dependents' are still more likely to be optimistic 
than Conservative independents (and less likely to fear things 
will get worse). Considering the difference between the original 
and control tables for the Conservatives it is clear that some 
partisan reinterpretation is at work. 'Dp' for those who view 
their prospects as bleak is reduced, in this respect from 35.1% 
to 15.2%. This is not the case, however, for Conservatives 
making positive predictions. After controlling for party, 'dp' 
barely changes from 13.0% to 14.1%.
The most significant results are for floating voters and 
non-Conservatives. For the former the marked difference between 
'dependents' and independents is most obvious for those who feel 
things will be the same (dp=28.8%) , and for those who feel things 
will get worse (dp=36.9%). If a 'no change' perception in the 
depth of a recession is considered non-hostile as far as the 
Conservatives are concerned, the result might be interpreted as 
confirming (or at least not contradicting) our hypothesis that 
'dependents' will have a distinctive set of perceptions. On the 
other hand, the difference between 'dependents' and 
'independents' on the issue of pessimism is pronounced and in the 
hypothesised direction. This is the case for non-Conservatives 
as well as floating voters. The non-Conservative 'dependents' 
are very much less likely to think things will deteriorate than 
their independent counterparts (dp=4 0%). The corresponding 
figure for floating voters is comparable (dp=36%). Sadly, again
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our analysis suffers from the fact that so few individuals 
perceive things as getting better. Yet the results are clear and 
show a marked tendency for 'media dependency' to impact upon 
economic perception.
We thought it appropriate to test the validity of the 
'dependency' variable. We considered that if the concept were 
a valid one, the associated variable would have little or no 
impact on respondent's perception of their immediate environment. 
Dependency might conceivably have an impact on backward regarding 
perceptions or, indeed, on projections. However, we might expect 
it to have no influence on perceptions of the closest and most 
tangible facets of family financial life. To test this we took 
the three 'dependencies' we had identified and cross tabulated 
them with a measure of current financial situation. The question 
used was phrased, "Which of these statements best describes the 
present financial situation in your household?" (our emphasis). 
Responses, which were subsequently collapsed, included, "We are 
running into debt", "We have to draw on our savings", "We are 
just managing to make ends meet on our income", "We are saving 
a little", and "We are saving a lot". These were not ideal, but 
they were the best afforded by the Gallup survey.
The results from this exercise are recorded below ;
Table 5.32 Present Perceptions Aaainst Prospective Dependency
; Controlling for Partisanship
Present Personal Perceptions by Personal Prospective Dependencv 
ALL 'Depend.' 'Indep.
GOOD 32 . 6 28.7
(153) (176)
SAME 52 . 0 51. 6
(244) (317)
BAD 12.8 15.3
(60) (94)
D/K 2 . 6 4.4
(12) (27)
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CON 
'Depend.' 'Indep.'
FLOAT 
'Depend.' 'Indep.'
NON-
'Depend.'
CON
'Indep.
G 40.2 48.3 36.0 25.0 29.5 23.7
(43) (58) (18) (18) (92) (100)
S 47.7 40.0 56.0 56.9 52.9 54.0
(51) (48) (28) (41) (165) (228)
B 9.3 10.0 8.0 8.3 14.7 18.0
(10) (12) (4) (6) (46) (77)
D/K 2.8 1.7 - 9.7 2.9 4.3
(3) (2) - (7) (9) (18)
It is clear from this table at least that media dependency for 
prospective perceptions, as we might expect, has an extremely 
modest impact on perceptions of present economic circumstances. 
In this sense our hypothesis is confirmed. Our confidence in the 
validity of the concept and its associated variable is 
reinforced. The result is little changed if we control for 
partisan affiliation. Looking at dependency for general 
prospective perceptions a very similar picture emerges :
Table 5.33 Present Perceptions Aaainst General :Prospective
Dependencv : Controlling for Partisanship
Present Personal Perceptions bv General Prospective Dependencv
ALL 'Depend.' 'Indep.'
GOOD 34.8 27.9
(138) (191)
SAME 48.9 53.4
(194) (366)
BAD 11.8 15.6
(47) (107)
D/K 4.5 3.1
(18) (21)
CON FLOAT NON-CON
/Depend.' 'Indep.' 'Depend.' 'Indep.' 'Depend . ' 'Indep.'
G 41.4 47.4 26.1 31.6 33.3 22.7
(46) (55) (12) (24) (80) (112)
S 46.8 40.5 58.7 55.3 47.9 56.2
(52) (47) (27) (42) (115) (277)
B 9.0 10.3 8.7 7.9 13.8 18.1
(10) (12) (4) (6) (33) (89)
D/K 2.7 1.7 6.5 5.3 5.0 3.0
(3) (2) (3) (4) (12) (15)
Again our confidence in the validity of the variable is 
sustained. However, the situation is slightly more complicated
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if we look at those who ;are media dependent for their general
retrospective perceptions :
Table 5.34 Present Perception Aaainst General Retrospective
Dependencv : Controllina for Partisanship
Present Personal Percent. bv General Retrospective Dependencv
ALL 'Depend.' 'Indep.'
GOOD 43.9 23.3
(163) (166)
SAME 42.6 56.5
(158) (402)
BAD 7.3 17.9
(27) (127)
D/K 6.2 2.3
(19) (16)
CON FLOAT NON-CON
/Denend.' 'Indep.' 'Depend.' 'Indep.' 'Depend.' 'Indep.'
G 56.5 32.1 27.3 30.8 40.6 20.3
(65) (36) (12) (24) (86) (106)
S 34.8 52.7 59.1 55.1 43.4 57.6
(40) (59) (26) (43) (92) (300)
B 5.2 14.3 4.5 10.3 9.0 19.8
(6) (16) (2) (8) (19) (103)
D/K 3.5 0.9 9.1 3.8 7.1 2.3
(4) (1) (4) (3) (15) (12)
Here there appears to be something going on. Even after 
controlling for partisan attachment, general retrospective 
dependency seems to have an impact on contemporary perception. 
In conclusion we might suggest that there is strong though mixed 
support for the underlying validity of our measure. We may be 
reassured by the fact that the level of impact (dp=24% and 
dp=20%) is at the lower end of the scale of effects we have 
observed so far. Changing the measure of general retrospective 
'dependency' to the less stringent interpretation (minus personal 
prospective) scarcely made a difference at all.
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5.7
What then are we to make of our individual level approach to the 
structure of economic perceptions? At the risk of going over old 
ground it seems clear that our results point to some fairly 
unambiguous conclusions. The first is that the economic 
perceptions are in large part independent or discrete. By this 
we mean that individuals are quite capable of holding different 
or indeed diametrically opposing views of how things have been 
and will be at these four levels of perceptions. There is not, 
as we might have expected, a partisan drive towards consistency. 
Individuals seem comfortable holding different opinions at 
different levels, though it is impossible to determine with any 
certainty from the data available whether those views alter 
independently.
We have also noted that the strength of the relationship 
between partisanship and economic perception differs from level 
to level. General retrospective and general prospective
perceptions are most closely related to partisanship in this 
respect. This means that not only are the various levels 
discrete for many, but that they are differentially affected by, 
or affect, partisanship. The evidence is testimony to the 
complexity of the opinion climate, and the difficulties 
confronting us in giving explanatory integrity to our aggregate 
models.
Our analysis of the unemployed is further testimony, if 
testimony were needed, that we need look beyond, or rather, 
beneath sociological categories to their ideational substance. 
It is clear that though the unemployed, on the whole, have a
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lower absolute standard of living, they are not necessarily more 
inclined to see things as having changed for the worse. If the 
notion of monitoring the environment for change and punishing the 
Government if things get worse is integral to the Downsian 
pocketbook model, then we cannot look to the relationship between 
the category of "unemployed" and its association to Conservative 
defection as a test of pocketbook voting, as Heath et ai. do 
(Heath et al., 1985).
If anything can be said about media significance from a 
cross sectional approach to structure of economic perceptions, 
then the section on 'media dependency' is relevant and important. 
The assumptions made in the construction of the 'dependency' 
variable may err on the side of permissiveness, but we would 
contend that they are not entirely immoderate. If these 
assumptions are accepted, it seems clear that 'media dependents' 
in many respects have a different view of the economic universe. 
Our results lend some support to the notion that some aspects of 
general retrospective opinion, and general or personal 
prospective perceptions may be influenced by the mass media.
The questions raised and unanswered are, however, are as 
important as those addressed. The notion of 'media dependency' 
leaves unexplored the issue of the impact of local perceptions 
on economic predictions or perceptions. The work on constituency 
effects is couched in the Weberian terms we have been critical 
of, but it should at the very least alert us to the possibility 
that a narrow territorial dynamic is operating. The Gallup data 
we have available cannot address that issue. Nor can it address 
the issue of attribution of responsibility. We may believe
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things are getting better, worse or are staying the same, but who 
is to be held responsible for this. Is it the government, 
exogenous influences or luck, or is the individual partly or 
wholly responsible (particularly for personal wellbeing)? If 
people make inferences about attribution does this in turn 
animate the passions (by making us angry or jubilant) or does it 
merely influence the individual's rational calculus? Again the 
data we have available cannot address these issues.
Yet the most lamentable deficiency in our analysis lies in 
the difficulty in addressing the issue of causality. In 
particular we may specify the strength of the relationship 
between partisanship and economic perceptions, but an 
understanding of the causal connection eludes us. Cross 
sectional data is particulary unsuited to answering this sort of 
question. If we are to approach any of the issues thus related 
we have to look to a different methodology. With this in mind 
we turn to the construction of a panel study to give us at least 
some insight into such issues.
163
CHAPTER SIX
PANEL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS : STRUCTURE AND IMPACT
6.1
The survey we conducted was focused on one particular 
borough in South London - Lewisham. The choice was largely 
dictated by cost considerations, but was considered appropriate 
as individuals in a broader nationally representative survey 
might bring with them a varietv of narrow parochial attitudes 
which would deflect attention from the analysis of uniform local 
detail. Lewisham borough was chosen as it contained two fairly 
marginal constituencies (Lewisham West and Lewisham East). These 
constituencies had a broadly based demographic profile. Waller 
notes of Lewisham West, from whence the majority of respondents 
came :
"It •••• enjoys a cross-section of social 
characteristics (ie housing). [Though] this microcosm 
of London and England is not of an internally uniform 
nature. Labour has some very strong wards, such as the 
inter-war council estate at Dillingham, at Sydenham 
East and in Forest Hill. The Conservatives do best in 
Catford and on the boundary with Dulwich in Upper 
Sydenham." (Waller, 1983, p.65)
None of our respondents came from these party dominated areas.
Lewisham East is similarly mixed, especially with regard to
housing. The l.T.N. Election Handbook of 1987 notes that this
constituency, "..consists of a cross-section of council and
owner-occupied housing.." (Mathias, 1987, p.179). While this
constituency also has its unrepresentative enclaves, we sought
to find respondents from a variety of locations.
Having chosen the location for our survey, the approach to
potential respondents was made initially by telephone. We were
given access to maps containing detailed delineation of council
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housing estates. From these we were able to narrow our range of 
target districts. A balance was sought between council and non­
council areas. From here the approach was to have commercial 
companies provide us with a random list of telephone numbers from 
within the specified areas (to the number we had specified). 
Generally our field workers operated on lists of around one 
thousand telephone numbers.
Using these numbers the initial contact was made. The use 
of telephone contact has its obvious biases and problems (De 
Vaus, 1991). The most obvious of these problems concerns 
telephone penetration (or rather the lack of it) . With our 
resource constraints we had to live with such biases. We were, 
however, reassured by the fact that the technique has been used 
successfully in recent British research (Miller, 1990). It also 
had some important advantages. We were able to screen out 
individuals who stated they had declined to vote. As this was 
intended to be one of our dependent variables, and given that 
expensive field interviews needed to be kept to a minimum, we 
felt it necessary to operate along these lines. Moreover, 
through preliminary media exposure and demographic questions we 
could control some important characteristics in the sample 
(gender, spread of quality and tabloid readers, number of 
pensioners etc.). Lastly, it became evident that some 
individuals were extremely uncooperative and would weed 
themselves out by outright refusal to take part. Again it was 
obvious that bias might creep in. The less interested, though 
also less likely to vote, are a significant part of the 
electorate and need attention. However, we felt that since long
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term cooperative involvement of respondents was a necessary 
condition for successful completion of the survey, dropping the 
markedly uncooperative elements could be defended on the grounds 
of methodological expediency.
Having made initial contact by phone we followed up with a 
face to face interview in the individual's own home (rather than 
at the doorstep). These twenty five to thirty five minute 
interviews provided us with the in-depth background material as 
well as the primary political data we sought. The telephone 
survey provided us with a list of targetable and targeted 
individuals , only some of whom were both contacted and 
cooperative. These people constituted the substance of our 
survey (203 individuals in total). Of these, 167 were 
successfully contacted at all three points in the exercise. The 
number here is small by representative survey standards, but 
given our extremely limited resources it was the best that could 
be managed.
The limited resource aspect of the exercise also had an 
impact on the way the survey was conducted. The panel did not 
take the form of one single group of individuals followed over 
the three survey shots. Due to time, money and staffing problems 
the panel is split into two groups : group A numbering 133
individuals and group B with 70. These groups were approached 
at different times on the different shots so there is a degree 
of overlap. For Group A the typical month in terms of spread on 
the first contact is September 1987; on the second shot the mean 
date is December 1988; the third shot took place around July 
1989. For Group B the picture is a little more compressed.
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starting point clusters around September 1988; second shot around 
August 1989; final contact around December/January 1989/90. The 
elapse time between shots for the two groups is, accordingly, 
different. For Group A the mean elapse time for shot 1-2 was 15 
months; for shot 2-3 it is 7 months. For Group B the mean elapse 
time for shot 1-2 was 9 months; for 2-3 the figure was 4.5 
months.
The structure of the sample is somewhat idiosyncratic, but 
we felt it did not debilitate. Much of the analysis does not 
relate individual responses to what was 'really' going on in the 
economic environment at a particular time. More effort is 
expended on exploring the structure of perceptions and their 
connection with political preferences. Given the resource 
constraints we felt that the structure did not negate the 
exercise. Straightforward and unqualified crosstabulation 
exercises using all 2 03 respondents are out of the question in 
such a context. However, with judicious safeguards we were able 
to maintain the full sample for some of the calculations.
The problem is especially acute if the analysis of the 
respective group subsections suggest opposing relationships 
between variables. In this context a cumulative arithmetic 
exercise might well lead us to dispute the validity of a 
hypothesised relationship (the respective tendencies cancelling 
each other out). This danger will always be with us given the 
structure of the sample. However, we can maintain the full 
sample for the purposes of analysis if we resolve to test at each 
stage if the subsections are telling us different things. This 
form of diagnostic exercise will be carried out throughout, and
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any anomalies reported.
Was the sample obtained in this fashion unrepresentative of 
the constituencies from which they hailed? We divided the sample 
into their associated constituency groupings and compared those 
groups with the known features. Of these, 64 came from Lewisham 
East (LE); 137 from Lewisham West (LW). Two remaining
respondents came from just south of Lewisham West in Forest Hill. 
Judging from the social characteristics of the two groups we do 
not have a fully representative constituency sample. It would, 
indeed, have been surprising if a sample of this size, drawn from 
the borough catchment area, had been so. However, we did come 
surprisingly close.
The LE group contained 3 0% home owners, a figure lower,but 
comparable with that for the constituency as a whole (38% fall 
into this category - Mathias, 1987). Those of the LE sample in 
professional or managerial categories formed a group constituting 
15.7%. Again this was comparable with the constituency as a 
whole - 13.8% according to Crewe and Fox (Crewe and Fox, 1984, 
p.20). Pensioners constituted 20.3% of the LE sample - 
remarkably similar to the figure quoted by Crewe and Fox (20.8%, 
ibid., p.214). The most obviously under-represented group were 
the manual workers, especially skilled-manual - 30% in our
Lewisham East sample versus 46% in the constituency (iJbld.)^. 
The biggest section was the 'residual' category which constituted 
43.8%, comprising pensioners, student, those on state benefits 
and women who were looking after the family home.
^. Probably accounted for by the slight over-representation 
of lower non-manual workers at 10.9%.
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The larger Lewisham West (LW) group were comparably
representative. Owner-occupiers constituted 56%, as against
43.5% in the constituency at large. Professional and managerial
elements comprised 18.3% of the sample - 15.9% in the
constituency (Crewe and Fox, ibid, p.215). Pensioners formed 13%
of the LW group, against 19% in the constituency itself (ibid.).
Again those in manual occupations were under-represented at 30%
against the constituency's 45%; again the shortfall was in
skilled manual. The residual category was again the most
numerous at 35%.
Looking at the sample, then, it is clear that it is not
hugely over- or under-represented in any particular category.
There is a fairly even spread in the age profile :
Table 6.1 Sample Age Distribution
15-25 18.2%
26-35 18.2%
36-45 22.7%
46-45 11.8%
56-65 18.7%
65+ 10.3%
To a certain extent we were lucky here. The break-down is fairly
even across the categories. Here our targeting method paid
dividends and gave us the ability to focus, in particular, on
pensioners. On gender there is a balance of sorts (though
obviously not matching the distribution in the actual community) .
Here again we were quite lucky (having no way at our disposal of
organising a balance in those who chose to cooperate) :
Table 6.2 Sample Gender Distribution
Female 43.3%
Male 56.7%
Finally on housing tenure characteristics there is something of
an even spread :
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Table 6.3 Sample Housing Tenure Distribution
owner-occupiers 47.3%
council tenants 32.0%
with parents 7.9%
housing assoc. 4.4%
private rented 3.4%
others 4.9%
On average, across the two constituencies, the owner-occupiers
tend to be fractionally over-represented and council tenants
slightly under-represented, but the percentages were small (under
10% in this instance).
There are a few things to be noted here. The first is that 
the owner-occupiers are not a homogenous group of 'typical' two 
up, two down, semi-detached owners. Twenty four out of the 
ninety seven home-owners (24.7% of the home-owners) had bought 
their house from the council. The second point we want to draw 
attention to is the 'with parents' category. It was not on the 
original questionnaire, but has been 'constructed' from the data 
as it emerged. Respondents were categorised as 'with parents' 
if they answered 'no' to the 'owner-occupier', and 'the pay rent 
to who' questions (but only if they were in the 15-25 age group) .
Marital status is an area where again we have a degree of 
balance in the sample (37% married or living as such, 63% without 
live in partners). However, without national figures readily to 
hand it is difficult to determine whether this is wildly un­
representative or not.
Finally if we look at the sample in its entirety, the social
class balance is fairly even : Table 6.4 Sample Class
Distribution
(A) 6.4 %
(B) 10.8 %
(Ci) 14.8 %
(Cii) 8.9 %
(D) 20.7 %
(E) 38.7 %
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There is still an under-representation of manual occupations, but 
we do not feel that this unduly threatens the balance of the 
sample.
The skewed social class statistics are not as disturbing as 
those for the form of employment. The ratio of employees to 
self-employed seem reasonable (89.7 % to 5.4 % with 4.9 %
uncodable). However, in terms of supervisory capacity there is 
a marked skew :
Table 6.5 Supervisory Status of Sample
non-supervisory 53.2 %
super. 1-2 0 36.0 %
super. 21-4 0 1.5 %
super. 41-50 1.0 %
super. 50 + 3.0 %
uncoded 5.4 %
Here the 36.0 % supervisory group swells to fairly large
proportions the group that Heath et al. are primarily interested 
in. The redeeming feature here is that the '1-2 0' grouping masks 
the fact that most were supervising only a handful.
The profile in terms of location of employment is much as 
we might expect :
Table 6.6 Employment Sector Distribution
private company 52.7 %
national, industry 6.4 %
local/central govt. 31.0 %
charity 1.0 %
other 3.9 %
uncoded 4.9 %
The numbers of those in government employment of one sort or 
another seems high. However, this may reflect the constituencies 
lack of manufacturing employment. Crewe and Fox (ibid.) detail 
in their reference text the top or bottom constituencies on a 
number of criteria (eg. highest proportion of students, the 
various socio-economic groupings, the lowest unemployed etc.).
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Only on the percentage in the service sector (and in ethnic 
groups) did either constituency figure in the top fifty.
The last feature in this section is trade union membership 
either at present or in the past. If we collapse the then-and- 
now distinction the figures look like this :
Table 6.7 Union Membership
membership now or in past 59.1%
never in a union 40.9%
The 40.9 % may be a little too low even for Lewisham. However,
the sample is not badly skewed; we still have a fair balance.
On voting and partisanship the overview is quite
encouraging. We have an overall spread which is quite even in
terms of partisanship :
Table 6.8 Partisan Attachment
no close part. 24.6 %
Conservative 29.1 %
Labour 3 6.0 %
Centre Parties 8.8 %
More importantly, the distribution across the sample on voting
intentions for the main parties is close to the 1987 result.
Voting intention responses from the first round of interviews
were as follows :
Table 6.9 Reported Vote in 1987
Conservative 37.4 %
Labour 34.0 %
Centre (accumulated) 11.9 %
Others/wont'say/D/K 17.0 %
They are comparable with and in proportion to (though obviously
not the same as) the actual result in the June 1987 election :
Table 6.10 Constituency Vote ; Lewisham East and West
LEWISH. EAST LEWISH. WEST
CON 45% CON 4 6%
LAB 34% LAB 37%
CENTRE 20% CENTRE 15%
The numbers who did not know or would not say probably accounts
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for the disparity, but the relative order and magnitude are 
comparable.
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6.2
The primary focus of this chapter is the structure of 
economic perceptions. What, in this respect, is the relationship 
between levels of perception? The last chapter highlighted the 
notion that individuals may develop different perceptions at 
different levels. We wished to determine whether this extended 
to the level of local perceptions. Were our respondent's views 
of the national situation cued from perceptions of their personal 
or local context? Beyond this we wanted to look at consistency 
of attitudes over time. Were individuals consistent in their 
appreciation of the local, national or, indeed, their personal 
position?
If the individuals did have varying views at the different 
levels, we also wanted to explore their understanding of their 
circumstances. To this effect we asked individuals whether they 
considered the Government responsible or not. Here we hoped to 
tie our study into research conducted in the U.S.A. on the 
mediating impact of causal attribution (Peffley, 1984; Peffley 
and Williams, 1985; and Tyler, 1982).
While we wished to focus on those individuals who showed 
consistency across levels of perception, we wanted to extend this 
analysis to look at the relationship between partisanship and the 
different levels of perception. Particular attention is paid 
here to the under-explored local level. The local economic scene 
is, by definition, closer to home than some abstract notion of 
the 'national economy'. With known individuals subject to the 
vicissitudes of the local economic climate, were individuals more 
or less likely to mis-perceive their circumstances along partisan
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lines? Were negative as well as positive feelings a part of this 
equation.
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6.3
The first step is to determine the nature of aggregate 
alterations within the sample : how the sample differed over the 
three survey shots in its appreciation of personal, local and 
national circumstances. There are two points of importance that 
need to be flagged before we begin. The first relates to the 
splitting of the sample into the two groups noted in the section 
above. As we are dealing with alterations in perceptions as a 
function of notionally exogenous influences it is important that 
we disentangle the two groups. These, as we have noted, were 
interviewed at different times and so were subject to differing 
'exogenous' influences. Conflating the groups would impede 
interpretation or render it meaningless.
The second point that requires attention is the temporal 
focus of the questions. As we noted in the last chapter a fully 
comprehensive appreciation requires that we look not only at 
backward regarding perceptions, but at forward regarding and 
contemporaneous attitudes. If we are looking at perceptions of 
personal and national circumstances this gives us an attitudinal 
matrix with six elements. We felt that to maintain all three 
time frames and expand the analysis to both the intermediate, 
local level, and attribution at all levels would bring undue 
complication. It would also have greatly extended an already 
large questionnaire. As we wanted to maintain cooperation and 
reduce attrition in an already small sample, we decided to narrow 
our focus to retrospective perceptions and give our attention to 
three levels : personal, local and national.
Focusing on Group I we can see from the table that the
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collectivity, at the first interview, viewed the local situation 
in the bleakest light :
Table 6.11 Aggregate Economic Perceptions ; Group I 
SOCIOTROPIC LOCAL PERSONAL
Better 34.6 10.5 42.9
Same 24.8 39.8 33.8
Worse 20.3 36.8 22.6
Unsure 20.3 12.8 0.8
The distribution of personal perceptions shows a rosier, more
balanced distribution. National perceptions fall somewhere in
between. As we might expect the numbers who were "Unsure" climb
as we move from the personal to the national. The personal and
local are proximate, the national, by definition, somewhat more
remote and abstract. The second interview shows a drift towards
deterioration at national level; likewise at the local level.
The drift is less marked, though also evident at personal level
which still maintains a semblance of balance. Finally the last
shot shows continued deterioration with personal perceptions in
aggregate appearing to catch up.
The second group (Group II) were interviewed in comparable
stages but at later dates. This shows up in the general run of
perceptions at the 'aggregate' level :
Table 6.12 Aggregate Economic Perceptions ; Group II
SOCIOTROPIC LOCAL PERSONAL
Better 34.3 14.3 34.3
Same 28.6 31.4 32.9
Worse 27.1 34.3 27.1
Unsure 10.0 2 0.0 4.3
At the first shot personal and national distributions are
comparable; local perceptions are skewed towards deterioration.
By the second shot there is a distinct deterioration at national
and local levels. Likewise, personal perceptions became skewed
towards deterioration, but the tendency was less marked. The
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third shot shows comparatively little change. While this may be 
a function of flattening exogenous influences, it may also spring 
from the relatively modest time difference between second and 
third shots.
The relatively modest shifts in aggregate level perceptions 
do, however, mask volatility at the individual level. We coded 
the respondents for alteration in perception (at each respective 
level) between the first and second, and second and third 
interviews. The responses available to the sample when
questioned at each interview had two items inferring 
modification, and two stability. After collapsing the 
categories, the responses coded were :
(i) Things got better
(ii) Things remain the same
(iii) Things have got worse
(iv) Unsure
(i) and (iii) unambiguously suggest change in circumstances or 
perception, (ii) and (iv) suggest lack of awareness or perceptual 
stability.
We wished to ascertain how many individuals had registered 
perception of change or stability across all three survey shots. 
Thus individuals answering 'Got Better' or 'Got Worse' at one 
interview, but 'The Same' or 'Unsure' at the other two were coded 
or scored "one" (for one instance of appreciation of change). 
Those who had registered 'Better' or 'Worse' at all three 
interviews were coded or scored "three". Individuals stating 
'Unsure' or 'Same' at all three interviews were coded zero. 
Therefore a high score denotes perception of change over all 
three shots, while low or zero suggests minimal perception of 
change or lack of awareness of change. The scores for the three
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respective levels of perception are as follows :
Table 6.13 Attitudinal Movement on Economic Perceptions
NATIONAL LOCAL PERSONAL
SCORE PERCEPTIONS PERCEPTIONS PERCEPTIONS
0 14 (8%) 54 (32%) 20 (11%)
1 31 (19%) 41 (24%) 45 (26%)
2 71 (43%) 49 (29%) 54 (32%)
3 47 (28%) 23 (13%) 48 (28%)
It is clear that there is more awareness of change or more 
volatility in perception at the global level and least at the 
local. The majority of individuals were at least aware of and 
prepared to register perception of change at the national and 
personal levels (those showing change at two or three 
interviews). Volatility was less marked with respect to local 
observations.
The obvious question which arises here is, were we looking 
at some form of response set (De Vaus, 1991, pp.89)? Were 
individuals who stated 'Got Better' or 'Got Worse' two or three 
times over the three survey shots registering a knee jerk 
response rather than an awareness or appreciation of real change. 
We looked at the individuals with two or three change responses 
at personal, local and global levels to determine whether they 
gave the same answer across two or three replies.
If we look at sociotropic responses first, and at those who 
registered change at all three interviews, the results suggest 
the response set notion is not sustained. Of the forty seven 
registering change, twenty two show "variability" (ie. 'Got 
Better' and 'Got Worse' in tandem). However, of the seventy one 
who register two perceptions of change only twenty two show such 
variability - room here, perhaps, for a response set 
interpretation.
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A similar pattern emerges if we concentrate on personal 
level responses. Of the forty eight who give three indications 
of perceived change, twenty show variability. Yet of the fifty 
four who gave two responses suggesting change, only ten gave 
variegated answers. Local level perceptions, on the other hand, 
give the most room for the response set interpretation. Twenty 
three registered change over the three interviews, of whom only 
five showed variability. Of the forty nine expressing perception 
of change at two shots, fifteen showed variability.
If the patterns of response are interpretatively complex, 
awareness of change at personal level seems fairly easy to 
explain. Individuals are acutely aware of changes in their own 
financial circumstances, especially individuals of modest means. 
Small changes for them may have a profound impact. The 
difference between the local and personal or national level 
distributions is further testimony to the independence of 
stratified perceptions. Perhaps local circumstances did not 
change as markedly as personal circumstances or perceptions of 
global fluctuations. Alternatively the parochial economic scene 
may not have figured prominently in the press or on the main 
television channel servicing the area (South London Press, The 
Evening Standard or Thames Television respectively). Without 
these as alternative sources the sample could scarcely have 
registered anything save ignorance or stability. Whatever the 
explanation it seems likely that local perceptions have, in a 
sense, a life of their own. However, we cannot be certain of 
this until the relationship is formally analyzed - this we leave 
to the next section.
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with national economic perceptions volatility has a 
potential explanation. The media produce something in the nature 
of a continuous stream of information on the economy, often 
taking the form of description of fluctuations in the country's 
fortunes. This might help explain gross volatility. However, 
this still leaves the question of whether individuals rely on 
national news for national perceptions. They may extrapolate 
from their own experience and this may explain the comparable 
volatility in personal perceptions. It is to this question of 
extrapolation that we now turn.
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6.4
If we look at the individual level processes at work here 
is there anything of significance that can be said with respect 
to the extrapolation issue? What of the relationship between the 
three levels of individual response? Can we say anything about 
their relationship? We looked at the straightforward 
crosstabulation of responses at the three levels. The assumption 
here is that if there is extrapolation, responses should be the 
same or at least similar for the respective levels. This did not 
turn out to be the case :
Table 6.14 Similarity Across Perceptual Strata
Percentage With Same Response for Both Questions^
shotl shot2 shot3 
SOCIOTROPIC - LOCAL 32.9 52.5 39.9
PERSONAL - LOCAL 28.3 42.5 45.9
PERSONAL - SOCIOTROPIC 35.7 44.0 41.1
As with the results from the Gallup national survey it is 
clear that there is a relationship between the various levels, 
but it is not a close one. The results confirm that it is 
difficult to maintain that sociotropic perceptions are in some 
simple sense extrapolated from personal experience. In the first 
shot only 35.7% share the same personal and sociotropic 
perceptions.
We would obviously have liked to have confirmed that the 
group so identified mirrored the national distribution. To have 
done this would have required access to the disaggregated Gallup 
material for the same period. Since there is an enormous period 
of time between the collection of Gallup Political Index material
^. Rather surprisingly, splitting the sample into Group A 
and Group B does not markedly alter the results obtained.
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and its deposit in the ESRC Data Archive our only recourse was 
to ask Gallup directly if they would do the relevant calculations 
and pass the results on to us. This they kindly did. We look 
at the cross tabulation of general retrospective on personal 
retrospective perception. The distribution of answers from their 
sample of 1886 respondents (excluding "Don't Know"s) for the 
month of September 1987 was as follows^ :
Table 6.15 Gallup Crosstabulation of Personal and Global
Attitudes
Personal Circumstances
1.bett lit.bett same lit.wor. l.wor
lot bett. 25 38 50 11 0
General lit.bett. 57 173 260 73 19
Economic same 30 106 302 107 51
Perception lit.wor. 19 34 134 12 6 53
lot wor. 9 8 67 57 77
We felt that only the highlighted cells running top left to 
bottom right could be considered to be consistent or capable of 
extrapolation. It was, we submit, less likely that the rest were 
extrapolating from personal experience to general conclusions. 
The percentage sharing the same personal and global perception 
is, in this case, 48%. This is higher than our sample, but of 
the same order of magnitude. We suspect that the difference is 
a function of the split sample design we employed, or of the 
geographical focus; but small numbers made this difficult to test 
with any certainty.
If extrapolation were the root of sociotropic appreciations 
we might have expected the figure we have surveyed to have been 
different. Of further significance is the relationship between 
local and national perceptions. Here only 32.9% of individuals
The numbers refer to cell frequencies.
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share local and national perceptions. The hitherto unexplored 
question of extrapolation from local circumstances is answered. 
Individuals actually seem less inclined to extrapolate from the 
local than they do from the personal*. The relationship between 
local and national perceptions at the individual level is still 
weak.
If we go on to look at the coincidence of perceptions at the 
second and third shots a more complicated picture begins to 
emerge. At the second shot the percentage showing coincidence 
between sociotropic and local perceptions rises to 52.5%. The 
coincidence between pocketbook and national attitudes rises to 
44.0%. If we go on to look at comparable results for the third 
shot local-national coincidence drops again to 39.9%; personal- 
national coincidence to 41.1%. The strengthening of the 
coincidence at second and third shot lends credence to the 
extrapolation hypothesis. Yet it may be a function of the 
generalised drift to pessimism we might expect as a country 
enters recession, in tandem with experience of depressed inner 
city life. Alternatively, the changing levels of coincidence are 
perhaps further testimony to the relative independence of the 
varying levels of perception.
An interpretative question here concerns the timing of the 
relationship between perceptions. It is entirely possible that 
perceptions of local or personal circumstances do not impact upon 
national perceptions at the time of interview. Thus they may not
Again it has to be stated that coinciding perceptions 
do not necessarily mean extrapolation. We can only suggest that 
diverging responses rule out or render less likely the process 
of extrapolation.
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show up in the crosstabulation of responses at 'tl'. We may have 
to look at the relationship between local or personal perceptions 
at tl, and sociotropic attitudes at t2. The results of this form 
of analysis are reported below :
Table 6.16 Temporal Contingency in Similarity Across
Perceptual Strata
Percentage With Same Response for Both Questions^
LOCAL tl - SOCIOTROPIC t2 37.3%
PERSONAL tl - SOCIOTROPIC t2 30.7%
LOCAL t2 - SOCIOTROPIC t3 37.5%
PERSONAL t2 - SOCIOTROPIC t3 33.3%
It is clear from the results that the extrapolatory
hypothesis is not borne out even if this method is employed. The
percentage of those showing coincidence of responses, local or
personal (tl) to sociotropic (t2) are 37.3% and 30.7%
respectively. If we extend this to look at the results for t2
local or personal, they are comparably low at 37.5% and 3 3.3%.
If we were looking at a relationship that bore the hallmark of
straightforward extrapolation we would expect the percentages to
be higher than they are for our particular sample.
By means of comparison with our earlier cross-sectional
study we sought to determine whether those who were consistent
were in any way distinct. First we looked at the three
socioeconomic variables that we had been interested in previously
- age, gender and class. There were few surprises here with
respect to age and gender. As with the broader cross-section,
neither of these categories were related to consistency at any
of the three interviews. We collapsed the sample into over- and
^. Again splitting the sample does not suggest a revision 
of results is necessary.
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under-thirty fives. At no point did this age differential 
distinguish consistants from inconsistants. This pattern was 
repeated with the gender variable. Results are broadly similar 
to those derived from the cross section we studied.
Finally due to small numbers we had to collapse the class 
category into non-manual and manual groups. At none of the 
survey shots did this variable in any way distinguish consistants 
from the rest. This is a somewhat different story from the 
earlier cross sectional analysis. In that instance a gradation 
was evident, with consistency more likely the lower down the 
socio-economic ladder. The results here might suggest that the 
relationship between class and constituency is unstable over 
time. It is more likely, however, that the sample's 
characteristics account for the disparity. The one area where 
the sample seemed unduly skewed was in the class category (with 
the working class, and particularly the skilled working class 
being under-represented) . As a consequence, we fear we can infer 
little from a disparity between the respective cross sectional 
and panel approaches.
Turning to partisanship the results from our panel were 
reassuringly similar to those from our cross section. We defined 
as partisans those who expressed a very strong or fairly strong 
attachment to their party. Those "not very strongly attached" 
or merely "close to a party" (along with true independents, 
neither "partisans" nor "close") were classified as non-partisan. 
As with the cross sectional results there seemed little, or 
indeed no difference between partisans and non-partisans on the 
level of consistency.
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The results look reassuringly like those from our earlier 
Gallup survey exercise. In this sense then we might hazard, 
tentatively, that consistency is not influenced by partisanship, 
and that we have the makings of a stable generalisation. This 
still does not help us in assessing the political impact of the 
respective levels of perception nor of their relative importance. 
To this we now turn.
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6.5
The path chosen was to replicate something of the earlier 
exercise with respect to the analysis of perception and 
partisanship. With a view to cell frequencies and the prospect 
of empty cells we decided that it was both expedient and 
defensible to collapse our analytical categories. On the side 
of economic perceptions we chose to dichotomise our measures 
along the lines of positive and static versus the negative. This 
would mean that the replies on economic perception would be 
collapsed into 'better/the same' and 'worse'. This relieves some 
of the more acute problems associated with small numbers, but is, 
we feel, defensible in the sense that at least one author has 
suggested that individuals respond to negative alterations in the 
economy , but not always to positive or static circumstances 
(Mosley, 1978).
With this in mind we proceeded to explore the issues of 
partisanship and economic perception with a view to teasing out 
more thoroughly the causal elements in the equation. The 
emphasis is on the affective; the perspective longitudinal. We 
sought to look initially at the cross sectional relationship 
between economic perceptions and partisanship. But given the 
problem of reciprocal causation it was crucial to go beyond this. 
We therefore sought to look at the impact of prior economic 
perceptions on contemporary partisanship; prior partisanship on 
following economic perceptions. We also looked at alterations 
in affect by enquiring whether individuals had grown warmer or 
colder towards the Government since the last time contacted. The 
results of the exercise are reported below.
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Table 6.17
shot 1 
Sociot - Partisan 
0.29
Local - Partisan 
0.14
Pocket - Partisan 
0.25
shot 2 
Sociot - Partisan 
0.21
Local - Partisan 
0.24
Pocket - Partisan 
0.08
shot 3 
Sociot - Partisan 
0.23
Local - Partisan 
0.05
Pocket - Partisan 
0.20
Partisan
.21 
.29 
. 08
Sociotropic
Local
Pocketbook
.26
.25
.05
Partisan
Sociotropic
Local
Pocketbook
.27 . 12\ /
. 00 —  Partisan —  . 07
/ \.23 17
Sociotropic
Local
Pocketbook
Partis. - Hot/Cold 
0.21
Partis. - Hot/Cold 
0. 06
Socio - Hot/Cold 
0.37
Local - Hot/Cold 
0.28
Pocket - Hot/Cold 
0.11
Socio - Hot/Cold 
0.24
Local - Hot/Cold 
0.07
Pocket - Hot/Cold 
0.07
Sociotropic
Local
Pocketbook
. 19 \
.15- Hot/Cold 
/. 22
Sociotropic
Local
Pocketbook
. 10 \
. 03— Hot/Cold 
/.08
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The results suggest a complicated picture, and one in which 
relationships are fairly weak (the reported statistic is "Phi”). 
The attempts to wrestle with the issue of reciprocal causation 
are not entirely successful. Four techniques are used : cross 
sectional (for partisanship to economy and economy to changing 
affect); preceding partisanship to following economy; preceding 
economy to following partisanship; and preceding economy to 
changing affect. In an attempt to simplify an otherwise overly 
complicated set of results we chose to focus on the strongest and 
weakest relationships evident from the data. Criteria for 
strength and weakness in this context are essentially and 
necessarily arbitrary, but we chose to look at relationships 
where the Phi statistic was greater than 0.25 and less than 
0.10*. This left us with six relatively strong associations and 
ten weak ones :
Table 6.18 Strongest and Weakest Provisional Relationships
STRONGER
Sociotropic - Hot/Cold 
(t2) 0.37 ft2)_____
Partisan - Local
(tl) 0.29 (t2)
Sociotrop. - Partisanship 
(tl) 0.29 (tl) 
Local - Hot/Cold
(t2) 0.28_____ (t2)
Sociotrop. - Partisanship 
(tl) 0.27 (t2)
Sociotrop. - Partisanship 
(t2) 0.26 (t3)
(continued over page)
* Bryman and Cramer note, in their analysis of contingency 
tables, that an illustrative example had a Cramers' V of 0.24. 
In this instance they submit it suggests a "..weak relationship" 
(Bryman and Cramer, 1990, p.176). We thought it not unreasonable 
to use this as a bench mark.
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WEAKER
Local - Partisanship
0.00
Local
(t2) 0.03
Hot/Cold
(t3)
Pocket. 
(t2) 0. 05
Partisanship
(t3)
Local
(t3) 0.05
Partisanship
rt3)
Partisan. Local
(t2) 0.07 (t3)
Local
ft3) 0. 07
Hot/Cold
(t3)
Pocket
ft3) 0.07
Hot/Cold
(t3)
Pocket
ft2) 0.08
Partisanship
ft2)
Partisan. - Pocketbook
ftl) 0.08 ft2)
Pocketbook 
ft2) 0.08
Hot/Cold
ft2)
There are a few fairly obvious points that need to be made 
with respect to the results. The first is that no single 
perceptual level is dominant throughout. A provisional 
conclusion might be that different economic factors are prominent 
at differing times. It does appear at first, however, that 
sociotropic perceptions figure fairly prominently in the stronger 
relationships table, local perceptions only once and pocketbook 
elements not at all.
Obvious qualifications need to be entered straight away. The 
first concerns the connection between economic perceptions and 
changes in affect. This is a cross sectional approach tying 
change in affect to change in economic perception over the same 
period. We cannot simply assume that the economy influences 
change; change in affect occasioned by other factors could impact 
on economic perception. To explore this issue in regard to 
sociotropic-to-hot/cold, and local-to-hot/cold, we controlled for 
partisanship. The question here is, does partisanship influence
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both economic perception and the individual's feelings of warmth 
or coolness towards the Government? For the relationship of 
sociotropic (t2) to hot/cold (t2), controlling for partisanship 
did not have a great deal of impact. Phi=0.37 for the original 
relationship dropped to Phi=0.2 3 for Conservatives; Phi=0.36 for 
all non-Conservatives. In the case of local to hot/cold Phi=0.28 
drops to Phi=0.0 for Conservatives, but stays at Phi=0.29 for 
non-Conservatives. The relationship is sustained for the non- 
Conservative majority (though still fairly weakly, it must be 
said). Numbers here are obviously small, given sample size, but 
the signs are that the relationship between economy and change 
in affect is not simplv a function of rolling partisan 
attachment.
If we turn to the relationship between sociotropic 
perceptions and following partisanship, a different problem 
emerges. The issue is relevant to the relationships : 
sociotropic (tl) to partisanship (t2); and sociotropic (t2) to 
partisanship (t3). The question is, does preceding partisanship 
- at (tl) and (t2), respectively - influence the sociotropic 
perception and the following partisanship? Is the relationship 
we have highlighted only testimony to the maintenance of a pre­
existing partisan attachment? This would imply a very different 
interpretation of the relationship. We controlled for preceding 
partisan affiliation :
Table 6.19 Partisan Control on Sociotropic - Partisan
Relationship
SOCIO. 1 -------PARTIS. 2 SOCIO. 1 PARTIS2
PARTIS.1
Phi = 0.27 Conservative Phi = 0.21
non-Conserv. Phi = 0.15
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The calculations for the second relationship are as follows ; 
Table 6.19 (cent)
SOCIO. 2   PARTIS. 3 SOCIO. 2 PARTI S3
PARTIS.2
Phi = 0.2 6 Conservative Phi = 0.26
non-Conserv. Phi = 0.09
The results suggest that while the relationship is less close
when we control, it does not disappear altogether (at least for
the Conservative segment). In this sense the relationship is
sustained. Although partisanship influences sociotropic
perceptions, they in their turn impact on partisanship.
Little can be said about the cross sectional relationship
on which we focused on : sociotropic (tl) to partisan (tl). The
reciprocal causation issue renders interpretation difficult. But 
given that the calculations above suggest partisanship (tl)
influences sociotropic perceptions at (tl) as well as 
partisanship (t2), the result is hardly surprising^.
If we go on to look at the relationships that appear
singularly weak in our estimation, the splitting of the sample 
into its two sections becomes crucially important. The 
arithmetic of the disaggregated cross tabulations may, in this 
respect, highlight strong relationships where none obtained in 
the aggregated group. The relationships which survive this test 
include the following :
(see over page)
^. It might be noted though that all the primary 
relationship noted above withstand the diagnostic test of 
splitting of the sample into its two component segments to 
determine whether the root of the relationship remains.
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Table 6.20 Weak Relationships Surviving Partisan Control
Local t3 Partisanship t3 Phi =0.05
Partisan. t2 Local t3 Phi = 0.07
Local t3 Hot/Cold t3 Phi =0.07
Pocketbook t3 Hot/Cold t3 Phi =0.07
Partisan. tl Pocketbook t2 Phi =0.08
In none of the remaining relationships does the splitting of the 
sample take the respective segments into the Phi = 0.26+
category, and in only one case does it take it beyond Phi = 0.20 
(and in the case of Pocketbook (t2) to Hot/Cold (t3), the very 
small numbers mean we can have little confidence in the result) . 
The local and pocketbook elements still figure largely with 
respect to weak linkage.
Returning to the elements where relatively strong 
relationships pertain, it is important to test whether the link 
between elements is due to other economic perceptions. Is the 
connection between, say, sociotropic t2 to hot/cold t2, a 
function of the another underlying association (pocketbook t2 to 
hot/cold t2)? The calculations as ever suffer from low small 
cell frequencies. However, we chose to control for pocketbook 
perceptions in each of the relationships that featured 
sociotropic and dependent variables. The results were mixed and 
suggest something of a moderated relationship (Bryman and Cramer, 
1990, p.225) :
Table 6.21 Sociotropic Perception Against Affect, Controlling
for Pocketbook Perceptions
Sociotropic - Hot/Cold 
t2 0.37 t2
Pocketbook t2 (Better/Same) Pocketbook t2 (Worse)
Sociotropic - Hot/Cold Sociotropic - Hot/Cold
t2 0.42 t2 t2 0.07 t2
(see over page)
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Table 6.22 Sociotropic Perception (tl) Against Partisanship
(t2) , Controlling for Pocketbook Perceptions (tl)
Sociotropic - Partisanship 
tl 0.27 t2
Pocketbook tl (Better/Same) Pocketbook tl fWorse)
Sociotropic - Partisanship Sociotropic - Partisanship
tl 0.24 t2 tl 0.22 t2
Table 6.23 Sociotropic Perception (t2) Against Partisanship
(t3). Controlling for Pocketbook Perceptions (t2)
Sociotropic - Partisanship 
t2 0.26 t3
Pocketbook t2 (Better/Same) Pocketbook t2 (Worse)
Sociotropic - Partisanship Sociotropic - Partisanship
tl 0.32 t2 tl 0.08 t2
Table 6.2 4 Sociotropic Perceptions (tl) Against Partisanship
(tl), Controlling for Pocketbook Perceptions (tl)
Sociotropic - Partisanship 
tl 0.28 tl
Pocketbook tl (Better/Same) Pocketbook tl (Worse)
Sociotropic - Partisanship Sociotropic - Partisanship
tl 0.26 tl tl 0.16 tl
Bearing in mind that the relationship 'sociotropic - hot/cold'
is in our strong category at the same time as 'local - hot/cold',
we felt it was necessary that we control for local perception in
the case of 'sociotropic - hot/cold' :
Table 6.2 5 Sociotropic Attitudes Against Affect. Controlling
for Local Perceptions
Sociotropic - Hot/Cold 
t2 0.37 t2
Local t2 (Better/Same) Local t2 (Worse)
Sociotropic - Hot/Cold Sociotropic - Hot/Cold
t2 0.28 t2 t2 0.42 t2
Finally, it seemed appropriate to look more closely at the
relationship between local perceptions and the change of affect
variable ('hot/cold'). It is possible that relationship is a
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function of other perceptions, so we controlled for both 
pocketbook and sociotropic attitudes :
Table 6.2 6 Local Views Against Affect, Controlling for
Sociotropic Beliefs
Local - Hot/Cold 
t2 0.28 t2
Sociotropic t2 (Better/Same) Sociotropic t2 (Worse)
Local - Hot/Cold Local - Hot/Cold
t2 0.03 t2 t2 0.24 t2
Table 6.27 Local Perceptions Against Affect, Controlling for
Pocket-book Perceptions
Local - Hot/Cold 
t2 0.28 t2
Pocketbook t2 (Better/Same) Pocketbook t2 (Worse)
Local - Hot/Cold Local - Hot/Cold
t2 0.30 t2 t2 0.17 t2
The results from the control experiments presented above are 
variegated. While they are more complicated than they might seem 
initially (a point which should not surprise us) , there is little 
to suggest that the sociotropic impact is, in some sense, simply 
a reflection of pocketbook or local influences. If this were the 
case "Phi" would drop to zero (or near zero) in both the control 
condions. What we have is a moderated relationship between 
sociortopic perceptions and affect (it pertains only where 
personal perceptions are buoyant) . The notion of a moderated 
impact is somewhat difficult to theorise, and more difficult to 
explore given small numbers. But it does not negate the notion 
of a relatively strong sociotropic element in the preferential 
calculus. With less ambiguity the results suggest that local 
perceptions, in all but one case, have no distinctive impact on 
political perceptions.
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6.6
If circumstantial evidence points towards the relative 
importance of the sociotropic elements (over the personal or 
local) we are still left with the problem of explaining why they 
are influential at some times and not at others. One possible 
answer is the intervening variable of attribution of 
responsibility. The local, national or personal situation may 
deteriorate or improve, but research from the U.S.A. suggests 
there is a greater likelihood of this impacting on Government 
popularity when the Government is, in some sense, held 
responsible (or if it could have avoided unpleasantness by 
alternative action).
The wording of our questionnaire allows us to explore this 
aspect of impact - though with small numbers this can only be 
done to a limited degree. If we focus on the first shot in 
particular (where numbers are highest), we find that the pattern 
of attribution is different at the varying levels. The question 
was phrased in terms of the effect of Government policy being 
good, bad, mixed, having little effect, or the individual being 
unsure. When we collapsed the mixed and no effect categories for 
the first interview, the results are as follows :
Table 6.28 Area Specific Attribution of Responsibility
Sociotropic Local Personal
Perceptions Perceptions Perceptions
Good effect 23.6 8.5 21.7
no/mixed effect 47.8 52.2 48.8
Bad effect 18.7 29.9 21.2
Unsure 9.9 9.5 8.4
It is obvious that a very small percentage felt that the
Government had a good effect on the local scene. A larger
percentage felt the Government had a good effect on personal or
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national circumstances. The distributions for personal and 
sociotropic elements look similar, but we wanted initially to 
determine whether the attributional responses merely conveyed the 
individual's partisan attachments. For the first interview, 
where numbers were greatest, we cross tabulated partisanship with 
attribution at the three levels. The results are shown below®: 
Table 6.29 
Sociotropic
Partisan Attachment Against Economic Attribution 
Strata
Conservative 
Independent 
non-Conservat.
Good
Effect
34
4
10
Cramer's V = 0.35 
Local
Conservative 
Independent 
non-Conservat.
Good
Effect
12
1
4
no/mixed
Effect
25
12
58
no/mixed
Effect
41
12
52
Bad
Effect
2
4
31
Bad
Effect
7
5
47
Cramer's V = 0.27
Personal
Conservative 
Independent 
non-Conservat.
Good
Effect
25
4
15
no/mixed
Effect
34
9
53
Bad
Effect
4
6
33
Cramer's V = 0.25
The strongest association relates sociotropic attribution 
to partisanship. Interpretatively this could mean that partisans 
are more or less likely to think the government responsible for 
the national situation. Conversely it could mean that thinking 
the Government does harm or good reinforces or detracts from 
partisanship. The issue of reciprocal causation is still
8. The numbers represent cell frequencies.
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relevant.
We decided at this juncture to look at the relationship 
between partisanship and the so called "feeling thermometer". 
This indicator is, like partisanship, affective in character. 
The two are strongly related though not co-extensive (collapsed 
cross tabulation yields Phi = 0.54). While it is true that the 
overwhelming bulk of Conservative partisans feel warmth towards 
the Government it is by no means the case that the bulk of non- 
Conservatives are coldly disposed. It taps a generalised warmth 
or coldness towards the Government or party and in a sense we 
might speculate that, in aggregate, these sentiments form the 
substance of partisanship. And it is this aspect which 
interested us. The American literature hints at the importance 
of attributional inference on vote and perhaps on partisanship. 
We sought to determine whether this relationship held true for 
our fraction of the British public.
We looked at the relationship between thermometer reading 
and attribution at the various levels of perception. As before 
we have had to resort to collapsing categories. Here we have 
pitted the benign and inoffensive against the bad. Accordingly 
good, mixed, neutral and uncertain responses are contrasted with 
perceptions of bad influence. The results are recorded below, 
as are the controls for partisanship which we felt were 
appropriate given its strong relationship with the thermometer*:
(see over page)
*. The numbers represent cell frequencies. Difference in 
control cell frequencies due to uncoded or uncodable cases.
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Table 6.30 Affect Against Economic Attribution (Sociotropic. 
Local and Personal -
Effect', 'No Effect' Against 'Bad Effect').
Controlling for Partisanship
Sociotrooic Attribution
Conservative g/m/n bad
cold 5 —
g/m/n bad warm 61 2
cold 62 28 Phi = 0.04
warm 101 9
Phi = 0.29 Non-Conservat. g/m/n bad
cold 56 28
warm 4 7
Phi = 0.20
Local Attribution
Conservative g/m/n bad
cold 4 1
g/m/n bad warm 57 6
cold 49 41 Phi = 0.09
warm 91 19
Phi = 0.31 Non-Conservat. g/m/n bad
cold 45 39
warm 34 13
Phi = 0.18
Personal Attribution
Conservative g/m/n bad
cold 5 —
g/m/n bad warm 59 4
cold 62 28 Phi = 0.09
warm 95 15
Phi = 0.21 Non-Conservat. g/m/n bad
cold 56 28
warm 36 11
Phi = 0.10
The numbers here are small, but the signs seem relatively
clear. When we control for partisanship the relationship between 
perception and temperature is markedly reduced, most
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conspicuously in relation to the pocketbook aspect of 
attribution, though perhaps less so with regard to sociotropic 
attribution. The empty cells give problems. However, if we were 
to fill them with the body of one imaginary respondent the 
results do not look entirely dissimilar. Even if we set aside 
the notion of reciprocal causation, partisanship bleaches out the 
influence of attribution on thermometer readings.
We did, however, seek to find out if attribution was a 
mediating factor in other relationships. We decided to look at 
the relationship between the three levels of perception and their 
relationship with the thermometer readings. Since both 
perception and thermometer were related to partisanship we sought 
to control for this element to determine if the relationship 
endured for the partisan sub-groups. The results are reported 
below :
Table 6.31 Affect Against Stratified Economic Perception
(Sociotropic. Local and Personal - 'Better', 
'Same' Against 'Worse'), Controlling for 
Partisanship
Sociotropic Perception
Conservative
cold
bet/same worse 
5
cold
bet/same worse
47
warm 7 4
Phi = 0.31
34
12
warm 44
Phi = 0.10
Non-Conservat. bet/same 
cold 41
worse
34
warm 3 0
Phi = 0.26
(continued over page)
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Local Perceptions
Conservative
cold
bet/same 
3
worse
bet/same 
cold 37
worse
38
warm
Phi
38
= 0.16
20
warm 61 
Phi =0.15
34
Non-Conservat.
cold
bet/same 
34
worse
37
warm 
Phi =
23
0.14
14
Personal Perceotions
Conservative
cold
bet/same 
5
worse
bet/same 
cold 62
worse
27
warm
Phi
56
= 0.09
6
warm 87 
Phi =0.14
20
Non-Conservat.
cold
bet/same 
57
worse
26
warm 
Phi =
31
0.00
14
We are again presented with empty cells. If these are 
filled by the minimum number possible to render a meaningful - 
if notional - "Phi statistic", we see a relationship only for 
non-Conservatives, and then only for sociotropic perceptions. 
We took this group of non-Conservatives and controlled the 
relationship between perception and thermometer for attribution 
of responsibility at that level. The results are shown below 
(again numbers are cell frequencies) :
(see over page)
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Table 6.32 Affect Against Non-Conservative Sociotropic
Perceptions, Controlling for Attribution
Non-Conservative Sociotropic Perceptions
Good/no/mix/unsure bet/same worse
cold 31 16
bet/same worse warm 25 6
cold 41 34 Phi = 0.16
warm 30 7
Phi = 0.31
Bad Effect bet/same worse
cold 10 18
warm 5 1
Phi = 0.37
We must, of course, be careful not to claim too much from 
the distribution of such small numbers; but that not­
withstanding, for a clearly defined group it would appear that 
the attributional element has an impact in conjunction with 
sociotropic perception. One reading of the statistics would 
suggest that Conservatives are unmoved by the economy (in terms 
of warmth or coldness). However, for the non-Conservative 
elements the notion that Government is responsible is important. 
Those who, for one reason or another, feel the Government 'has 
done well', 'neither well nor badly', 'do not know' or think the 
Government 'has no effect', do not respond to sociotropic 
perceptions. Yet those who consider that the Government has 
badly affected the national economic circumstances are strongly 
animated against the Government in respect to the health or 
otherwise of the national economy.
The temptation to extrapolate to the broader context must 
be resisted given the smallness of the sample and its mode of 
construction (constituency oriented rather than nationally) . But 
we might suggest that with respect to the Lewisham constituencies
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(relatively marginal as they were and are) there was ideological 
mileage for the government in convincing the population that in 
no sense did their policies impact adversely on the national 
economy. Given that the controls on partisanship would suggest 
that we are not just dealing with Conservatives who thought the 
economy was doing well, the Government had a good influence on 
things and who therefore felt warmly towards it, we might start 
to enquire from whence the individuals got their ideas about the 
impact for good or ill of Government policies.
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6.7
What have we learned from the chapter's analysis? Clearly 
the most consistent results relate to the independence of the 
respective levels of perception. They strongly suggest that 
sociotropic perceptions in particular are independent of both 
personal and local level observations. This is not only the case 
in cross sectional terms, but it stands the test of longitudinal 
analysis. The notion that the degree of association between 
levels of perception fluctuates over time is, we feel, further 
testimony to the notion that the levels themselves are discrete 
and independent. We appear here to have the makings of some form 
of law-like generalisation with regard to people's perception of 
the economic world.
The levels of perception are not only autonomous, but as we 
might expect, they show at least some degree of independent 
variability. The identification of variability is awkward. But 
we feel confident that it is not a crude reflection of individual 
response sets (in the sense that individuals signalled 
appreciation of change, but not the same signals over the three 
shots) . The conclusion does have to be qualified here in one 
respect though. As we followed the sample across time the 
economic situation did deteriorate. In this context it was not 
surprising that there was some convergence evident over time.
If we examine the results with an eye to exploring the 
consistency in individual perceptions across levels, we again 
find that it is largely independent of partisanship. Strong 
partisans are not necessarily driven, as we might expect, towards 
consistency across the levels of economic perception. In this
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respect our longitudinal, small scale survey gives encouraging 
support to our cross sectional analysis of consistency.
The core of this chapter has explored the notion of the 
causal aspects of economic perception. Notwithstanding the 
problem of reciprocal causation it can be argued that there was 
a consistent, if qualified, case for the notion of the effect of 
sociotropic perceptions on political preferences (the independent 
variables in question being partisanship and alteration in 
affect). These relationships withstood the diagnostic
techniques we felt were appropriate as a function of sample 
construction. They also withstood our attempts to control for 
overlapping causal patterns and the impact of prior partisanship. 
In this sense we tried to establish whether a strong relationship 
between one level of perception and our dependent variable was 
simply a manifestation of the impact of a different level of 
perception. The conclusion was that sociotropic perceptions are 
influential (albeit in a complicated fashion). On the other hand 
local and personal perception seemed to have an intermittent or 
limited impact (subject as far as was possible to the limitations 
imposed by the small numbers we were dealing with).
We went on to explore this notion of discontinuous impact 
in terms of attributional inference. Attribution of
responsibility did appear to relate quite strongly to partisan 
attachment (most obviously with respect to sociotropic 
attribution though with personal and local not far behind). 
Switching the dependent variable to the feeling thermometer - a 
measure related to but not co-extensive with partisanship - we 
explored the direct impact of attribution on warmth toward the
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government. The results suggested little direct impact. 
However, we went on to explore its mediating impact between 
economic perception and thermometer reading. The results here 
suggest, with respect to sociotropic perception alone, that 
attribution can be a significant component in the development of 
political preference. The small numbers we were dealing with 
obviously qualify that result. But we feel that the results 
suggest that further attention to this facet of public perception 
would be appropriate.
One interesting facet of our results was the extent to which 
the Downsian elements in our analysis largely failed to register 
an impact. We seek in the next chapter to pursue this issue 
using the open-ended responses we gathered. We also wish to 
explore the impact of attributional inference and the nature of 
sociotropic perceptions.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ATTRIBUTION, AFFECT AND DEPENDENCY REVISITED 
7.1
Our survey allowed us an insight into personal level 
attributions through the open-ended comments of the respondents. 
The object is to look at the Downsian thesis in relation not just 
to vote, but to affect. Does perception of personal distress or 
plenty animate the individual (rather than merely informing 
judgements)? Does attribution mediate the impact of personal 
circumstances (ie. do we only feel angry about personal 
circumstances when we feel the Government is to blame) ? A 
limited open-ended question approach was also used to explore the 
issue of comprehension in relation to attribution for personal 
circumstances in particular. The question - how do respondents 
explain their personal circumstances?
Our chosen tactic grouped individuals according to a number 
of criteria. These were a) consideration of improvement or 
deterioration in personal conditions, b) deliberation on the 
Government's responsibility or otherwise for the individual's 
predicament, and, finally c) partisanship. The resultant matrix 
is reproduced below^ :
(see over page)
The numbers are simply convenient tags for the various 
groups. Bracketed numbers refer to the average thermometer 
reading for the group. The dash symbols (-) represent categories 
which were largely unrepresented.
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Table 7.1 Grouping of Open Ended Responses bv Pocketbook. 
Attribution and Partisanship
Those who considered that their lot had improved
GOVT. ATTRIB. GOOD NO EFFECT BAD
____________________________ EFFECT______ / UNSURE______EFFECT
Conservative Voters 1(76) 2(74) -
Independents - 3 (54) -
Non-Conservat.Voters 4(30) 5(35) 6(11)
Those who considered that their lot had deteriorated
GOVT. ATTRIB. GOOD NO EFFECT BAD
____________________________ EFFECT______ / UNSURE EFFECT
Conservative Voters - 7 (62)
Independents - 8 (45)
Non-Conservat.Voters - 9 (36) 10 (29)
The responses to the open-ended questions which asked people to
account for their personal situation are reported below; beside
them are the readings from the thermometer question (expressions
of warmth or coldness towards a party with 1° as cold and 100°as
very warm) . The first set refer to groups 1 and 4 (with one
residual "Independent" included)^ :
Table 7.2 Open Ended Responses of Groups One and Four
THOSE WHO WERE BETTER OFF AND WHO THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT HAD HAD 
A GOOD EFFECT ON THEM
Conservative
60 mortgage rate down, wages up, inflation static 
70 change of job
* 80 pay rise
100 prices stabilised 
90 new job
* 50 training at work
100 income tax down; mortgage down
* 70 perks in the job - bonuses
60 improved work situation - more steady work 
80 getting more for his pension than he was a year ago;
^. Each written entry represents the response of a specific 
individual. The preceding number refer to the thermometer 
response that same individual gave with respect to the 
Government. Averaging seperately acoss these thermometer 
readings for the Conservative, Independnents and Non- 
Conservatives gives the figures in brackets in Table 7.1.
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pen. more valuable
70 business success
* 100 good pay rise
* 80 pay increase, promotion
* 60 husband earning more; both increased wages
Independents
* 60 pay rises
Non-Conservative
* 55 promotion
* 40 husband's prospects have improved
* 50 pay rise
* 20 promotion
* 0 wife's higher salary
60 new job
* 20 just had a rise
30 deduction in taxation 
0 better job 
0 tax changes
* 50 additional earnings other than salary
The starred versus unstarred responses are the product of an 
attempt to differentiate on what we felt were common themes. The 
most obvious themes embodied the distinction between what we 
chose to call proximate causes (relating to immediate, family or 
job related factors such as wage increases), and exogenous causes 
which are, or could be. Government driven^. These included 
changes in inflation, tax, job availability and changes in 
employment. This has intuitive appeal only in the sense that we 
considered that individuals may more easily associate the 
Government with unemployment and inflation, than with salary 
increases and promotion within the company. The only problem we 
saw in this was the incidence of public sector employment. 
Individuals who stated they account for changes in conditions due 
to pay rises (for it was rises predominately) may have meant what 
we consider an exogenous influence.
As we can see the Conservative group split 50:50 on
^. Starred responses refer to 'proximate' causes.
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proximate to Government responses. However, from these responses 
alone it is difficult to establish whether the proximate 
responses reflect the belief that Government activity penetrates 
to company level with respect to wages and promotion in 
particular (they did, after all, state that the Government had 
a good effect on their personal circumstances). Non- 
Conservatives are only marginally more likely to give proximate 
responses (the corresponding ratio is 64:36. Yet they do appear 
to be quite different in their thermometer reactions 
(Conservative average is 76 to the non-Conservative average of 
30) .
The difficulty in interpreting the open responses for groups 
1 and 4 is evident if we compare them with those for groups 2, 
3 and 5  ^ :
Table 7,3 Open Ended Responses of Groups Two, Three and Five
THOSE WHO WERE DOING WELL. BUT THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO 
EFFECT OR WERE UNSURE
Conservative
* 75
70
* 80
* 80
* 70
* 100
80
* ? 60
* 75
* 70
* 75
* 75
80
* 80
* 80
30
Independent
Again starred responses relate to proximate themes. 
Question marks (?) reflect mixed or ambiguous answers.
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* 0
* 0
* 30
* 50
* 10
50
75
30
* 50
30
* ? 20
* 0
* 50
* 50
* 10
* 10
* 40
* 70
* 75 hard work
* 75 pay rise
50 job at the weekend
35 found a job
40 started job from school
* 50 promotion at work
Non-Conservative
 pay rise 
 higher scale job 
 wage rise 
 promotion 
 pay rise of husband 
 now has a job 
 mortgage paid off
 not spending as much; more "temping" work for the wife 
 working harder 
  got a job in the last year
 promotion, pay rise, increment, possibly tax cuts 
 pay rise 
 pay rise
 attendance allowance increase 
 biannual wage increase 
 wage increase 
 improved work situation 
 work situation
Again we have differentiated between 'proximate' (*) and 
'exogenous' causes. It should be noted that these three groups, 
though doing well, replied that the Government had no effect, a 
mixed effect or that they were unsure. We might be safer here 
in inferring that those designated 'proximate' dissociate the 
personal from the overtly political. We might also be tempted 
to consider that the Conservative Government would profit from 
convincing the non-Conservative voters that they were 
responsible, had it not been for the fact that those who ^  think 
the Government responsible for their good fortune (group 4 above) 
show little sign of overtly rewarding the Conservatives. They 
do not feel particularly warm towards the Government, and are on 
average colder towards it. The thermometer reading is 30 to the 
35 of those who were better off, but thought the Government had 
no effect on them or were unsure.
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The third cluster we focused on was group 6 (with residual
Conservative and Independent included). These non-Conservatives
felt their personal lot had improved over the last twelve months,
but that the Government policies had had a bad effect on their
own finances. The open-ended responses are reported below :
Table 7.4 Open Ended Responses of Group Six (with Residuals)
THOSE WHO WERE BETTER OFF, BUT THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT HAD HAD AN 
ADVERSE EFFECT ON THEIR PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Conservative
70 self-employed for about a year
Independents
* 50 more overtime
Non-Conservatives
* 0 pay award
* 0 strike action led to wage rise
0 getting a job
0 new work : part-time to full-time about to occur 
0 got a better job
* 25 pay rise
* 30 pay rise
* ? 50 husband increase in salary; low mortgage rates
0 got job
The average thermometer reading (at 11) is very low. However, 
the nominally exogenous (unstarred) responses seem to have a 
positive connotation. Given that the individuals attested to the 
Government's negative impact on personal finances, his would seem 
suggest that positive, job related explanations need not be 
associated in respondents mind with Government responsibility 
(perhaps not surprisingly, if relief of cognitive dissonance is 
a factor).
Moving on, perhaps it is significant that virtually no one 
said they were doing badly, and that the Government had a good 
effect on their financial situation. However, it is interesting 
to contrast the responses of groups 4 and 5 (shown above) with
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those of 9 and 10. Few Conservatives were prepared to say they 
were worse off and that the Government had a neutral effect on 
finances, but Non-Conservatives were less reticent. There 
responses are given below^ :
Table 7.5 Open Ended Responses of Group Seven. Eight and Nine
THOSE WHO WERE WORSE OFF, BUT WHO THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT HAD A 
NEUTRAL EFFECT, OR WERE UNSURE
CONSERVATIVE
* 50 change of personal circumstances
* 70 less money in job
70 inflation
50 loss of business agency (?)
INDEPENDENT
* ? 4 0 unemployed and a baby
* ? 50 don't really know
* 40 misfortune
NON-CONSERVATIVE
20 inflation
100 lack of money/accommodation for four children 
0 spouse retired 
40 change of job 
25 because of loss of job 
25 unemployed at the moment 
20 less 'temping' work 
70 shopping costs up 
90 unemployed
65 bills seem to be increasing, ie. telephone 
10 rise in the cost of living
40 just more in the bank account; could spend more (?)
0 because prices go up 
3 0 changed job
40 now saved money pays for house 
wasn't paying rates, now has to 
50 became a student again 
0 retired
It is clear that the non-Conservatives in particular favour the 
extraneous or exogenous over the proximate in explaining their 
circumstances. We might not find this particularly startling. 
Individuals are more likely to attribute responsibility for
* ?
*
*
*
*
*
^. Again the starred (*) responses reflect proximate or 
personal themes, with associated numbers showing thermometer.
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unpleasant circumstances to external, exogenous factors (Gergen 
and Gergen, 1981). On the other hand, individuals are more 
likely to attribute satisfying circumstances to their own 
endeavours. Not only does attributional self-protection drive 
those who are doing badly to proffer external explanations, but 
as non-Conservatives they may be more willing to cite Government 
'controlled' economic features as root causes. Yet the link is 
difficult to make given that they do actually state that the 
Government had no effect on them or that they were unsure
One notable feature is the average temperature of the 
thermometer reading for the non-Conservative group. At 36 it is 
of the same order of magnitude as that for groups 4 and 5 (30 and 
35 respectively). It would seem that neither personal 
circumstances themselves nor attribution for those circumstances 
have any impact on the temperature of the respondents. This is 
confirmed if we look at the last section of open-ended responses. 
Group 10 responses are reported below (with one residual 
Conservative response included) :
Table 7.6 Open Ended Responses of Group Ten
PEOPLE WHO WERE WORSE OFF AND WHO THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT HAD A 
BAD EFFECT
CONSERVATIVE
50 rising prices
NON-CONSERVATIVE
* 0 wife has stopped work, because of baby
* ? 40 1.retirement 2.rent
* ? 80 no entitlement to benefit while hospitalised
20 price rises
* 10 retired this year from part-time job
* ? 50 rent increased
* 30 change in personal situation - not necessarily the
country's
* 25 spent on buying own home
25 cuts in social security and housing benefit 
20 increased prices
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60 civil servants underpaid compared to private sector; pay
rises far behind 
50 price of goods; when goes to the shops, everything has
gone up
50 pension does not keep up with inflation (gas,
electricity, rent: all
0 inflation
0 handling of the economy
0 rents going up; rates up
This group is of particular interest. Not only do they think the 
their present situation is deteriorating, but they expressed the 
opinion that the Government was responsible and a goodly number 
cited exogenous explanations. However, the average thermometer 
reading is 29. This is comparable with those non-Conservatives 
saying they were better off and the Government was responsible 
(30) , and those who said things were better (though the 
Government had not effected them - 36). This is something of a 
mystery given that, in the Downsian canon, group 10 would be the 
most likely to punish the Government for its behaviour, or 
certainly more likely to punish than those in groups 4 or 5).
The explanation may revolve around the question of the 
validity or otherwise of the survey elements. The questions 
themselves may be tapping mental constructs that are altogether 
too complicated to be rendered down to a single response. 
Likewise the truncated open-ended question may not be the best 
technique to probe attributional inference. Notwithstanding 
these issues it would seem that Downsian model is weakened in 
this case by the complete lack of anv differentiating pattern 
among those who were both impoverished and held the Government 
responsible. If these questions cannot be answered here, we 
wanted to go on to explore the nature of global perceptions. 
Were these perceptions generated from a reading of the
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inflationary and unemployment context? Or were they reflected 
in the individual's perceptions of how well, in general, the 
Government was handling the economy?
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7.2
Having explored the underlying patterning of attribution and 
its impact, we ought to turn our attention to sociotropic 
perceptions and their substance. Are they derived in a clear and 
unambiguous way from perceptions of inflation and unemployment? 
We can explore this using responses drawn from the first survey 
shot. In terms of raw aggregates perceptions were distributed 
as follows ;
Table 7.7 Aggregated Economic Perceptions at tl
Unemploy Inflation Sociotropic
Percent Percent Percent
better 41.4 18.7 34.5
same 29.1 23.6 26.1
worse 17.7 41.9 22.7
unsure 11.8 15.8 16.7
It seems fairly clear that the majority felt unemployment would
get better, and that the inflation rate would get worse. On the
state of the national economy perceptions were more evenly
balanced.
We wanted to know if evaluations of inflation or 
unemployment bleed into judgements on the national economy. 
Again we chose cross tabulation as a measure of association, 
though we were aware that this form of test is in no sense ideal. 
Having collapsed the categories for the respective perceptions 
into 'better', 'worse', neutral or 'unsure' we cross tabulated 
sociotropic with inflation and unemployment impressions. The 
results are reported below  ^ :
Table 7.8 Sociotropic Perceptions Against Inflation & 
Unemployment
Sociotropic X Unemployment : Cramer's V = 0.27 
Sociotropic X Inflation : Cramer's V = 0.21
Splitting the sample to accommodate temporal disparity 
does not suggest the results need significant modification.
218
It would appear that neither element contributes decisively to
perception of the national economy. If we are prepared to talk
in terms of causal association we might hold that unemployment
makes a stronger contribution to global perceptions than does
inflation. We were aware, however, that all three measures might
simply reflect partisan attachments. The table below gives an
indication of the strength of the respective relationships  ^ :
Table 7.9 Partisanship Against Unemployment. Inflation and Socio­
tropic Perceptions
Partisanship Against :
Unemployment V = 0.22
Inflation V = 0.19
Sociotropic V = 0.29
With the partisan element in mind we sought in as far as possible 
to determine whether our initial description of the relationship 
between inflation or unemployment, and global appreciations still 
held. :
Table 7.10 Sociotropic Perceptions Against Unemployment with
Partisan Control
All
Sociotropic X Unemployment 
Cramer's V = 0.27
Conservative Non-Cons./Independ.
Cramer's V = 0.31 Cramer's V = 0.30
The figures have to be treated with some caution. The four-by-
four cross tabulations left cells empty in the 'Conservative'
sub-group (though not in the other). Corresponding figures for
inflation are shown below, though again the statistic for the
Conservative sub-group are likely to be unreliable as a function
'. To maintain cross tabulation symmetry we dropped the 
'unsure' category from our calculation and ranged 'Conservative', 
'Independent' and 'non-Conservative' against 'Better', 'Worse' 
and 'Same'.
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of empty cells :
Table 7.11 Sociotropic Perceptions Against Inflation with
Partisan Control
All
Sociotropic X Inflation 
Cramer's V = 0.21
Conservative Non-Cons./Independ.
Cramer's V = 0.24 Cramer's V = 0.20
The figures would tend to suggest that the correspondence between 
perceptions of inflation or unemployment, and broader national 
circumstances are not simply the product of underlying 
partisanship (for one sub-group at least). We might interpret 
the results as suggesting that people do in some measure draw on 
their sense of fluctuation in inflation and unemployment when 
judging the global environment. However, there seems to be more 
substance to sociotropic perceptions than can be accounted for 
by inflation or unemployment alone.
This perhaps should not surprise us. The issues of 
inflation and unemployment were chosen because they were (and 
still are) the issues on which the Government and Opposition 
sought to fight so many of their rhetorical battles. Obviously 
this was not done to the exclusion of other economic issues. The 
national debt, taxation and interest rates, competitiveness and 
productivity, public sector borrowing requirement, and the 
balance of payments are ready alternatives. So though we have 
shown that unemployment and inflation are important elements in 
voter's perceptions of the broader economy, they are by no means 
the most salient or determinate.
If inflation and unemployment have a bearing on sociotropic 
perceptions we also wanted to know if these, in turn, were
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articulated to a broader concept of government performance. To 
this end we used responses to a question concerning the handling 
of Britain's problems f"In general, how well do you think the 
Government is handling the country's problem?"). Again, in the 
absence of detailed open ended material, we used cross tabulation 
to give us an idea of the structure of the relationship between 
the respective cognitive elements.
There was a danger that we might mistake dual partisan 
perception for a simple pattern of association between global 
impression and general handling of problems. The 'handling' 
question was more closely associated with partisan alignment than 
most others (Cramer's V = 0.48). In this instance, any
correspondence between the response on handling problems, and 
perceptions of the national economy might simply reflect partisan 
commitment.
The results suggest that sociotropic evaluations are more
closely associated with 'handling' responses than either
unemployment or inflation®. Though we realise that sociotropic,
inflation and unemployment perceptions are not unrelated, we
thought it appropriate to treat them individually :
Table 7.12 Handling Against Economic Perceptions, Controlling
for Partisanship
Conservative 
All Cramer's V = 0.47
Handling X Sociotropic
Cramer's V = 0.30 Non-Cons./Independ.
Cramer's V = 0.27
(continued over page)
®. Again four by four calculations mean the Conservative 
control sub-group has empty cells and the associated statistic 
is thus unreliable.
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Conservative 
All Cramer's V = 0.23
Handling X Unemployment
Cramer's V = 0.19 Non-Cons./Independ,
Cramer's V = 0.19
Conservative 
All Cramer's V = 0.18
Handling X Inflation
Cramer's V = 0.13 Non-Cons./Independ.
Cramer's V = 0.15
The relationship is closest for sociotropic perceptions and is 
sustained for the non-Conservative control group. There is a 
lesser degree of association with the other variables (though the 
degree of association is still sustained in the non-Conservative 
control group). We can only speculate on whether the 
relationship would look different for the Conservative had our 
controls avoided empty cells. Given the different positions of 
the parties we might have expected their partisans to have 
differed in the significance they assigned to fluctuations in 
unemployment and inflation. We might expect to see some 
difference in control groups. Research involving larger numbers 
of respondents is the only way we can test such speculation. In 
the meantime all we can say is that for non-Conservatives the 
associations we have identified for the sample as a whole are 
still evident.
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7.3
Having looked at attribution, and the construction of 
sociotropic perceptions, we wanted to explore the link between 
these evaluative elements and emotional expression. A number of 
authors have attempted to extend the analysis of attribution into 
the field of emotional reaction. Smith and Kluegel established 
that the form of attribution one makes about an occurrence 
mediates the type of emotional reaction to the object seen as 
causal agent (Smith and Kleugel, 1982). Conover and Feldman look 
at emotional reactions to national and personal circumstances and 
try to assess the impact of those reactions on the evaluation of 
the President (Conover and Feldman, 1985). We would have liked 
to have tackled both these questions, but this project would have 
been much too ambitious. Instead we looked at emotional 
reactions to Government as object and sought to determine if this 
was affected by attribution concerning the impact of Government 
on the respondents or on the economy more generally.
Conover and Feldman's factor analysis isolates two 
dimensions of negative emotional reaction to the economy 
(national and personal). Anger and disgust are contrasted with 
uneasiness and fear. They speculated that the former may be 
associated with externally caused conditions that are 
controllable by others (namely Government), and those which are 
externally caused and uncontrollable. On the positive side of 
the emotional equation they isolated feelings of pride, hope, 
happiness, confidence and sympathy (though these were not seen 
as tied to an attributional calculus). On the other hand Smith 
and Kluegel note the association between positive emotional
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reaction and the individual's ability to operate with some 
freedom. Negative reactions are induced by being thwarted as a 
consequence of the actions of others (ibid., pp.133).
We could not hope to fully replicate the structure of these 
studies. What we did do was look at emotional reactions to 
Government using a slightly modified version of Conover and 
Feldman's emotional categories. We then examined those reactions 
in the light of respondent's thoughts on whether the Government 
had a positive or negative effect on the national economy or 
their personal situations.
First we looked at the degree of exclusivity of the 
emotional reactions to the Government. Conover and Feldman state 
that,
"..by no means are positive and negative 
emotions completely collinear; the mention 
of a positive reaction to the economy does 
not preclude the possibility that a person 
has also reported negative feelings."
(ibid., p.61).
Although the object of our analysis was not the economy but the 
Government, it is clear from the following tables that the mix 
of emotion, the authors highlight is scarcely in evidence. We 
cross tabulated Conover and Feldman's four negative categories 
(angry, disgusted, uneasy and afraid) with each of the positive 
indicators (happy, hopeful, pleased, proud and relaxed). The 
table represents the percentage who showed neither emotive 
response (N), those who showed one emotional response but not the 
other (E), and those who showed both simultaneously (S). It is 
the latter we are interested in :
(see over page)
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Table 7.13 Consistency Across Positive and Negative Affective
Responses
Consistency Across Positive and Negative Affect
angry/hap. angry/hope. angry/ple. angry/proud angry/relax.
N 18.9% 10.4% 15.9% 27.0% 21.9%
E 72.2% 70.6% 70.7% 65.5% 68.7%
S 8.5% 18.9% 13.4% 7.5% 9.5%
disg./hap. disg./hope. disg./pie. disg./proud disg./relax.
N 26.6% 15.4% 22.9% 37.0% 31.3%
E 70.1% 74.1% 71.1% 59.0% 63.2%
S 3.0% 10.4% 7.0% 4.0% 5.5%
uneas/hap. uneas/hope. uneas/ple. uneas/proud uneas/relax.
N 19.4% 10.0% 17.4% 25.5% 21.4%
E 72.7% 72.6% 68.7% 69.0% 70.7%
S 8.0% 17.4% 13.9% 5.5% 8.0%
afrai/hap. afrai/hope. afrai/ple. afrai/proud afrai/relax.
N 30.8% 15.4% 25.4% 39.0% 32.8%
E 65.5% 77.6% 68.6% 58.0% 63.7%
S 3.5% 7.0% 6.0% 3.0% 3.5%
Conover and Feldman maintain that both positive and negative 
emotions can be felt simultaneously. This may be true in the 
U.S.A. for personal circumstances and views on the national 
economic situation. It is certainly not true for reactions to 
the Government in Britain. It might have been surprising if 
something akin to Conover and Feldman's results had been 
replicated. However, at least we can say with some certainty 
that mutual incompatibility of emotional expression is strongly 
evident. We might speculate that there are varying degrees of 
emotional exclusivity (depending on the object of attention and 
the country of origin).
The obvious next step was to look at the relationship 
between emotional reactions and our main focus of interest 
(economic and personal attributions and perceptions). Exploring 
the area was not without its difficulties. We collapsed the 
emotional responses into two categories (numbers prevented
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further refinement). Those who expressed the emotion (at 
whatever strength) formed one category, and those who did not 
constituted the other. The collapsing of categories for 
perceptions and attributions proved more difficult. An example 
will illuminate the problem. A respondent may well say they felt 
anger towards the Government; at the same time they had the 
option of saying they thought the Government had a good, a bad, 
and a mixed effect on them (or the economy), or that they made 
no difference - some might be unsure.
It is not intuitively clear how the positive or neutral 
elements should relate to the angry/not angry response (though 
we might well think a negative attribution might induce anger). 
We finally decided that for cross tabulations on positive
emotions (pleased, happy etc.) we would collapse negative and 
neutral responses and juxtapose them with positive attributional 
or perceptual answers. A mirror image was used for negative 
emotions (angry - not angry cross tabulated with positive/neutral 
- negative) :
Table 7.14 Modelling the Relationship Between Affect and
Attribution or Perception
ATTRIBUTION PERCEPTION
good bad/mixed better
effect effect/unsure same/unsure worse
no response X X no response X X
happy X X angry X X
The results are shown in Appendix II, the figures showing
'Phi' for the two-by-two crosstabs. We controlled for partisan
attachment as an obvious intervening variable. The star (*)
refers to crosstabs where one cell has less than four occupants.
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One star denotes one cell with less than four; two, that two 
cells fall below four. Three stars denotes that the crosstab had 
an empty cell. Due to the low numbers many of the Conservative 
control crosstabs have low or empty cells. As a result the 
corresponding statistics have to be treated With considerable 
scepticism*.
Three things strike us in these tables. First the 
relationships are not simply the product of partisan attachment. 
It is not the case non-Conservative partisan necessarily or 
automatically feels a negative emotion and at the same time feels 
the Government is responsible for the state of the national 
economy or that global economic conditions have necessarily 
deteriorated. In many instances controlling for partisanship 
does not negate the relationship which holds for the group as a 
whole.
The second feature of the cross tabulations is that the 
relationships, while weak overall, are most prominent for 
national perception, national level attribution and for personal 
attribution (in roughly that order). Personal level perceptions 
are rarely associated with either positive or negative emotions 
after we allow for partisanship. This has a bearing on our last 
point which deals with the hoary old problem of reciprocal 
causation. Are non-Conservatives angry with the Government 
because the national economy is getting worse; or are those who 
feel anger towards the Government merely more disposed to say the 
economy is in decline? Or are we looking at a complex
*. It proved too difficult to reproduce the tables in the 
body of the text. We clustered the crosstabs together for ease 
of comprehension.
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interconnection? We would tentatively submit that we are not 
simply talking about emotion leading to economic or attributional 
inferences. If this were the case we might expect the 
relationship between personal economic experience and emotional 
reaction to look more like that for national perception, national 
attribution and personal attribution.
A last point that has to be made as a caveat concerns the 
similarity in some of the cross tabulations. This holds true for 
the crosstabs on emotional reaction and national attribution, 
perception of the national economy and attribution of 
responsibility for personal circumstances. The cell frequencies, 
and hence the associated statistics on association, look quite 
disturbingly similar in many instances. We cannot be certain 
that there is an overlooked variable that unites the three 
responses, but sadly we do not have the numbers to explore this 
as fully as we might have liked. What we can say is that the 
uniting element is not necessarily partisanship.
228
7.4
We have, so far, examined attribution, the structure of 
global economic perceptions and their emotional concomitants. 
Questions concerning the source of the global attitudes in 
particular are, however, still outstanding. In our chapter on 
the Gallup Political Index we attempted to isolate those we 
nominally considered dependent on the mass media for sociotropic 
information. We did this by identifying those whose observations 
of the global environment differed from their experience of 
personal changes in circumstances. The assumption was that if 
individuals were not drawing on their own experience to flesh out 
sociotropic perceptions (this showing up in a lack of 
correspondence between levels), then their cognitions must have 
alternative sources.
The obvious problem with this assumption is that individuals 
could be drawing on vicarious experience. In our question on the 
state of the local economy we have a surrogate measure which 
might be suitable for testing this notion. We showed earlier 
that this measure is not closely associated with sociotropic 
perception. However, it is entirely possible that a combination 
of personal experience and local observation in some sense cue 
or inform our global calculations. With this in mind we sought 
to isolate those whose sociotropic observations differed from 
both their personal and local perceptions (we termed these 
'dependent'). The results for the three survey shots are 
outlined below :
Table 7.15 Retrospective Dependency Across Three Survey Shots
shot 1 shot 2 shot 3
Dependent 44.1% 28.8% 39.3%
Independent 55.9 71.2 60.7
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We also noted that though the 'dependents' represented a 
substantial proportion at all three shots, these individuals did 
not represent a core group of perennially dependent voters. We 
looked at those who were, by our definition, 'dependent' at all 
three stages in our survey. They constituted only 4.2% of the 
sample consisting of the 167 individuals who made it to the end. 
We might safely say in this context that we are not talking about 
a core or homogenous group of media dependents - even if our 
definition is accepted. The different percentages at different 
times can be explained by recourse to the notion of independent 
starta of thought. 'Dependents' are simply those whose personal 
and global perceptions do not match (their global perceptions 
cannot be contaminated by personal circumstances - we can thus 
make inferences about how the media influence this group). But 
that degree of matching will change over time as personal 
circumstances change - so the size of the dependent group is 
bound to change over time.
We obviously have to stress that the terms 'independent' and 
'dependent' are still provisional. We do not seek to claim that 
in performing our calculation we have in fact isolated the 'truly 
dependent'. Suffice it to say that we feel that this group is 
more likely to be dependent on the mass media for cues than the 
'independent', or that the they are less likely to be 
extrapolating from unrelated experiences.
We were aware, however, that there was one last prospective 
source of non-mediated economic information : namely
interpersonal communication. Notions of two-step-flow have long 
been prevalent in communication studies, though the concept has
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attracted critical attention on occasion (Gitlin, 1978, Ball- 
Rokeach, 1985, Severin, 1988). The theory normally gives opinion 
leaders the role of communicating a mediated version of reality 
to the broader public. We felt that personal communication, as 
a potential source of information, obviously merited attention. 
To this effect we sought to isolate those we considered to be 
free of personal or local influences and isolated those that had 
stated that they "never", or only "occasionally" or "rarely" talk 
to "family, friends, neighbours or workmates" about politics. 
We felt the question cast sufficiently broad a net to isolate 
the 'two-step-flow' component of sociotropic perception. The 
question is, how many of those whom we consider 'dependent' on 
the mass media are talking to others about politics. We looked 
at those whose sociotropic perceptions differed from both local 
and personal experience. Taking this group, we tried to 
determine what percentage did not report talking about politics. 
The results are reported below (the percentages for 'dependents' 
are those which do not match personal and global, and who do not 
talk about politics - so are less likely to derive global 
perceptions from others' personal experience) :
Table 7.16 Non-Communicative Dependents Across Three Shots
shot 1 shot 2 shot 3
Dependent 33.7% 23.7% 32.7%
Independent 66.3 76.3 67.3
We felt that this was a much more rigorous test of media 
dependency than simply isolating those with divergent personal 
and global judgments (though it has to be noted that we had to 
use a single response on political conversation from the first 
shot to help define media dependents for shots two and three). 
Individuals who are not extrapolating from the personal or the
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local, and who, at the same time, do not talk about politics with 
immediate associates, are prime candidates for identification as 
'media dependents'. In this respect it is somewhat surprising 
to see the size of the group so identified. Between a quarter 
and a third of individuals are at any one time dependent on the 
mass media for their national perceptions on the economy. A 
significant number by any standards.
What were the social and ideational characteristics of this 
group that we called 'media dependent'? The more obvious social 
groupings were unrelated to dependency. Dependents were as 
likely to be old as young; as likely to be male as female. Those 
who were not dependent were a little more likely to have 
undertaken no part-time or full-time studies; but are as likely 
as the rest to have gone to FE or have professional or technical 
training. On the other hand, they are a little less likely to 
have gone to university. On social class, dependents were 
fractionally less likely to be A/B than independents; as likely 
to be Cl or C2; and 10% more likely to come from social class D 
than 'independents'. As such the dependents seemed socially 
undifferentiated.
Looking at ideational rather than structural categories it 
was clear the picture is more complicated. One disturbing 
feature appears in the cross tabulation of dependency with 
sources of political information^® :
(see over page)
The cells represent percentages summing to 100% 
horizontally; the brackets, row numbers.
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Table 7.17 Dependency by Main Source of Political News
Family
Friends News
Etc. Radio TV Papers Mix None
Depend. 11.8 2.9 50.0 19.1 14.7 1.5 - 100%
(68)
Indep. 6.0 6.7 39.6 27.6 17.9 2.2 - 100%
(134)
There are two points worth making here. First, the row 
percentages do not differ much. Although not significant in 
itself, we can say that the media sources specified by are likely 
to be informing their global perceptions (something we cannot say 
about 'Independents'). Second, our assumption was that media 
dependents were not part of a causal chain that featured 
interpersonal communication. Eleven percent of the 'dependency' 
group cited this as the main source of information. We may be 
heartened that this is as small as it is representing only eight 
out of sixty eight.
It may be considered significant that only a segment of 
'dependents' use papers as a source of information (19.4%), while 
some may use them from time to time (14.7%) . In this context we 
would not expect the weight of Conservative dominance of the 
press to be, in any sense, determinate in there impact. Other 
ideational factors of interest include respondent's interest in 
politics and their partisanship. The cross tabulation results 
are reported below^^ ;
Table 7.18 Political Interest & Partisanship Against Dependency
Depend Indep. Depend Indep.
Very Inter. 1.5 14.9 Conserv. 43.4 29.3
Fairly Int. 59.7 56.0 Indep. 6.0 12.0
Not V. Int. 28.4 21.6 Non-Con. 50.7 58.6
Disinterest. 10.4 7.5 100% 100%
100% 100% (68) (134)
. Cell figures represent column percentages.
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It seems clear that 'dependents', are less likely to be very 
interested in politics, but in all other respects are similar to 
'independents'. There is a tendency for dependents to be more 
Conservatively inclined; for 'independents' to be non- 
Conservative partisans. Otherwise, the dependents seem 
relatively unremarkable with regard to their social and ideation 
composition. However, if we are to explore more fully the 
significance of 'dependency' we need to look beyond these surface 
characteristics.
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7.5
Looking at the relationship between 'dependency' and the 
three levels of perception we had identified earlier, we 
hypothesised that the magnitude of influence of dependency would 
more than likely differ from our 1981 sample. Economic 
circumstances differed markedly and, we might hazard that so did 
media coverage of those circumstances. However, we felt that if 
our projection was correct, dependency would be associated with 
buoyancy in sociotropic perception (sociotropic perceptions would 
be established in a media context generally, though not wholy 
favourable to the Conservatives) . We felt that it would be 
impossible to hypothesise a relationship with local perceptions. 
Dependency on national media for national level perceptions does 
not entail any necessary local, or indeed personal level, 
concomitant. Limiting ourselves to retrospective perceptions we 
did not possess a surrogate for immediate, personal level 
perceptions, and as a result we were unable to fully replicate 
our representative sample analysis.
However, the results from our analysis are presented below. 
We controlled for party loyalty as the most likely intervening 
variable though numbers dictated we collapse 'independents' and 
'non-Conservatives' into the one c a t e g o r y :
Table 7.19 Dependency Against Economic Perceptions,
Controlling for Partisanship
Conservative
All Phi =0.09
Dependency X Sociotropic
Phi = 0.16 Non-Cons./Indeoend.
Phi =0.15
. None of the cross tabulations had problems with empty
cells.
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Table 7.19 (continued)
All
Dependency X Local 
Phi =0.03
All
Dependency X Personal 
Phi = 0.04
Conservative 
Phi =0.08
Non-Cons./Independ. 
Phi =0.05
Conservative 
Phi =0.06
Non-Cons./Indeoend. 
Phi =0.13
The findings are in one sense in concurrence with our 
hypothesis - though there is a degree of ambiguity. The straight 
cross tabulation on sociotropic perception seems to confirm the 
hypothesis, though when we control for partisan attachment the 
relationship is only sustained for non-Conservatives.
The weak nature of the relationship is also significant, 
though much of the detail is lost in the collapsing of 
categories. If we look at the uncollapsed cross tabulation a 
slightly different picture emerges^* :
Table 7.2 0 Sociotropic Perceptions Against Dependency#
Controlling for Partisanship
All
DEPEND. INDEP.
BETTER 35.3 34.3
SAME 20.6 28.4
WORSE 10.3 29. 1
UNSURE 33.8 8 . 2
(68) (134)
(continued over page)
. Cells represent column percentages; parenthesis refers 
to column marginal frequencies.
236
Conservative Non-Conservative
DEPEND INDEP. DEPEND INDEP.
BETTER 44.4 46.2 BETTER 28.9 29.8
SAME 13.8 35.9 SAME 23.7 24.5
WORSE 3.4 10.3 WORSE 15.8 37.2
UNSURE 37.9 7.7 UNSURE 31.6 8.5
(29) (39) (38) (94)
The non-Conservative component is interesting. Dependents here 
are as likely as independents to say they are doing better. 
However, they are much less likely to say they are worse off 
(dp=21.4%). The weak relationship in the collapsed cross 
tabulation appears to have important underlying features which 
are more clearly consistent with our hypothesis.
When we turn to personal perceptions the uncontrolled, 
collapsed cross tabulation seems to show no relationship between 
'dependency' and perceptions at this level. When controlling for 
partisan attachment the relationship reemerges (though only for 
non-Conservatives). The nature of the relationship is, however, 
idiosyncratic^* :
Table 7.21 Personal Perceptions Against Dependency.
Controlling for Partisanship
Conservative Dep. Indep.
bet/same 93.1 89.5
Dep. Indep. worse 6.9 10.5
bet/same 72.7 76.5 (29) (38)
worse 27.3 23.5
(66) (132) Non-Conservat. Dep. Indep.
bet/same 58.3 72.0
worse 41.7 28.0
(36) (93)
14. Cells represent column percentagesi. The numbers in
brackets represent column marginal frequencies.
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Here non-Conservative 'dependents' are less likely to say they 
are better off or the same, and more likely to say they are worse 
off, than 'independents'. Our hypothesis does allow us to live 
with this degree of idiosyncrasy. It is not clear how individual 
level, backward regarding perceptions might be influenced by 
media dependency, if at all. And with the limited numbers at our 
disposal it is impossible to pursue the case much further. At 
local level the situation is clearer. Neither at the superficial 
nor at the controlled level does 'dependency', as we have defined 
it, impact on perception.
Clearer results come from the exploration of the 
relationship between 'dependency' and perception of Government's 
handling of the country's problems. As we suggested earlier, 
economic elements may be important, though certainly not 
exclusive criteria by which the public judge the Government's 
competence. We might hypothesise that the global media 
environment is as good to the Conservatives on the issue of 
handling the country's problems as it is in respect of economic 
reportage, though clearly we must be cautious in relating 
sociotropic dependency to perceptions of overall handling of the 
economy. However, if our assumption is correct we might expect 
the dependent to have a rosier or at least a less gloomy picture 
of reality than independents. We tested this hypothesis, and the 
results are outlined below. Again we controlled for partisan 
attachment as the most likely confounding variable :
(see over page)
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Table 7.22 Perception of Government Handling of Problems 
Against Dependency
All
DEPEND. INDEP.
WELL 41.8 26.9
NEITHER 26.9 24.6
BADLY 16.4 36.6
UNSURE 14.9 11.9
100%
(67)
100%
(134)
The initial cross tabulation suggests that sociotropic dependency 
is related to perception of handling the economy in the way we 
expected. This might lead us to speculate that the 'handling' 
question probes perceptions with a strong sociotropic element. 
We went on to control for partisan attachment.
Table 7.24 Control on Partisanship for Handling Against
Dependency
Conservative 
DEPEND. INDEP.
Non-Conservative 
DEPEND. INDEP.
WELL
NEITHER
BADLY
UNSURE
75.9 61.5 WELL 15.8 12.8
10.3 23 . 1 NEITHER 39.5 25.5
--- 7.7 BADLY 28.9 47.9
13 .8 7.7 UNSURE 15.8 13.8
100
(29)
100
(39)
100
(38)
100
(94)
While almost inevitably we have empty cells, a distinguishable 
pattern continues to emerge. The pattern is consistent with our 
hypothesis.
Our results are somewhat different from our earlier analysis 
of a representative sample. Relationships are weaker, though 
still broadly as we might have imagined them. This may be as 
much to do with the timing of the respective surveys as the
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phenomenon of dependency itself. However, we would not expect 
dependent individuals to be, in any sense, 'delivered' by the 
Conservative dominated press. It is clear from our media 
exposure indices that the sample live in a complex, 
differentiated and media-rich environment. In this context we 
would not expect Conservative press to dominate in any real 
sense. The most we might expect would be for it to shift the 
centre of balance of coverage in their favour of the Government. 
It is to this media mix that we now turn.
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7.6
The media exposure profile of our sample is particularly 
complex. The split between quality and tabloid in our sample is 
probably of the same order as it would be nationally (10.8% to 
88.4% - with 1.0% uncoded). The daily and Sunday newspaper 
intake were as follows :
Table 7.24 Reported Newspaper Readership ; Daily and Sunday
No paper 18.4 % No Sunday 19.2 %
Quality only 8.5 % Telegraph 2.0 %
Sun 22.4 % Times 4.9 %
Mail 10.5 % Observer 8.4 %
Express 4.5 % The Sport 0.5 %
Star 3.4 % News of World 25.6 %
Today 3.4 % Sunday Express 7.9 %
Mirror 28.4 % Mail on Sunday 8.9 %
Daily News 0.5 % People 10.8 %
Mirror 10.3 %
n = 2 01 News on Sunday 1.5 %
The evening papers were read by 3 6.5 % of our sample. This
combined with exposure in many cases to second and third dailies, 
Sundays and 'other' newspapers gives a rich mixture of exposure 
that is extremely difficult to squeeze into unambiguous 
categories.
Television adds a new layer of complexity. If television
news exposure is our focus; the figures are as follows :
Table 7.2 5 Television News Viewing and Channel Selection
non-viewers 9.4 %
every evening 57.6 %
3/4 per week 16.3 %
1/2 per week 5.4 %
occasional 11.3 %
The favoured channels are as follows :
Mainly BBC 32.6 %
Mainly ITN 34.8 %
Mainly CH4 3.8 %
Mixed 28.8 %
Current affairs material was viewed by 70 % of respondents either
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"often" or "occasionally", while 30 % watched it rarely or not 
at all.
We tried to establish whether exposure to Conservative daily
tabloids affected respondent's perceptions of the global economic
climate. We grouped Sun, Mail. Express and Star readers together
and contrasted with the rest. The results are presented below:
Table 7.2 6 Sociotropic Perception Against Press Exposure,
Controlling for Partisanship
All
CONSERV NON-CON.
EXPOSE. EXPOSE.
BETTER 34.5 34.5
SAME 27.4 25.2
WORSE 19.0 25.2
UNSURE 19.0 15.1
100
(84)
100
(119)
Conservative Non-Conservative
BETTER
SAME
WORSE
UNSURE
CONSERV
EXPOSE.
NON-CON.
EXPOSE.
CONSERV
EXPOSE.
NON-CON
EXPOSE.
39.5 53 . 3 BETTER 30.4 29.1
28.9 23.3 SAME 26.1 23.3
2.6 13 . 3 WORSE 32. 6 30.2
28.9 10.0 UNSURE 10.9 17.4
100 100 100 100
(38) (30) (46) (86)
The cross tabulations make it clear that simple exposure alone 
has no unambiguous effect on sociotropic perceptions. Though we 
are dealing with small numbers it would appear that Conservative 
readers of Conservative newspapers are actually less optimistic 
than readers of non-Conservative output. Non-Conservatives in 
contrast are wholly unmoved.
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As another focus of analysis we explored media use. We 
looked at secondary as well as primary press use, following 
Dunleavy and Husbands who (rightly) suggest we cannot look at 
primary sources alone :
Table 7.27 Sources of Political Information ("Most
Important" and "Second Most Important”)
PRIMARY SECONDARY
friends etc. 7.9% 11.3%
radio 5.4% 8.4%
television 42.9% 23.6%
newspapers 24.6% 36.5%
mixed 16.7% 8.9%
none specified 2.5% 11.3%
n = 203 n = 203
We were anxious to employ an indicator reflecting usage rather 
than relying simply on exposure (though we appreciate some 
studies hint at the importance of "passive learning" - Keeter and 
Zukin, 1983; Zukin and Synder, 1984). To this end we isolated 
those who said they used papers either as their primary or their 
secondary source of political information. We found that 61.1% 
of our sample claimed to used papers as their primary or 
secondary source of political information - a considerable 
percentage by any standards.
We sought to find out whether their appreciation of economic 
circumstances matched those of non-users. The resultant cross 
tabulation is outlined over page (with controls on partisanship 
reported below) . There are some signs of a relationship here 
which emerge more clearly if we control for partisan affiliation:
(see over page)
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Table 7.28 Sociotropic Perception Against Paper Use, 
Controlling for Partisanship
All
PAPER NONPAR
BETTER 38.7 27.8
SAME 23.4 30.4
WORSE 21.0 25.3
UNSURE 16.9 16.5
(124) (79)
Conservative Non-Conservative
BETTER
SAME
WORSE
UNSURE
PAPER NONPAR PAPER NONPAR
50.0 36.4 BETTER 32.5 25.5
21.7 36.4 SAME 23.4 25.5
4 . 3 13.6 WORSE 32.2 30.9
23.9 13 . 6 UNSURE 13 . 0 18.2
100%
(46)
100%
(22)
100%
(77)
100%
(55)
There are signs that something is going on. The percentage 
difference for the Conservative group between paper-users and 
non-users is 13.6% (in the category thinking things got better). 
The corresponding percentage difference for the non-Conservatives 
is a modest 7%. Otherwise, there are few signs that paper use 
affects perceptions either pessimistically or optimistically. 
Yet the increased optimism among paper users (though small) is 
consistent with our thesis. Even this is surprising given that 
many paper readers were using newspapers which were critical of 
the Conservative Government.
We sought to elaborate the thesis by isolating those who 
reported using television as their primary source of political 
information. Were television users more or less bullish about
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the economy? The results are complex, but interesting. The 
initial crosstabulation suggests that television users are more 
buoyant and less bleak than the rest :
Table 7.2 9 Sociotropic Perception Against Television Use.
Controlling for Partisanship
All
TV NON-TV
BETTER 37.9 31.9
SAME 23.0 28.4
WORSE 17 . 2 26.7
UNSURE 21.8 12.9
100% 100%
However, if we control for partisan attachment a different 
picture emerges :
Conservative
TV NON-TV
Non-Conservative 
TV NON-TV
BETTER
SAME
WORSE
UNSURE
38.2 52.9 BETTER 37.7 24.1
26.5 26.5 SAME 20.8 26.6
5.9 8.8 WORSE 24.5 35.4
29.4 11.8 UNSURE 17.0 13.9
100%
(34)
100%
(34)
100%
(53)
100%
(79)
Here Conservative television users are less bullish than non­
television users. Non-Conservatives, on the other hand, are more 
buoyant and less bleak than their non-watching counterparts. We 
might speculate that the more balanced nature of televisual 
output is responsible for the resultant distributions. 
Conservatives are lured away from the untrammelled 'optimism' we 
might expect from partisans. The non-Conservatives are not as 
assured in their negative perception of a country run by
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Conservatives.
The strength of the relationships we have examined are small 
(as are the cell frequencies) . But this is not difficult to 
explain if we look at the overall complexity of patterns of 
exposure and use of the media. The table below shows television 
and newspaper overlap and the incidence of mixed exposure. We 
looked at all daily, evening and Sunday papers and at nightly 
television. Overlaps and isolated exposure to one or other media 
are highlighted (as is lack of media use). As Conservative 
newspapers we took The Sun, The Dailv Mail. The Dailv Express. 
The Star. The Evening Standard, The Mail On Sundav. The Sundav 
Express. News of the World. The Sundav Telegraph and The Sundav 
Times. The non-Conservative papers we took as Todav, The Mirror. 
The Dailv News. The Evening News. News On Sundav, The Observer. 
The Sundav Mirror and The Sundav People (MacArthur, 1989). The 
resultant calculation yield the table below^^ :
Table 7.30 Mixed Media Exposure
TV + QUALITY PAPER 6.9%
TV + CONSERVATIVE PAPER 20.2%
TV + NON-CONSERV. PAPER 9.9%
TV + MIX OF PAPERS 32. 0%
CONSERVATIVE PAPER ONLY 6.4%
NON-CONSERV. PAPER ONLY 2.0%
BROADSHEET PAPER ONLY 4.4%
MIX OF PAPERS ONLY 3.4%
TV ONLY 12.3%
NO TV OR NEWSPAPERS 2.5%
n = 201
It is perhaps significant that the largest single category is for 
television in combination with a mix of newspapers (32%). In 
this sense our sample is exposed to mixed information.
. The figures include evening as well as dailies, and 
multiple dailies of mixed political complexion.
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If we look instead at what respondents say is their most
important source of political information, the picture is not
really simplified in any significant way. We took the 'most
important source of political information' and matched it with
the type of exposure the respondents reported :
Table 7.31 Combined Use and Exposure
PAPER ; QUALITY PAPERS 7.4%
PAPER : UNIFORMLY CONSERVATIVE 6.3%
PAPER : UNIFORMLY NON-CONSERV. 2.6%
PAPER : POLITICAL MIX OF TITLES 8.4% n = 190
TELEVISION 42.1%
RADIO 5.8%
MIXED MEDIA SOURCES 18.9%
FAMILY, FRIENDS AND WORKMATES 8.4%
The table suggests that the media diet of our sample was
omnivorous. Only 6.4% of the sample were uniform in their use
of Conservative papers alone. In this context it is hardly
surprising that we do not see a greater impact of press source
dependency on public perceptions. Sadly the size of our sample
prevents us from exploring much further the role of the media in
influencing sociotropic perceptions.
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7.7
What can we conclude from the preceding analysis as a whole? 
First, its seems clear that the straightforward Downsian account 
of voter calculation is further weakened. Average temperature 
for those whose positions had deteriorated (and who thought the 
Government responsible) was the same as those for respondents 
whose financial situation got better and thought the Government 
had caused this. The findings are decidedly counter-intuitive 
and the open-ended questions do not really clarify matters. The 
structure of responses to these questions is somewhat confusing, 
though there may be some support for attribution theory 
emphasising external causes for unpleasant circumstances. What 
is clear is that more work remains to be done not least in 
clarifying what exactly respondents mean by their attributional 
reports. Analysis might also be extended to the open-ended 
probing of sociotropic perceptions and attributions.
It is similarly clear that there is more to sociotropic 
attitudes than perceptions of unemployment and inflation. 
Although these elements play a significant part, in no sense are 
they determinate. The same might be said in relation to the 
sample's perceptions of the Government's handling of the 
country's problems. Economic issues figure strongly here, but 
obviously not to the exclusion of other concerns. The results, 
while hardly very surprising help place 'economic' models firmly 
in perspective.
On the issue of emotional reaction, and with specific 
reference to the Government, it is clear from our results that 
there is a degree of emotional exclusivity. This again might
248
hardly surprise us. However, it draws attention to the emotional 
patterning that may underlie the less cerebral or cognate 
elements of partisanship. What is clear and significant is that 
emotional responses are much more closely related to national 
perceptions and attributions (and to a lesser degree personal 
attribution) than they are to perceptions of personal wellbeing. 
Here there is more scope for the fruitful extension of the 
preceding analysis. All three elements have a global aspect and 
the issue of dependency ought to figure in their appreciation.
Our analysis of the structure of our sample's perceptions 
throws further light on this concept of media dependency. With 
our emphasis on local cues and interpersonal communication we 
applied much more stringent tests on the validity of dependency 
as a concept. The result show that it is more prevalent than we 
might imagine and that 'dependents' (if they may be so termed) 
are not homogeneous, but a fluid and heterogeneous group of 
between one third and one quarter of the sample. With the timing 
of our survey differing widely from that of the representative 
sample we analyzed in a previous chapter, it would have been 
surprising if the effects of dependency had been replicated in 
our sample. However, we do suggest there are some signs that the 
group we isolated are affected as a function of their dependency. 
The effects are not large, yet have to be viewed in the 
perspective of glacial rather than radical shifts in public 
opinion.
A search for an explanation for modest effect focused on the 
complexity of media exposure and use. Although as a function of 
our sample size conclusions are at best tentative, we found that
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patterns of use rather than exposure explain some of the 
differences in perception highlighted earlier. Use of the press 
as primary source was associated with a greater buoyancy in 
perception. Television use, on the other hand, was associated 
with the moderation of the position of the respective partisan 
groupings.
If we were to offer a synthesis from the preceding analysis 
it would highlight several features. First, that so called 
'sociotropic' perceptions have an important role in cuing 
emotional reactions. Second, that dependency and media use have 
an important role in affecting sociotropic perceptions (perhaps 
independently, but more likely in tandem). Third, that size of 
effect changes over time and can range from the modest to the 
substantial. And that lastly, the size of effect might be 
explained by the type of prevailing conditions and the complex 
and overlapping nature of media exposure and use.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS
What overall conclusions can we draw from the preceding 
analysis? The evidence we have accumulated suggests that 
sociotropic perceptions are important, though not determinant 
elements in the calculus which forms political preference, this 
notwithstanding small number problems in the latter sections. 
We are obviously not claiming to have established this beyond 
doubt. The small numbers question means our conclusions are 
provisional, qualified and tentative. However, we have attempted 
to control for intervening variables and entertain competing 
alternatives. It is our contention that a sophisticated model 
will have room for the notion of glacial shift in public 
perception; a media influence on political preference; and the 
sharper impact of exceptional political phenomenon.
Our initial contention is that voting behaviour studies are 
still carrying the dead weight of class analysis - and suffer 
accordingly. Despite recent attempts at rehabilitation, we feel 
that the initial premises were laboured and that the original 
model was applicable to a smaller subsection of the population 
than was formerly imagined. Ultimately the problem lies with the 
interpretation of the link between self and party, and self and 
class. It is less than clear from the work of Butler and Stokes 
that the link in either case is 'fraternal' and based 
unambiguously on class solidarity.
The attempts to resurrect the class thesis using refined 
definitional categories have been less than fully successful. 
We contend that the notion of class has to contain a clear
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ideational element. The classes must represent clear ideational 
communities of some sort. This goes well beyond having ideas in 
common. The class unit must also possess more than an element 
of self-identification (awareness of class 'for itself' to borrow 
Marxist terminology). The evidence presented by those who wish 
to salvage the class thesis is insufficiently clear on both these 
counts. The work of Heath, Curtice and Jowell suffers in this
respect. The policy responses of their respective classes fail 
to show any clear community of preference. Little of the work 
we have done suggests that class clearly differentiates 
perception of the economy. Work in progress on disaggregated 
'econometric' models suggests that differences between classes 
are fairly modest (though it should be stressed that the research 
results are provisional - Marsh, Ward and Sanders, 1990^).
The vogue in voting behaviour analysis is now the issue 
model. The model posits the significance of the correspondence 
between the issue preferences or 'shopping list' of voters and 
their behaviour in the polling booth. But causal understanding 
is elusive. Dunleavy and Husbands quite rightly pointed out that 
voter inconsistency in issue deliberation is an important factor 
(Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985). Likewise, Dunleavy has 
highlighted the deficiencies of Himmelweit's seminal study of the 
topic (Dunleavy, 1982). Detailed dissection of Sarlvik and 
Crewe's research results suggests that we need to be guarded 
about taking on board the unvarnished issue model. The central 
problem lies with the role of partisanship. We are concerned
^. The paper was a draft text, and represents work in 
progress.
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that insufficient attention has been paid to partisan 
misperception or partisan preemption. The question is, do 
partisans state an issue position they know to be associated with 
the party they feel closest to? Are they capable of mis- 
perceiving their own party's position and that of the least 
favoured alternatives? Insufficient theoretical or empirical 
attention has been given to the role of partisanship in this 
equation. Likewise virtually no work has been done on how much 
voters actually know about issues, or on the extent to which they 
understand the details behind them. Mardle and Taylor suggest 
that, for British youth at least, knowledge and comprehension of 
politics and its personalities is very limited (Mardle and 
Taylor, 1987). We would contend that attention to the 
measurement of political knowledge, consistency and 
sophistication is a crucial missing element in the issue voting 
thesis.
We also hold that it is insufficient to dismiss the notion 
of partisan interference by suggesting that party attachments 
have no independent significance - that they are simply the same 
thing as decisions to support a party. It is not merely another 
form of raw preference (Rose and MacAllister, 1986). We consider 
that it is more appropriate to consider partisanship as 
affective, emotive and visceral. Work in the United States and 
elements of our own study suggest that there are more dimensions 
to the affective realm (of which partisanship is a part) than 
have been explored, either in Britain or elsewhere. It is clear 
from work in psychology and media studies that the concept is not 
without explanatory utility. It cannot be dismissed as an a
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adjunct to or re-expression of a party preference.
The issue voting approach, while the most popular, has not 
been the only alternative to the old class voting thesis. Some 
considerable attention has been given to the spacial dimension 
in explaining voter preference. The work on the social class 
background of constituencies has appeal if the object is to 
rehabilitate aspects of the old class model. There is also an 
interest in the regional dimension of vote distribution. The 
work in this sphere is at a comparatively early stage, and work 
continues. However, the conceptualisation of underlying 
ideational dynamics is as yet under-theorised. We await the
empirical exploration on which theorising can be based.
Economic models (often conflated with issue voting 
approaches) are a possible alternative to the voting model 
outlined above. The hypothetico-deductive approach is employed 
to give provisional explanatory leverage on the issue of
ideational dynamics. Much ink has, and continues to be spilled
on the logical integrity and opening premises of the various 
models (Dunleavy, 1991). On a number of criteria the models 
developed by the rational choice school might be considered 
superior. What is asked of the electorate, in terms of
information processing and knowledge, is not excessive. It is 
contended that the voter can take his or her own financial 
position as a datum. In the baldest form. Downs requires only 
that we be aware of how governments, past and present, have 
affected our own financial position.
Analysts have put flesh on Downs's deductive bones largely, 
though not exclusively, through aggregate modelling of government
254
popularity. There has been a fair degree of success in this 
endeavour. Focusing on statistics on the state of the 'real' 
economy, they model popularity using time series techniques. The 
explanation of underlying attitudinal processes is still 
essentially Downsian. The statistics are an indicator of the 
effects of economic fluctuations on the 'real' lives of the 
electorate. We have tried to show that in some instances the 
attempt to do this is somewhat strained (Husbands, 1985) . The 
problem lies with the instability of the model parameters over 
time. A variable reflecting one form of aggregate fluctuation 
is significantly associated with popularity at one time, but not 
at another. Hence, for instance, balance of payments or real 
disposable income figure prominently at one point, but fail at 
another. Unemployment offers a significant parameter over one 
period, but not over another.
We feel this evident deficiency is testimony to the lack of 
attention to underlying ideational dynamics. Only a few of the 
authors who use econometric techniques have addressed the issue 
directly in attitudinal terms. Sanders, Ward and Marsh have 
added aggregated attitudinal elements to their global model of 
public opinion. In doing this they take an important step beyond 
the earlier research by placing perceptual elements on the 
independent variable side of the equation.
The initial investigation into the more advanced econometric 
models was comparative in character. We submit that the 
comparison highlights the need for a closer integration of media 
analysis into an explanatory framework. The thesis might be 
criticised for failing to compare like with like. There might
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be something about the Scottish context which disallows a
straight comparison. National identity, strongly radical Labour
roots or differing political system might figure in such a
critique. We would accept that this is a problem, but not if the
ideational dynamics behind the model are firmly Downsian. For
Downs even the correspondence between party ideology and utility
maximisation is tested against 'reality' by the rationally
calculating individual. In this sense alone we might expect
rational actors to react if not similarly, then comparably.
Alternatively, we might be committing a form of logical
error associated with the 'ecological fallacy'. Bulmer looks at
the problems associated with aggregate level analysis, and in
cataloguing them he highlights,
••"fallacies of aggregation from one subpopulation to 
another at the same level of analysis." (Bulmer, 1986, 
pp.229)•
The danger is that the aggregated sub-populations are assumed to 
have the same aggregate features as the whole population. It is 
a fallacy to assume a necessary correspondence. But in the case 
of Downsian analysis, again we assume comparable processes at 
work in the calculation of party differential - for one 
aggregate, as for the other.
A glance at the overall shape of Government popularity in 
Scotland suggests an admittedly flattened U-shape (or 'downswing- 
upswing'), as it does for Britain as a whole. The conclusion 
that might be drawn from this is that economic decline and 
recovery processes are at work. Yet in Scotland the Falklands 
period is anomalous. This is the period where, for Sanders, Ward 
and Marsh, the restored and revitalised economy began to impact
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on Government popularity. But no such effect is registered. We 
conclude that the only way we can accommodate this is by 
hypothesising the impact of media presentation - an impact that 
is not closely related in any way to the economy per se, but 
reflects the conservative leanings of much of the press.
The study does not suggest a means by which this may be 
carried out. Yet it was our feeling that an overarching model 
of the Government's inter-electoral popularity must allow that 
the media may displace the economy when its attention is turned 
to politically traumatic events. What is more we felt that an 
understanding of the role of the media in mediating economic 
perception is crucial to fleshing out such a model.
It is significant that the Downsian thesis does not require 
a media element. The voter is supposed to be able to calculate 
the party differential without the help of the media. This 
assumption might be acceptable if the resultant, tested models 
show personal conditions to be important (either directly, or as 
a means of calculating what might happen in the future). But so 
much of the literature in the United States and elsewhere 
stressed the role of national level perception over calculations 
made on personal experience. If this is also the case in Britain 
there might be a prima facie case for exploring the role of the 
media in prompting changes in global perceptions of the economy. 
Our attempt to re-specify a model of popularity was occasioned 
by this consideration. We wanted to know whether the sociotropic 
elements were, indeed, important. We also wanted to consider how 
the electorate were judging the future if personal level 
calculations were not uppermost in the mind.
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Our results suggest that retrospective perceptions 
definitely need attention. They figure strongly and clearly in 
the models we tested (whether in isolation or combined with 
prospective evaluations). The two we tested most successfully 
were sociotropic in character. The general retrospective
variable relates to the global circumstances, and it implies no 
necessary Governmental responsibility. The variable on 'handling 
the economy' is sociotropic and focuses on the present, though 
the Government is a significant part of the equation. The 
question is worded, 'Do the Government's policies for tackling 
the economic situation give you the feeling that the are or are 
not handling the situation properly?'.
These models perform quite well by the standards Sanders, 
Ward and Marsh set. The one element that fails to figure is 
personal retrospective. We considered it particularly worrisome 
that this element, of all others, should fail to figure in most 
of our regression models. If economic turbulence were affecting 
the populace directly it would show up in this indicator. This 
in turn would impact upon Government popularity. This is the 
classical Downsian theory on vote preference and the economy. 
No evidence was found to support this form of explanation. 
Personal retrospective perceptions figured in some of our models, 
but this was generally where sociotropic variables were excluded, 
or where multicollinearity obscured the picture.
We became worried by the very notion of the inclusion of 
aggregate economic statistics at this juncture. We were doubly 
concerned that Sanders, Ward and Marsh's earliest models seemed 
to fuse the Downsian and sociotropic approaches together.
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Exchange rates, public sector borrowing requirement and 
unemployment variables were explained, provisionally, in terms 
of media presentation. Personal expectations were framed in 
Downsian terms. But, to our mind all economic statistics have 
a dualistic element; they have a dual or parallel existence. 
They reflect economic turbulence, but they are also pawns in the 
broader rhetorical battle (over 'the economy' and how the 
Government is handling it) . In the course of any parliament the 
Government and Opposition front benches regularly clash at the 
despatch box using economic statistics as rhetorical weapons. 
This is a context in which we feel it is extremely important to 
distinguish between their sociotropic and the 'pocketbook' 
manifestations.
The issue is particularly important given that the personal 
retrospective variable fails to figure in aggregated experiments. 
We felt that if 'the economy' was affecting Government popularity 
through its impact on the lives of the electorate, then this 
variable, of all others, should have a marked influence. In the 
event it did not. If 'the economy' was significant, we have to 
look at other, possibly sociotropic, ways to theorise its 
influence. One obvious way is through the media's role in 
transmitting information on the state of the economy.
The media's role obviously cannot be taken for granted. 
Mechanisms and routes of influence have to be established 
empirically. However, theorising the impact of economic news (as 
opposed to or in conjunction with pocketbook impact) provides a 
provisional explanation for the instability of past 'econometric' 
models of Government popularity - specifically for those models
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focusing exclusively on Government statistics. Downs submits 
that economic ups and downs will register in voter's 'party 
differential' calculations, and will do so consistently. Of 
interest here are voter's actual experiences of deprivation or 
abundance. On the other hand, we find that the media focus on 
different economic signals in different historical periods. 
Sociotropic signals differ over time. The balance of payments 
or unemployment reflect the poor or good state of the national 
economy at particular times (the 1960s or early 1970s 
respectively). At others, the public sector borrowing 
requirement or money supply figure more prominently (in the early 
1980s). So if the 'Government statistics' elements of regression 
models were functioning as sociotropic signals rather than in 
their capacity as pocketbook surrogates, we would actually expect 
the parameter to be unstable over time.
If this is the case we would also anticipate other results. 
Instability of parameters would afflict models including 
statistical and attitudinal elements as it would those which used 
Government statistics alone. However, it would afflict the 
statistical parameters alone - not the attitudinal. Sociotropic 
variables in general, and national retrospective perceptions in 
particular would, theoretically, figure in all time periods. 
They would, in essence, reflect prevailing economic diversions.
There are some signs of this. Sanders, Ward and Marsh have 
experimented with different parameters since 1987. Exchange 
rates lagged twelve months, unemployment and PSBR was the 
original choice of variables with a direct impact. Yet, latterly 
the Essex team have experimented with a misery index made up of
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inflation (which did not figure anywhere in the original model), 
unemployment and an official index of the sterling price of 
imported goods and services. Most recently, interest rates and 
a Poll Tax measure have figured in models (Sanders, 1991). On 
the other hand the original model of personal expectations 
included consumer durable expenditure, short-time working, 
taxation, and interest rates. The short-term working has now 
been dropped, and the authors have experimented with industrial 
production, unemployment and the Poll Tax measure. Personal 
expectations still figures consistently in the equation, and 
continue to be highly significant (though a lag of some three 
months is now considered appropriate) . As Sanders, Ward and 
Marsh point out,
"In previous studies we have established 
that, throughout the 1980s, the only 
'economic' variable that consistently 
influenced directly was personal economic 
expectations" (Sanders, Ward and Marsh,
1991, pp.18)
Theorising apart, we felt it was appropriate to explore the 
structure of individual level perception. The importance of such 
an exercise is underscored by the theorists of method. They 
point to the danger of making mistaken inferences about 
individual level processes from data at higher levels of 
aggregation (Galtung, 197 0; Williamson et al, 1977; and Bulmer, 
1986) . The danger is alarming and ever-present in aggregate 
analysis. However, the authors give reassuring examples of 
studies where this particularly troublesome feature is exposed. 
Studies which emphasised the mistaken leap of inference are, or 
tend to be taken from individual level analyses, or individual
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level research on process. We felt the issue had to be addressed 
in respect to aggregate economic analyses, and the Gallup 
material offered an ideal opportunity.
The most striking early feature of our results was the 
conclusion that there was a marked degree of inconsistency in the 
sample. Half the sample gave different responses for different 
levels of perception (both backward and forward looking). A 
small minority were consistent across all perceptions. For a 
substantial element of the population the different levels are 
independent. There was also no suggestion that strong 
partisanship drives people to consistency across levels of 
perception.
We might regard this conclusion as unexceptional. But it
is testimony to the complex nature of the individual level
perceptions that underlie aggregate models. Our results on the
partisanship and preference change were, we feel, more
significant. Using collapsed categories we found that general
prospective and general retrospective more closely associated
with vote and partisanship than personal prospective perceptions.
Personal retrospective perceptions are least closely associated.
This latter finding confirms our misgivings about models
(aggregate or individual level) which are grounded in Downsian
assumptions. The term 'association' is used advisedly since the
problem of reciprocal causation is obviously an issue. Dunleavy
is correct in enquiring,
..'•how can we analyse two-way causation flows between 
voting behaviour and a wide range of correlated variables? 
What relationship is there between voting, issue attitudes 
and evaluations of party competence in government? Or 
between voting and economic expectations?" (Dunleavy, 1990, 
p.7) .
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The question is, obviously, do economic perceptions influence 
partisanship, or does partisanship impact on economic 
evaluations. Our data here does not allow us to address this 
issue, but we can say something. We can suggest that it is 
worrisome that personal economic variables show such a weak 
association. For general evaluations we can say that they may 
affect or may be affected. But as correlations advance toward 
the weaker end of the spectrum it is more difficult to maintain 
either notion of causal direction. This was significant with 
respect to both of the personal variables we looked at. Our 
attempt to isolate individuals with diametrically opposite 
evaluations of the personal and global situations took us no 
further on the issue of direction of causation, but it tended to 
confirmed the notion of the prevalence of general over personal 
components of the party preference equation.
When we turned our attention to respondent's change in party 
preference the results were a little disappointing. The 
majority seemed to be either stable in preference or switching 
between opposition parties. Nevertheless, general prospective 
evaluations followed by personal prospective perceptions tended 
to show the closest association with change. We were, though, 
sceptical about the lack of clear results. We were looking for 
sea changes where a focus on glacial shift may be the more 
appropriate (Harrop, 1987). We were also concerned by the 
difference between actual vote in 1979, and reported vote in our 
sample. As we reported, the sample's memory of actual voting 
behaviour in 1979 differed from know national figures :
(see over page)
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Table 8.1 Comparison of Sample's Vote and Known Result
Known Sample's
1979 Reported
Vote Vote 1979
Conservative 44% 41%
Labour 37% 45%
Liberal 14% 11%
We were concerned that underlying the observed stability of our 
sample lay a degree of selective memory loss. It is impossible 
to address the issue more fully, but we felt it important to flag 
it.
There was more encouragement from the results of the 
analysis of the unemployed as a group. We were concerned that 
the unemployed had been used as an example of a group whose 
behaviour contradicts the economic voting models (Heath et al, 
1985; Scarborough, 1987). Our analysis focused on the unemployed 
as a possible attitudinal community, rather than as a category 
characterised by their employment status alone. Our results 
suggest that they are not a particular good test bed for the 
Downsian thesis. The unemployed may be poor in absolute terms. 
But the difference between themselves and the employed on their 
perceptions of how their personal predicament has changed are 
marked rather than outstanding. It seems, therefore, wholly 
inappropriate that we judge economic models by the behaviour of 
the unemployed alone (even if we confine our view to models of 
a Downsian variety). This is further confirmation that we really 
have to go beyond occupational or employment categories and 
concentrate more closely on the underlying attitudinal terrain.
The picture is further clouded as the unemployed differ from 
the employed on general prospective perception in the same degree 
as in personal retrospective. So in this context, though we can
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say the unemployed are less favourably inclined towards the 
Conservatives, we cannot even declare that this is simply a 
function of Downsian calculation.
Our results were clearer when we focused explicitly on media 
dependency. And they suggest that there is some utility in the 
concept. Dependency has an important place in media theory on 
political effects (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur, 1976). The approach 
has a system focus and relates dependency to social change, 
conflict and instability (McQuail and Windahl, 1981). Dependency 
is seen as contingent on a variety of factors from historical 
context to social class. Elites in particular are in a 
privileged position of independence as a function of better 
access to multiple media sources.
Our results suggest that though social change (and in this 
context we mean economic change) is an important feature, 
dependency need not be associated with societies riven by 
conflict or instability (Severin, 1988). Moreover, in our 
estimation the A/B classes were more dependent on the media than 
the subordinate classes. We may speculate that this is a 
function of individual prosperity among the higher groups, but 
in an overall context of economic decline. The notion of strong 
effects associated with the dependency model need not necessarily 
apply in this particular context, as it is still probably the 
case that the higher socio-economic groupings have a wider access 
to a variety of different media material.
It is also clear that when individuals make predictions 
about the future they are not acting as primitive inductivists 
(assessing future prospects from past change). If this were the
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case we would expect there to be a greater correspondence between 
personal retrospective and personal prospective perception than 
we actually identified. With respect to personal prospective 
evaluations, we have to make it plain, though, that the approach 
we took isolated those more likelv to be media dependent rather 
than those who are actually dependent.
The distinction is an important one. Individuals may be in 
a position where they do not have to extrapolate from previous 
experience. This is particularly relevant with respect to 
personal prospective perceptions. They may be aware that they 
will be in a different position next year because of changing job 
situation, new additions to the family or whatever. Although 
they have different personal prospective and retrospective 
evaluations they are scarcely 'dependent' in any meaningful 
sense. Despite this caveat, we do hope that our mode of approach 
isolates some who are genuinely 'dependent' on the mass media. 
They are more likely to be represented in the 'dependent' 
category we have isolated.
For personal prospective 'dependency' we estimated the group 
at 4 3.3% of the sample. The implication of this finding for 
aggregate level analysis is important. For this group 
prospective perceptions are not rooted exclusively in individual 
experience. We would submit that they are a product of personal 
experience and media output. It would seem there is a 
sociotropic element to the raw, nominally personal level survey 
data. Only qualitative analysis can establish what the balance 
here is (coincidence of forward and backward looking evaluations 
does not entail extrapolation in itself).
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We also attempted to isolate general prospective dependents 
by assuring no contamination from personal prospective 
evaluations (personal expectations influencing global optimism). 
Yet bearing in mind the notion of a sociotropic element in 
personal expectations, it might be as appropriate to think of the 
causal connection running from the appreciation of the nation 
environment to personal expectations. Either way, we need to 
reassess the explanatory elements of Sanders, Ward and Marsh's 
thesis. The indirect, 'economic' influences on personal 
expectations can no longer be theorised in Downsian terms alone 
(or in Downsian terms at all).
On the other hand the general prospective and retrospective
indices have a strong media component. Of our sample, 36.7% and
34.3% respectively were considered dependent. We felt that there
was less chance of individual level signals contaminating the
calculation. Severin notes that,
.."people have various dependencies on the 
media and that these dependencies vary from 
person to person, group to group, and from 
culture to culture." (ibid. p.325)
We might add that in relation to economic perception this
dependency extends to a very significant proportion of the
population. Moreover, the experience of dependency does not
appear to be as differentiated by class as we might expect it to
be.
In respect to the notion of reciprocal causation, we were 
less worried about dependency and its 'effect' than we might have 
been by the correspondence between two overtly attitudinal 
elements. Dependency is an artificially constructed category and 
in this sense cannot be 'affected' by economic perception in the
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same way as we might expect economic perception to be affected 
by partisanship. When assessing the effects of dependency we 
did, however, take the precaution of controlling for partisan 
attachment. Having controlled we found that dependency had a 
significant effect on all economic perceptions. General 
retrospective dependency had the least effect across the board. 
The impact was restricted to the 'floating' element of our sample 
(in media effects terms that most vulnerable to influence - 
Robinson, 1974). General and personal prospective dependency, 
on the other hand, seemed to have an impact on all partisan sub­
categories. Our hypothesis that a media environment whose weight 
falls on the Conservative side of the balance, has an impact on 
the electorate's perceptions is, we feel confirmed.
The situation was unchanged when we applied a more stringent 
test of dependency in the later sections of chapter seven. We 
were anxious that the dependency we had identified was a valid 
construct and not just an artifact. We made sure that the 
elements we isolated were incapable of extrapolating from local 
knowledge. They were also reluctant to discuss politics with 
their peers. Although the economy might not constitute 
'politics' we were more confident that the group we isolated were 
indeed 'dependent'. The views of this group were skewed in the 
direction we hypothesised, though the impact was quite small. 
We felt that the construct merits further attention, with larger 
samples, and differentiated media use and exposure indices.
Although we had established with some confidence the notion 
of the impact of media dependency, we had yet to address 
frontally the issue of how important changing economic
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perceptions might be. We could have accepted Sanders, Ward and 
Marsh's notion that expectations have a commanding impact on 
voting preference. Alternatively we could have stuck by our 
earlier time series analysis and maintained that the media have 
an impact via the general retrospective perceptions of floating 
voters. Or, from the same analysis we could have hypothesised 
the impact on preference via dependency and general prospective 
evaluations. We chose instead to use a panel format to explore 
the impact of retrospective perceptions and attributions.
The results we obtained make us more confident in our 
descriptive than in our relational conclusions (this 
notwithstanding the small numbers issue). It was fairly clear 
that there is more volatility at the individual level than at the 
aggregate level. Gross volatility at the individual level 
underlies the modest net volatility. The results confirm the 
notion that a reliance on measures of net volatility can be very 
misleading (Miller at al. 1990, pp.26-35).
We also established beyond doubt that personal and 
sociotropic perceptions are in no sense coextensive. They show 
different levels of gross volatility; personal evaluations are 
only modestly related to their sociotropic counterparts. The 
levels seem distinct and show different degrees of association 
with partisanship. Moreover, it is clear that those who share 
perceptions at the two levels are not doing so as a function of 
partisan drive towards consistency. Those who are consistent are 
no more nor less likely to be strong partisans (or old, or female 
for that matter). If we turn to the relationship between local 
and sociotropic perceptions we find comparable features. Indeed,
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the relationship between these levels is weaker than between 
sociotropic and personal levels. What we seem to be looking at 
are discrete perceptual strata which may vary independently.
We can be less sure of the relationship between these levels 
of perception and changes in partisan attachment, or the 
thermometer indices. If we are to sketch a broad picture it 
would be one stressing the significance of the sociotropic over 
the personal and the local. Our prime interest, having isolated 
the strongest associations, was in the relationship between 
changing perception and changing affect (the notion of feeling 
warmer or cooler towards the Government). While not ideal, it 
offered a gauge of impact. In this instance we felt that having 
controlled for partisanship we were not simply looking at 
dissonance reduction strategies. It was not the case that 
Conservative partisans felt that the economy had got better, and 
had become warmer. On the other hand, it was not the case that 
non-Conservatives thought the economy was deteriorating and at 
the same time grew colder towards the Conservative Government. 
Something approaching a clearer understanding of causation begins 
to emerge with respect to sociotropic and local (though for the 
latter, confined to non-Conservatives).
Turning attention to 'leading' economic perceptions and 
their impact on 'following' partisanship, the results are more 
ambiguous. Again, having controlled for leading partisanship, 
it seems relatively clear that we are not just talking about 
partisanship colouring perception. The complication comes when 
effects thus isolated are confined to one partisan element. 
Sadly we have to remain silent on the issue as numbers problems
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prevent fuller exploration. Yet impact does seem apparent.
The last point of interest in relation to the material in 
chapter six concerns the combinations where nothing seemed to be 
going on. Here the pocketbook variables were fairly heavily 
represented. It would appear to us that the Downsian thesis is 
severely weakened by our results. Here the emphasis is not on 
reciprocal causation. For this to be an interpretative or 
explanatory issue there needs to be an association worth 
interpreting. Our results incline us to believe that there is 
no such association.
The approach to assessing impact could be refined and 
extended if we threaded together perceptual and affective change 
questions. The interviewer might ask, 'Over the last twelve 
months did your personal/did the national situation get worse 
stay the same or get better? ' Having got a response the next 
step might be to ask 'Did this make you feel warmer or colder 
towards the Government, or did it have no effect?'. Assuming 
that personal and sociotropic questions were not one after the 
other in the survey we might expect to isolate the effected 
cohort (if effects there were). The advantage is that we have 
a gauge of the meaning of the response (whether it be optimistic 
or pessimistic) . This gets us round some of the more intractable 
questions associated with interpreting decontextualised 
responses. In positing strong media effects Harrop strongly 
emphasises affirmative responses to the question 'Has television 
coverage helped you decide who to vote for?' (Harrop, 1987) . The 
volatile elements of the electorate and new voters show the most 
marked propensity to answer 'yes' to this question. However, the
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responses are decontextualised and could mean anything from 
'changed my whole life and political philosophy' to 'more firmly 
entrenched my prejudices against Party X' . The technique we 
advocate would help us avoid such ambiguities.
The approach would also serve three further functions. 
Firstly, we could determine the degree of impact associated with 
the respective levels of perception. Second, by controlling for 
partisanship we could filter out noise created by partisan 
misperception. And lastly, we might be able to judge the impact 
of attribution indirectly. For if individuals think things have 
got worse and think the Government was responsible this should 
show up in the affective response (likewise on the optimistic 
side). On the other hand, if they think things are changing, but 
that the Government is not doing enough, this should register 
too. The format has the added virtue of picking up affective 
change in response to lack of change (ie. the notion that 
individuals might think nothing changed, but that it certainly 
should have). If this sort of calculus is prevalent it should 
show up in affective responses.
The issue is of significance with respect to some aspects 
of aggregate analysis. Typically the calculation of an integer 
representing the state of play on economic perceptions, subtracts 
the number thinking things 'get worse' from those thinking things 
have or will 'get better'. The technique cannot pick up on 
indignation which might be generated by the perception of no 
change. An answer of 'the same' is not taken into consideration. 
Peffley certainly points to the importance of this attributional 
aspect, and we feel it requires attention (Peffley, M. 1984;
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Peffley and Williams 1985).
Our approach to attribution focused on its mediating role. 
Attribution on its own did not have an impact net of partisan 
attachment. We were, however, able to isolate at least one group 
for whom attributional inference was important in mediating the 
impact of sociotropic perception. Thermometer readings seemed 
to respond to sociotropic perception, but this was, to an extent, 
contingent on attributional inference. The notion of contingency 
puts a further question mark over the aggregate approach to 
economic modelling. It is far from clear how the two elements 
might be represented in a regression analysis. We might question 
the utility of entering two time series (one for perception, one 
for attribution) - even if month to month data on attribution 
were available. We found that attribution on its own seemed to 
have no effect over and above partisanship; independently 
attribution made little difference. Only in conjunction with 
sociotropic perception did attribution of responsibility have an 
effect (albeit modest).
Where it might be possible to fuse the individual and 
aggregate level approaches might be over the notion of 
dependency. Thus far, Sanders, Ward and Marsh have looked at 
press coverage and its relationship with 'actual' economic events 
or, rather, government statistics (Sanders, Ward and Marsh, 
1991). They have also looked at the relationship between press 
output and both consumer confidence (personal prospective 
perceptions), and Government popularity. The authors suggest 
that while coverage affects consumer confidence, it does so to 
a modest degree. The impact is, however, exclusively indirect
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(via expectations). Coverage provokes no alteration in 
popularity itself.
Our results would suggest an elaboration on this theme. An 
alternative would be to isolate the 'dependent' and 'independent' 
groups for each of the monthly segments. We can then construct 
a time series for the two cohorts on any of the perceptual 
dimensions we care to focus on (global or personal; forward or 
backward looking). We isolated a sociotropic element to people's 
personal expectations; and we might suggest that this is a clear 
focus for assessment of the impact of coverage. We might also 
suggest that the same coverage indices be used to model the 
general retrospective and general prospective time series. 
Lastly, we are sceptical about adding a 'coverage' variable to 
a model that already includes personal expectations. This may 
be somewhat misleading as consumer confidence itself has a strong 
sociotropic component. We feel we can establish that our 
exercise would give us as firm a platform for testing trends in 
media presentation against perceptual alterations and Government 
popularity as that of Sanders, Ward and Marsh.
The strategy just outlined would not, however, take us any 
further on the attributional front. Our final substantive 
chapter suggest that here the perceptions of the electorate are 
complicated and confused. The only thing we were clear about in 
our analysis of personal level attribution was that neither 
ourselves nor our sample were clear. The relationship between 
truncated open-ended response, and the closed-ended question on 
attribution was often obscure. What does seem a little clearer 
is that the combination of personal level perception and personal
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level attribution tend to have no 'impact', if by impact we mean 
thermometer response. The non-Conservatives who thought their 
situation had improved, and suggested at the same time that the 
Government had had a good effect upon them were - on average - 
no more hot or cold than those non-Conservatives who thought 
things had got worse and that the Government had had a bad effect 
on them. Either this is another blow for the Downsian thesis, 
or we are dealing with questionnaire items whose construct 
validity is in question. We sense that the answer is probably 
a combination of the two. Certainly more work has to be done to 
tease out the issue. Possibly focus group analysis or sustained 
unstructured interviews are the methods most appropriate for the 
examination of this complicated perceptual area.
We would also contend that more work needs to be done on the 
affective component of the electorate's perceptual calculus. Our 
analysis of affective response to economic change suggests that 
there are distinctively patterned responses to economic 
perceptions. Individuals are gladdened, made happy, filled with 
disgust, are hopeful and angry. In short, they are animated by 
a range of emotive reactions. Yet these emotions seem to be 
generated in response to sociotropic rather than personal 
considerations. Given that the structure of the respective cross 
tabulation tables were similar, we are almost sure we need to 
look for some underlying structure.
The question is, what underlying structure? We are still 
of the opinion that not only do sociotropic perceptions have 
strong media roots^ but attributions likewise. Those in the 
public sector may be the best placed to tie together the
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attributional inferences at sociotropic and personal level. The 
Government's role in controlling policy affecting staffing, pay 
and job security cannot possibly be lost on public sector 
workers. This group will also be aware of more general 
turbulence in the economy. And they may make the perceptual 
connection across the personal and sociotropic dimensions. This 
is less easy for the broad mass of the British public who will 
not have the same direct, vocational connection with Government 
activity. These individuals need to find reasons why the country 
stands as it does. The media offer one ready source of 
explanation. In this sense, we feel that the element combining 
the perceptual structures which are associated with affective 
impact are essentially sociotropic in character (national 
perceptions, national attributions and personal attributions). 
It is to this common feature that we must turn for a fuller 
understanding.
However, we feel that answers will require a step beyond the 
closed-ended question format. The exercise, though difficult, 
is not impossible, and has been performed successfully by some 
media analysts (Morley, 1980; Corner et al., 1990). The authors 
track media output and plumb audience understanding of the issues 
involved. This form of exercise is a rich source of data, and 
all the more difficult to digest for that richness. Yet it is 
our feeling that analysis of economic perceptions (and especially 
of attributional inference) desperately needs this sort of 
individual level, qualitative strategy.
If we are to look at the media's contribution in this 
respect, our analysis suggests we be sensitive to complex and
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overlapping patterns of media exposure and use. Our sample had 
complicated media preferences. Output from different partisan 
newspapers frequently overlaid television news and current 
affairs programming. What we have is a rich melange. As the 
most trusted and respected we might focus on television, but all 
are significant since our sample used a variety of sources and 
(we might speculate) get mediated information at one step removed 
through friends, relatives and acquaintances. Here there may be 
a need to focus on 'consonance' in media output (to use Noelle- 
Nuemann's term); on the incidence or otherwise of complementary 
or similar news items appearing on a range of media.
We were obviously unable to do this in our study. But the 
approach is recommended if we are to achieve a full and rounded 
understanding of why the population think the way they do. We 
need to look at television and press output in tandem. The 
approach would differ from that taken by the Glasgow University 
Media Group. Their lack of attention to mechanisms of media 
influence, and their consequent catch-all approach has come in 
for considerable criticism (Harrison, 1985; Anderson and 
Sharrock, 1979) . They claimed to have identified structures of 
media output that could not be understood by the audience as 
anything other than hostile to organised trade unionism and the 
Labour Party. The jump is essentially from content to attitude 
(though as the critics were quick to point out, no audience work 
was undertaken).
The approach we have outlined would avoid this pitfall. The 
move would be from empirically established avenues of effect ^  
analysis of content. The perceived role of global appreciations
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and attributions offer a platform for establishing more securely 
grounded content analysis categories. The social psychology and 
public opinion literature already gives us leverage on the issue
(Page, Shapiro and Dempsey, 1987; Severin, 1988). Output ought
to be categorised by source characteristic - relating 
specifically to source credibility. However, our work suggests 
we might also look at the attributional inferences of those 
'neutral' or 'expert' sources. Information relating to the 
national economy may be analysed on its own. We might also focus 
on the extent to which it is given a temporal focus. Is it 
viewed in the context of past trends? Do the press make
projections about likely future trends? Is the notion of blame
addressed directly or indirectly? Are trends typically placed 
in a framework of likely impact on specific sectors (as when 
budget alterations are viewed in the context of impact on 
stereotypical family groupings)?
The joy of this integrated strategy is that it can be used 
on a wide variety of issues. The obvious candidates are crime, 
policing and health care. Have individuals been unfortunate 
enough as to have come into contact with criminals? Are they 
aware of policing techniques? Have they benefited recently from 
NHS care? If the answer is 'no' to all these questions, and the 
individuals do not have vicarious experience through close 
associates, there is considerable room for media dependency 
(likewise for prompting on attribution of responsibility in the 
respective realms). There is a prospective research agenda here. 
The problem lies with finding opinion polls where the relevant 
combination of questions is asked ('Have you experienced this
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recently?'; 'Do you know anyone who has?'; 'Have you learned 
anything from that person's experiences?'). The combination 
would give us the capacity to make stronger inferences about 
dependency than hitherto.
The research agenda here is rather ambitious. With respect 
to the analysis of economics, our aims need to be a little more 
modest. First, we feel there is a need to assess the impact of 
a host of economic perceptions. Although we have focused on the 
sociotropic, it is our feeling that all the perceptual strata are 
in some respect important. General retrospective, general 
prospective and personal prospective perception are all likely 
to play an independent part in conditioning political 
preferences. However, it is important to bear in mind that, with 
respect to time series analysis, we are shackled to an ongoing 
opinion measurement project (the Gallup Political Index). The 
path we have chosen and the techniques we have deployed are as 
much a function of structures of availability, as they are the 
implicit significance of the strata isolated. There are, in 
short, more things in heaven and on earth than are included in 
a month on month questionnaire. This issue notwithstanding, we 
need a way to tie a variety of perceptual strata together.
Gallup have used composite measures in the past to assess 
the cumulative impact of a variety of perceptions. They use 
standardised indices constructed from a number of questionnaire 
responses - sociotropic, savings, consumer confidence, and price 
and lunemployment expectations among them (Gallup, 1991). This 
particular tack has much to commend it, but the R-Squared values 
are much lower than those obtained by Sanders, Ward and Marsh
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(andi our own unreported experiments with standardized sociotropic 
and personal indicators tended to support this).
If we need more attention to multiple strata, support for 
opposition parties also needs consideration. Almost all the 
research on economic voting has focused on the number of people 
expressing the intention to vote for the Government. The 
division of support among the Opposition parties is almost wholly 
ignored. Spencer, Dunn and Curtice have addressed the issue, and 
modelled Government and Opposition support using economic trend 
and political event variables (Spencer, Dunn and Curtice, 1991). 
Three equations are derived from this effort : one for Government 
support, one for Labour and one for the Liberals. The approach 
still focuses on Government economic statistics alone, and as 
such, in our estimation need elaboration. The political event 
elements are also a little under theorised. The authors do not 
fully explain why the Brighton bombing was an asset to the 
Conservative Party, a liability for the Alliance, and
insignificant for Labour support. Why, on the other hand, did 
the Falklands War favour the Conservatives, detract from Labour 
prospects, and mean little for the Alliance? It is our 
contention that this area of analysis, while potentially fertile, 
needs greater attention to the exploration of individual level 
dynamics.
The issue of 'multiple causation' (the economy affecting 
more than one party) still leaves us with a number of problems.
However, the technique we have advocated (asking about
perceptions, asking how perceptions influenced affect, and
controlling for partisanship) can at least in part address the
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issue of reciprocal causation. In this context we would not be 
relating discrete attitudinal elements, but the respondent's 
perception of the relationship. There is a potential problem 
here over the veracity of such responses, but it is no more 
serious than that which any survey analysts would have to contend 
with.
We would hope that the technique would also be sensitive to 
the development of negative evaluations (Crewe, 1980). Dunleavy 
is essentially correct in his plea for multiple preference 
indicators (Dunleavy, 1990). We do need an empirical handle on 
positive as well as negative perceptions of political parties. 
It is difficult to envisage how such indicators might figure in 
a single aggregated regression analysis. Yet we do need to stop 
regarding intention to vote solely as a positive support 
orientation. The technique we advocate has the potential to 
place such multiple preference indicators in developmental 
perspective. It would go some way towards an understanding of 
the Government as object (whether that be in positive or negative 
terms).
Needless to say there is a great deal of speculative and 
empirical work to be done. It is our hope that our research has 
provide a platform for the attempt.
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APPENDIX ONE 
SURVEY SCHEDULES
INITIAL CONTACT SURVEY 
TELEPHONE DELIVERED 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
NAME : 
ADDRESS;
TEL. No. :
SERIAL No. 
AREA No. 
DATE
INTERVIEWER
"Just a few background questions for the moment."
1. ARE YOU A PENSIONER AT THE MOMENT? Y
N
Y 
N
Y 
N
2. DID YOU VOTE IN THE LAST GENERAL ELECTION?
3. DO YOU READ THE TIMES. THE GUARDIAN. THE 
TELEGRAPH. THE INDEPENDENT OR THE GUARDIAN?
4. DO YOU READ A DAILY NEWSPAPER?
WHICH WOULD THAT BE?
HOW OFTEN IS THAT? EVERY DAY 
3/4 TIMES A WEEK 
1/2 TIMES A WEEK 
ONLY OCCASIONALLY
I f More Than One Read
WHICH WOULD YOU SAY WAS YOUR MOST IMPORTANT 
SOURCE OF POLITICAL INFORMATION
Star The Relevant Publication
N Goto
5.
5. DO YOU READ AN EVENING NEWSPAPER?
WHICH WOULD THAT BE? 
HOW OFTEN IS THAT? EVERY DAY 
3/4 TIMES A WEEK 
1/2 TIMES A WEEK 
ONLY OCCASIONALLY
N Goto
6.
6. DO YOU READ A SUNDAY NEWSPAPER?
WHICH WOULD THAT BE?
HOW OFTEN IS THAT? EVERY SUNDAY 
1/2 A WEEK 
ONLY OCCASIONALLY
N Goto
6.
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7. DO YOU READ ANY OTHER NEWSPAPERS (AT WORK
OR WHEN YOU ARE WITH FRIENDS OR NEIGHBOURS)? N Goto
8.
WHICH?
WOULD YOU READ IT / THEM QUITE OFTEN *
OCCASIONALLY *
OR RARELY *
8. DO YOU WATCH BREAKFAST TELEVISION? N Goto
9.
DO YOU WATCH IT EVERY MORNING *
3/4 TIMES A WEEK *
1/2 A WEEK *
ONLY OCCASIONALLY *
9. DO YOU REGULARLY WATCH THE EVENING NEWS
O'N TELEVISION AT SIX, NINE OR TEN O'CLOCK? N Goto
10.
DO YOU WATCH IT EVERY EVENING *
3/4 TIMES A WEEK *
1/2 A WEEK *
ONLY OCCASIONALLY *
IS THAT MAINLY BBC *
MAINLY ITN *
MAINLY CH4 *
Do Not Prompt A MIX
10. DO YOU EVER WATCH CURRENT AFFAIRS
PROGRAMMES SUCH AS PANORAMA. NEWSNIGHT.
'T.V. EYE OR WORLD IN ACTION? N (Thanks)
WOULD YOU WATCH THEM OFTEN *
OCCASIONALLY *
OR RARELY *
Thank You Very Much; You Have Been More Than Helpful
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MAIN FIELDWORK SURVEY 
HOUSEHOLD COMPLETION 
NEWCROSS
NAME : SERIAL No.
ADDRESS: AREA No.
DATE
INTERVIEWER
TEL. No. :
TIME STARTED 
TIME FINISHED 
TOTAL TIME
of living and towards the state of the country, in the run ud to
the next general election. It's not intended to test you
knowledge of Dolitics or economics.
We are also interested in oeoole's attitudes towards the
Dolitical oarties and in voting. However, any information you
give us will be held in the strictest confidence.
GENDER M INTERVIEWEE STATUS A
F B
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Could We Start With Some Background Questions
1. COULD YOU TELL ME THE AGE BAND 15 - 24 *
YOU FALL INTO? 25 - 34 *
35 - 44 *
45 — 54 *
55 - 65 *
65+ *
a) ARE YOU A MEMBER OF A TRADE UNION Y Goto b.
AT PRESENT? N Goto c.
n/a Goto c.
b) WHICH? ............................
C )  HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A Y Goto d.
TRADE UNION? N Goto 3.
n/a Goto 3 .
d) WHICH? ............................
a) ARE YOU A MEMBER OF A PROFESSIONAL Y Goto b.
ASSOCIATION OR BODY? N Goto 4.
n/a Goto 4.
b) WHICH? ............................
4. WHAT AGE WERE YOU WHEN YOU LEFT SCHOOL?
5. DO YOU HAVE ANY 'O' OR 'A' LEVELS? Y
N
Now Some General Questions On The Country's Economy
6. a) WOULD YOU SAY THAT, IN GENERAL, B Goto b.
THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IS BETTER, W Goto b.
WORSE OR ABOUT THE SAME AS IT WAS S Goto 7.
A YEAR AGO, OR ARE YOU UNSURE? U Goto 7.
b) IS THAT A LITTLE OR A LOT? LI
LO
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a) WOULD YOU SAY THAT, IN GENERAL, B Goto b.
THE INFLATION RATE IS BETTER, WORSE W Goto b.
OR ABOUT THE SAME AS IT WAS A YEAR S Goto 8.
AGO, OR ARE YOU UNSURE? U Goto 8.
t>) IS THAT A LITTLE OR A LOT? LI
LO
a) WE'VE ASKED ABOUT SPECIFICS, BUT B Goto b.
WOULD YOU SAY THAT, OVERALL. THE W Goto b.
COUNTRY'S GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION S Goto 9.
IS BETTER, WORSE OR ABOUT THE SAME U Goto 9.
AS IT WAS A YEAR AGO, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
ÏD) IS THAT A LITTLE OR A LOT? LI
LO
a) WITH REGARD TO THE COUNTRY'S G Goto b.
GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION WOULD B Goto b.
YOU SAY THAT - SINCE 1983 - THE M Goto 10,
GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES HAVE HAD A ND Goto 10.
GOOD EFFECT, A BAD EFFECT, A MIXED U Goto 10,
EFFECT OR MADE LITTLE DIFFERENCE,
OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
fco) WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS A FAIRLY F
 .....  EFFECT OR A VERY .....  V
EFFECT?
Now If I Could Ask A Few More Background Ouestions
10.a) DO YOU OWN YOUR OWN HOME OR HOLD A Y Goto b.
MORTGAGE ON IT? N Goto c.
b)) DID YOU BUY YOUR HOUSE FROM THE Y Goto 11
FROM THE LOCAL COUNCIL? N Goto 11
a) ARE YOU PAYING RENT AT THE MOMENT? Y Goto d.
N Goto 11
dl) ARE YOU PAYING RENT TO___LOCAL AUTHORITY *
HOUSING ASSOCIATION ■k
PRIVATE LANDLORD *
SOME OTHER BODY OR PERSON *
288
Now I^d Like To Ask You Some Very General Ouestions About Your
Own Financial Situation
WOULD YOU SAY THAT, FINANCIALLY, 
YOU ARE BETTER OFF, WORSE OFF, OR 
ABOUT THE SAME AS YOU WERE A YEAR 
AGO, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) IS THAT A LITTLE OR A LOT?
C )  YOU'VE SAID YOU ARE ...........
IN GENERAL TERMS, HOW DO YOU ACCOUNT FOR THIS?
B Goto b.
W Goto b.
s Goto 12
U Goto 12
LI Goto c.
LO Goto C.
12. a) DO YOU THINK THAT OVER THE LAST UPM Goto b.
YEAR YOUR INCOME HAS GONE UP MORE BEH Goto b.
THAN THE COST OF LIVING; HAS FALLEN EVN Goto 13.
BEHIND; OR HAS STAYED ABOUT EVEN UNS Goto 13.
WITH THE COST OF LIVING, OR ARE 
YOU UNSURE?
b) IS THAT A LITTLE OR A LOT? LI
LO
13.a) WITH REGARD TO YOUR OWN G Goto b.
FINANCIAL SITUATION WOULD B Goto b.
YOU SAY THAT - SINCE 1983 - THE ND Goto 14.
GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES HAVE HAD A U Goto 14.
GOOD EFFECT, A BAD EFFECT, OR MADE 
LITTLE DIFFERENCE, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS A FAIRLY F
......  EFFECT OR A VERY ....  EFFECT? V
a) WITH REGARD TO YOUR PROSPECTS OF G Goto b.
KEEPING OR GETTING A JOB, WOULD B Goto b.
YOU SAY THAT - SINCE 198 3 - THE ND Goto 15.
GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES HAVE HAD A U Goto 15.
GOOD EFFECT, A BAD EFFECT, OR MADE
LITTLE DIFFERENCE, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS A FAIRLY F
......  EFFECT OR A VERY ....  EFFECT? V
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15.a) WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE GENERAL
ECONOMIC SITUATION IN YOUR LOCAL 
AREA IS BETTER, WORSE OR ABOUT THE 
SAME AS IT WAS A YEAR AGO, OR ARE 
YOU UNSURE?
B
W
s
u
Goto b. 
Goto b. 
Goto 16. 
Goto 16.
b) IS THAT A LITTLE OR A LOT? LI
LO
16. IF UNEMPLOYMENT DOES NOT COME DOWN
IN THE NEXT YEAR OR SO, DO YOU THINK 
THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE HELD COMPLETELY 
RESPONSIBLE, NOT AT ALL RESPONSIBLE,
OR PARTLY RESPONSIBLE - OR ARE YOU 
UNSURE?
C
N
P
U
17. IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THE
GOVERNMENT HAS IT IN ITS POWER TO 
SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE NUMBER OF 
UNEMPLOYED - CAN THEY DO A LOT, CAN 
THEY DO A BIT, OR CAN THEY DO VERY 
LITTLE, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
L
B
V
U
18. IF INFLATION DOES NOT COME DOWN
IN THE NEXT YEAR OR SO, DO YOU THINK 
THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE HELD COMPLETELY 
RESPONSIBLE, NOT AT ALL RESPONSIBLE,
OR PARTLY RESPONSIBLE - OR ARE YOU 
UNSURE?
C
N
P
U
19. IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THE
GOVERNMENT HAS IT IN ITS POWER TO 
SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE INFLATION 
- CAN THEY DO A LOT, CAN THEY 
DO A BIT, OR CAN THEY DO VERY 
LITTLE, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
L
B
V
U
P.T.O
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20.aa) ARE YOU WORKING FULL TIME AT Y* Goto b.
PRESENT? N Goto 21.
kb) HAVE YOU BEEN OUT OF WORK IN Y* Goto 25.
THE PAST YEAR? N Goto 24.
21. HAVE YOU BEEN IN FULL-TIME WORK Y* Goto 23.
AT ANY TIME IN THE LAST YEAR? N Goto 22.
22. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN FULL-TIME Y* Goto 23.
EMPLOYMENT? N Goto 23.
23. ARE YOU LOOKING FOR FULL-TIME Y Goto 25.
WORK AT PRESENT? N Goto 25.
24. ARE THERE ANY PEOPLE IN YOUR Y Goto 25.
HOUSEHOLD WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED N Goto 25.
AND WHO ARE LOOKING FOR FULL-TIME 
WORK?
25. Only If One Of Above Responses Is Marked * Otherwise Goto 2 6
Now I Want To Ask You About Your Past/Present Job
P.T.O.
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25. a) WHAT IS/WAS THE TITLE OF YOUR JOB?
Id ) what kind OF WORK DID YOU DO MOST OF THE TIME?
C )  WHAT TRAINING OR QUALIFICATIONS DO/DID YOU HAVE 
THAT ARE/WERE NEEDED FOR THAT JOB?
a) DO/DID YOU SUPERVISE OR ARE/WERE YOU RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE WORK OF ANY OTHER PEOPLE?
Y
N
HOW MANY?
e) ARE/WERE YOU AN EMPLOYEE OR 
SELF-EMPLOYED?
E
S
Goto f. 
Goto 26.
£) IS/WAS THE COMPANY YOU WORK/WORKED 
F O R .....
A PRIVATE FIRM *
A NATIONALISED INDUSTRY *
A LOCAL OR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION *
A CHARITY *
OR WHAT?
(Please Specify)
26. ARE YOU MARRIED OR LIVING AS MARRIED 
AT PRESENT?
Y
N
Goto 27 
Goto 32
27. a) IS YOUR PARTNER WORKING FULL­
TIME AT PRESENT?
Y
N
Goto b. 
Goto 28.
b) HAS YOUR PARTNER BEEN OUT OF 
WORK IN THE PAST YEAR?
Y
N
Goto 31 
Goto 31
28. HAS YOUR PARTNER BEEN IN FULL­
TIME WORK AT ANY TIME IN THE LAST 
YEAR?
Y
N
Goto 30. 
Goto 29.
29. HAS YOUR PARTNER EVER BEEN IN 
FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT?
Y
N
Goto 30. 
Goto 30.
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30. IS YOUR PARTNER LOOKING FOR Y Goto 31.
FULL-TIME WORK AT PRESENT? N Goto 31.
31. Only If One Of Above Responses Is Marked * Otherwise Goto 32
Now I Want To Ask You About Your Partner's Past/Present Job
31. a) WHAT IS/WAS THE TITLE OF YOUR PARTNER'S JOB?
b) WHAT KIND OF WORK DID/DOES YOUR PARTNER DO MOST OF THE 
TIME?
C )  WHAT TRAINING OR QUALIFICATIONS DOES/DID YOU PARTNER HAVE 
THAT WAS/IS NEEDED FOR THAT JOB?
c3) DOES/DID YOUR PARTNER SUPERVISE, OR IS/WAS YOUR PARTNER 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WORK OF ANY OTHER PEOPLE?
Y ----- HOW MANY? ..................... .
N
e) IS/WAS YOUR PARTNER AN EMPLOYEE E Goto f.
OR SELF-EMPLOYED? S Goto 26.
f) IS/WAS THE COMPANY YOUR PARTNER WORK/WORKED 
F O R .....
A PRIVATE FIRM *
A NATIONALISED INDUSTRY *
A LOCAL OR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION *
A CHARITY *
OR WHAT?
(Please Specify)
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Now I^d Like To Ask You About Your General Interest In Politics 
And About Discussion Of Politics - But I Won't Be Asking About 
Your Own Private Beliefs
32. IN GENERAL, HOW INTERESTED IN
POLITICS WOULD YOU SAY YOU WERE? 
ARE YOU VERY INTERESTED, FAIRLY 
INTERESTED, NOT VERY INTERESTED OR 
DISINTERESTED?
V
F
N
D
33.a) WHAT WOULD YOU SAY WAS YOUR 
MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF 
POLITICAL INFORMATION? IS IT..
FAMILY, FRIENDS & WORKMATES *
OR RADIO *
OR T.V. *
OR NEWSPAPERS *
(Do Not Prompt) MIXED SOURCES *
NONE SPECIFIED *
b) WHAT WOULD YOU SAY WAS YOUR
SECOND MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF 
POLITICAL INFORMATION? IS IT..
FAMILY, FRIENDS & WORKMATES
OR RADIO 
OR T.V. 
OR NEWSPAPERS
(Do Not Prompt) MIXED SOURCES *
NONE SPECIFIED *
34.a) DO YOU TALK ABOUT POLITICS WITH 
YOUR FAMILY, FRIENDS, NEIGHBOURS 
OR WORKMATES?
Y
N
Goto b. 
Goto 35
b) WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS OFTEN, 
OCCASIONALLY OR RARELY?
OF
OC
RA
35.a) IN THE LAST WEEK OR SO CAN YOU
REMEMBER TALKING TO ANYONE ABOUT 
POLITICS?
Y
N
Goto b. 
Goto 36.
b) WITH WHOM? FAMILY *
FRIENDS *
NEIGHBOURS *
WORKMATES *
C)  ABOUT WHAT? ...........
d) DID YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE? A
D
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Now To Move On To The Political Parties. I'd Like To Ask You 
About The Feelings You May Have When You Think About Them.
I'll Do This By Asking You If A Particular Party Makes You Feel 
(For Instance) 'Happy' Or 'Anorv' Or 'Proud' (Etc.). And I'll 
Simply Ask You To Answer 'Yes' Or 'No' (If You Are Unsure Or The 
Question Sounds Odd, You Should Just Answer 'No'.
If You Answer 'Yes' I'll Ask You To Indicate How Strongly You 
Feel On A Scale From 'One' To 'Five' (Show Prompt Card). Here 
'One' Means You Feel The Emotion Weakly And 'Five' Means You Feel 
It Strongly.
You Can Choose Any Number Between 'One' And 'Five'.
ROTATE OUESTIONS 
36. TO 38.
ORGANISE ACCORDING 
TO STATUS OF 
RESPONDENT
Now If We Could Begin
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36. WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT THE LABOUR PARTY, AS A WHOLE, DOES IT
MAKE YOU FEEL.....
If ResDondent Status 'A'
Y N SCOI
HAPPY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL ANGRY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL HOPEFUL
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL DISGUSTED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PLEASED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL UNEASY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PROUD
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL AFRAID
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL RELAXED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL UNHAPPY
If Respondent Status 'B'
Y N SCOF
UNHAPPY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL RELAXED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL AFRAID
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PROUD
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL UNEASY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PLEASED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL DISGUSTED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL HOPEFUL
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL ANGRY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL HAPPY
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37. WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT THE ALLIANCE, AS A WHOLE, DOES IT
MAKE YOU FEEL.....
If Respondent Status 'A'
Y N SCOI
HAPPY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL ANGRY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL HOPEFUL
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL DISGUSTED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PLEASED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL UNEASY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PROUD
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL AFRAID
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL RELAXED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL UNHAPPY
If Respondent Status 'B'
Y N SCOI
UNHAPPY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL RELAXED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL AFRAID
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PROUD
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL UNEASY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PLEASED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL DISGUSTED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL HOPEFUL
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL ANGRY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL HAPPY
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38. WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, AS A WHOLE, DOES
IT MAKE YOU FEEL.....
If Respondent Status 'A'
Y N SCOI
HAPPY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL ANGRY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL HOPEFUL
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL DISGUSTED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PLEASED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL UNEASY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PROUD
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL AFRAID
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL RELAXED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL UNHAPPY
If Respondent Status 'B'
Y N SCOI
UNHAPPY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL RELAXED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL AFRAID
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PROUD
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL UNEASY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL PLEASED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL DISGUSTED
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL HOPEFUL
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL ANGRY
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL HAPPY
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Now I^d Like You To Express Your Feelings Of Warmth Or Coldness 
Towards The Major Political Parties. You Can Do This Through 
What We Call The 'Feeling Thermometer' (PROMPT CARD).
If You Have A Warm Feeling Towards The Particular Party You 
Should Give It A Score Between 50 And 100 Degrees. Depending On 
How Warm Your Feeling Is.l
On The Other Hand, If You Feel; Rather Cold Towards The Party You 
Should Place Your Score Between 50 and 0 Degrees.
If You Don't Feel Particularly Warm Or Cold Towards It You Should 
Place Your Score At The 5 0 Degree Mark.
ROTATE o.s 39-40
39. FIRST THE LABOUR PARTY. WHERE WOULD YOU PLACE THE 
LABOUR PARTY ON THE 'FEELING THERMOMETER' ACCORDING 
TO YOUR FEELINGS TOWARDS IT?
(SCORE IN NUMBERS)
0 - 41
50
51 - 100
40. NOW THE ALLIANCE. WHERE WOULD YOU PLACE IT ON THE 
'FEELING THERMOMETER'.?
(SCORE IN NUMBERS)
0 - 4 1
50
51 - 100
41. LASTLY THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY. WHERE WOULD YOU PLACE 
IT ON THE 'THERMOMETER'?
(SCORE IN NUMBERS)
0 - 4 1
50
51 - 100
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42.a) GENERALLY SPEAKING DO YOU NORMALLY Y Goto b.
THINK OF YOURSELF AS CONSERVATIVE N Goto 43,
LABOUR OR ALLIANCE?
b) WHICH IS THAT? CON *
LAB *
ALL *
C) HOW STRONGLY DO YOU GENERALLY FEEL? V
IS THAT VERY STRONGLY, FAIRLY F
STRONGLY OR NOT VERY STRONGLY? N
43.a) DO YOU EVER THING OF YOURSELF AS Y Goto b.
CLOSER TO ONE OF THE THREE MAJOR N Goto 44
POLITICAL PARTIES?
b) WHICH IS THAT? CON *
LAB *
ALL *
Now Just A Few More Background Ouestions
44.a) AT PRESENT ARE YOU DOING ANY Y Goto b.
PART-TIME OR FULL-TIME STUDIES? N Goto 45.
b) WHAT ARE YOU STUDYING?
45.a) HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY UNDERTAKEN ANY Y Goto b.
PART-TIME OR FULL-TIME STUDIES? N Goto 46.
b) WHAT DID YOU STUDY?
46.a) WOULD YOU SAY YOUR YEARLY INCOME Y Goto b.
IS OVER OR UNDER £10,000? N Goto b.
b) IS THAT BEFORE OR AFTER TAX?
47. DO YOU RECEIVE MONEY WEEKLY, EVERY W
TWO WEEKS, OR MONTHLY? 2
M
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48.a) DO YOU OWN OR HAVE REGULAR USE Y Goto b.
OF A CAR OR VAN? N Goto 49.
b) DOES THE CAR OR VAN COME WITH A Y
JOB? N
49. ARE YOU ENROLED FOR PRIVATE MEDICINE? Y
N
Now Some General Ouestions About The Government
50.a) IN GENERAL. HOW WELL DO YOU THINK W Goto b.
THE GOVERNMENT IS HANDLING THE B Goto b.
COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS? IS IT HANDLING N Goto 51.
THEM WELL, BADLY. NEITHER WELL NOR U Goto 51.
BADLY, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) IS THAT Q U I T E ...... OR VERY   ? Q
V
51.a) WITH REGARD TO YOUR LOCAL G Goto b.
COMMUNITY, WOULD YOU SAY THAT B Goto b.
- SINCE 1983 - THE GOVERNMENT'S M Goto 52.
POLICIES HAVE HAD A GOOD EFFECT, A ND Goto 52.
A BAD EFFECT, A MIXED EFFECT OR MADE U Goto 52.
LITTLE DIFFERENCE, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS A FAIRLY F
......  EFFECT OR A VERY   EFFECT? V
52. HOW FAR HAS THE GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTED G
TO THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT SINCE A
1983? HAS IT CONTRIBUTED A GREAT DEAL, V
A LITTLE, VERY LITTLE OR NOTHING N
DIRECTLY, OR ARE YOU UNSURE? U
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53.a) WITH REGARD TO INFLATION G Goto b.
WOULD YOU SAY THAT - SINCE 1983 - B Goto b.
THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES HAVE M Goto 52.
HAD A GOOD EFFECT, A BAD EFFECT, ND Goto 52.
A MIXED EFFECT OR MADE LITTLE U Goto 52.
DIFFERENCE, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS A FAIRLY F
....... EFFECT OR A VERY ..... EFFECT? V
54. IF THERE WAS A GENERAL ELECTION TOMORROW AND YOUR VOTE
DECIDED WHETHER, FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS , WE HAD H LABOUR,
A CONSERVATIVE OR AN ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT, HOW WOULD YOU VOTE?
WON'T SAY *
WON'T VOTE *
DON'T KNOW *
LABOUR *
CONSERVATIVE *
ALLIANCE *
OTHER *
55. IS THERE ONE OF THE THREE MAIN PARTIES (CONSERVATIVE,
LABOUR OR ALLIANCE) WHICH YOU WOULD DEFINITELY NOT VOTE
FOR?
WON'T SAY *
DON'T KNOW *
LABOUR *
CONSERVATIVE *
ALLIANCE *
56. DID YOU VOTE IN THE RECENT GENERAL ELECTION? HOW DID YOU
VOTE?
DIDN'T VOTE *
CANNOT REMEMBER *
WON'T SAY *
LABOUR *
CONSERVATIVE *
ALLIANCE *
OTHER *
57.a) WERE YOU ELIGIBLE TO VOTE IN THE 198 3 Y Goto b.
GENERAL ELECTION WHEN MRS. THATCHER WAS N *THANKS*
FIRST ELECTED?
b) HOW DID YOU VOTE IN DIDN'T VOTE *
THAT ELECTION? CANNOT REMEMBER *
WON'T SAY *
LABOUR *
CONSERVATIVE *
ALLIANCE *
OTHER *
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FIRST FOLLOW-UP
TELEPHONE DELIVERED
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
NAME ; 
ADDRESS:
TEL. No.
SERIAL No. 
AREA No. 
DATE
INTERVIEWER
1. a) WOULD YOU SAY THAT, OVERALL, THE 
COUNTRY'S GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
IS BETTER, WORSE OR ABOUT THE SAME 
AS IT WAS WHEN WE FIRST CONTACTED YOU? 
OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) IS THAT A LITTLE OR A LOT?
B
W
s
u
LI
LO
Goto b. 
Goto b. 
Goto 2. 
Goto 2.
2. a) WITH REGARD TO THE COUNTRY'S
GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION WOULD 
YOU SAY THAT - SINCE OUR LAST CONTACT 
THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES HAVE HAD A 
GOOD EFFECT, A BAD EFFECT, A MIXED 
EFFECT OR MADE LITTLE DIFFERENCE,
OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS A FAIRLY
......  EFFECT OR A VERY .....
EFFECT?
G
B
M
ND
U
F
V
Goto b. 
Goto b. 
Goto 3. 
Goto 3. 
Goto 3.
3. a) WOULD YOU SAY THAT, FINANCIALLY, 
YOU YOURSELF ARE BETTER OFF, WORSE 
OFF OR ABOUT THE SAME AS YOU WERE 
WHEN LAST CONTACTED OR ARE YOU 
UNSURE?
b) IS THAT A LITTLE OR A LOT?
B
W
s
u
LI
LO
Goto b. 
Goto b. 
Goto 4. 
Goto 4.
Goto c. 
Goto c.
4. a) WITH REGARD TO YOUR OWN FINANCIAL 
SITUATION WOULD YOU SAY THAT 
- SINCE OUR LAST CONTACT - THE 
GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES HAVE HAD A 
GOOD EFFECT, A BAD EFFECT, OR MADE 
LITTLE DIFFERENCE, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS A FAIRLY
.......  EFFECT OR A VERY   EFFECT?
G
B
M
ND
U
F
V
Goto b. 
Goto b. 
Goto 5. 
Goto 5. 
Goto 5.
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5. a) WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE GENERAL B Goto b.
ECONOMIC SITUATION IN YOUR LOCAL W Goto b.
AREA IS BETTER, WORSE OR ABOUT THE S Goto 6.
SAME AS IT WAS A YEAR AGO, OR ARE U Goto 6.
YOU UNSURE?
b) IS THAT A LITTLE OR A LOT? LI
LO
6. a) WITH REGARD TO YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY G Goto b.
WOULD YOU SAY THAT OVER THE LAST B Goto b.
YEAR THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES M Goto 7.
HAVE HAD A GOOD EFFECT, A BAD ND Goto 7.
EFFECT, A MIXED EFFECT OR MADE U Goto 7.
LITTLE DIFFERENCE, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS A FAIRLY F
......  EFFECT OR A VERY ....  EFFECT? V
7. a) IN GENERAL. HOW WELL DO YOU THINK W Goto b.
THE GOVERNMENT IS HANDLING THE B Goto b.
COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS? IS IT HANDLING N Goto 8.
THEM WELL. BADLY. NEITHER WELL NOR U Goto 8.
BADLY, OR ARE YOU UNSURE?
b) IS THAT Q U I T E ...... OR VERY   ? Q
V
8. a) GENERALLY SPEAKING DO YOU NORMALLY Y Goto b.
THINK OF YOURSELF AS CONSERVATIVE N Goto 9.
LABOUR OR ALLIANCE?
b) WHICH IS THAT? CON
b) WHICH IS THAT? CON
*
LAB *
ALL *
C )  HOW STRONGLY DO YOU GENERALLY FEEL? V
IS THAT VERY STRONGLY, FAIRLY F
STRONGLY OR NOT VERY STRONGLY? N
9. a) DO YOU EVER THING OF YOURSELF AS Y Goto b.
CLOSER TO ONE OF THE THREE MAJOR N Goto 10,
POLITICAL PARTIES?
*
LAB *
ALL *
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10.a) ARE YOU WORKING FULL TIME AT Y Goto b.
PRESENT? N Goto b.
b) HAVE YOU BEEN OUT OF WORK IN Y Goto c.
THE PAST YEAR? N Goto c.
c) ARE THERE ANY PEOPLE IN YOUR Y Goto 10.
HOUSEHOLD WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED N Goto 10.
AND WHO ARE LOOKING FOR FULL-TIME 
WORK?
11. IF THERE WAS A GENERAL ELECTION TOMORROW HOW WOULD YOU VOTE?
WON'T SAY *
UNDECIDED *
CONSERVATIVE *
LABOUR *
SLDP 
SDP *
OTHER *
12.a) IS THERE ONE OF THE MAIN PARTIES Y Goto b.
YOU WOULD DEFINITELY NOT VOTE FOR? N Goto 13
CON LAB SLDP SDP OTHER
b) HOW STRONGLY DO YOU GENERALLY FEEL? V
IS THAT VERY STRONGLY, FAIRLY F
STRONGLY OR NOT VERY STRONGLY? N
13.a) SINCE THE LAST TIME WE CONTACTED YOU W Goto b.
WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOUR FEELINGS C Goto b.
TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT ARE WARMER, S Goto 14.
COLDER OR ABOUT THE SAME, OR ARE YOU U Goto 14.
UNSURE?
b) IS THAT A LITTLE OR A LOT? LI
LO
14. DID YOU VOTE IN THE RECENT EUROPEAN ELECTION?
DIDN'T VOTE *
WON'T SAY *
CONSERVATIVE *
LABOUR *
SLDP *
SDP *
OTHER *
Thank You Very Much For Your Cooperation In The Survey
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SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL) LIMITED
GALLUP POLITICAL INDEX
OCTOBER 1981
EXTRACTS
1. a) IF THERE WAS A GENERAL ELECTION TOMORROW, WHICH PARTY WOULD 
YOU SUPPORT? (Mark first column below).
b) If "Don't Know" : WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU BE MOST INCLINED 
TO VOTE FOR? (Mark second column below).
a) b)
Conservative 1 7
Labour 2 8
Liberal 3 9
Social Democrats 4 0
Nationalists* 5 X
Other party 6 V
Don't know R R
2. DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF TO BE CLOSE TO ANY PARTICULAR PARTY? 
IF SO, DO YOU FEEL YOURSELF TO BE VERY CLOSE TO THIS PARTY, 
FAIRLY CLOSE OR MERELY A SYMPATHISER?
1 Very close
2 Fairly close
3 Merely a sympathiser
4 Not close to any party
5 Don't know
3. a) HOW DO YOU THINK THE GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THIS 
COUNTRY HAS CHANGED OVER THE LAST 12 MONTHS? (Read Out)
1 Got a lot better
2 Got a little better
3 Stayed, the same
4 Got a little worse
5 Got a lot worse
6 Don't know
b) HOW DO YOU THINK THE GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THIS 
COUNTRY WILL DEVELOP OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS? (Read Out)
1 Got a lot better
2 Got a little better
3 Stayed. the same
4 Got a little worse
5 Got a lot worse
6 Don't know
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4. a) HOW DOES THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD NOW 
COMPARE WITH WHAT IT WAS 12 MONTHS AGO? (Read Out)
1 Got a lot better
2 Got a little better
3 Stayed. the same
4 Got a little worse
5 Got a lot worse
6 Don't know
b) HOW DO YOU THINK THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR
HOUSEHOLD WILL CHANGE OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS? (Read Out)
1 Got a lot better
2 Got a little better
3 Stayed. the same
4 Got a little worse
5 Got a lot worse
6 Don't know
5. WHICH OF THESE STATEMENTS BEST DESCRIBES THE PRESENT 
FINANCIAL SITUATION IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD? (Read 
out - reverse order for alternate contacts)
1 We are running into debt
2 We have to draw on our savings
3 We are just managing to make ends
meet on our income
4 We are saving a little
5 We are saving a lot
6. a) HOW DO YOU THINK THE LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT (I MEAN THE 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE OUT OF WORK) IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE 
WILL CHANGE OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS? WILL IT : (Read out)
1 Increase sharply
2 Increase slightly
3 Remain the same
4 Fall slightly
5 Fall sharply
6 Don't know
b) COMPARED TO WHAT IT WAS 12 MONTHS AGO, DO YOU THINK THE 
COST OF LIVING IS NOW : (Read out)
7 Very much higher
8 Quite a bit higher
9 A little higher
0 About the same
X Lower
V Don't know
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7. a) DO YOU (OR YOUR HUSBAND/WIFE) BELONG TO A TRADE UNION?
1 Yes, self
2 Yes, husband/wife
3 No
b) IF YOU WERE TO SAY WHICH SOCIAL CLASS YOU BELONGED TO, WHAT 
WOULD YOU SAY? (Read out all five alternatives)
4 Upper
5 Upper-middle
6 Middle
7 Lower-middle
8 Working
8. CAN YOU TELL ME YOUR DATE OF BIRTH PLEASE? (Write in and code)
1 16 or 17
2 1 8 - 2 0
3 2 1 - 2 4
4 2 5 - 2 9
5 3 0 - 3 4
6 3 5 - 3 9
7 4 0 - 4 4
8 4 5 - 4 9
9 5 0 - 5 4
0 5 5 - 5 9
X 6 0 - 6 4
V 65 or over
9. a) SEX 1 Man
Woman
2 Housewife
3 Not housewife
b) ARE YOU 4 Married
5 Single
6 Widowed, divorced, separated
c) SOCIO- Non-manual 
ECON. 7 A
GROUP 8 B
9 Cl
Manual 
0 C2
X___ D
V E
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APPENDIX TWO 
AFFECT AND THE ECONOMY
Affect Against Economic Perceptions and Attributions 
HAPPY
NATIONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION PERSONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION
ALL : 0.33 ALL : 0.28
CON : 0.12 CON : 0.22
NON­•CON : 0.13 NON-CON ; 0.13
NATIONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION PERSONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION
ALL : 0.29 ALL : 0.10
CON : 0.20 CON : 0.09
NON­•CON : 0.28 NON-CON : 0.02
ANGER
NATIONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION PERSONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION
ALL : 0.29 ALL : 0.29
CON : 0.11 ** CON : 0.17 **
NON­■CON : 0.2 0 NON-CON : 0.20
NATIONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION PERSONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION
ALL : 0.37 ALL : 0.15
CON : 0.39 * CON : 0.21 **
NON­•CON : 0.25 NON-CON : 0.00
HOPEFUL
NATIONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION PERSONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION
ALL : 0.32 ALL : 0.21
CON : 0.00 ** CON : 0.06 **
NON­•CON : 0.13 NON-CON : 0.09
NATIONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION PERSONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION
ALL : 0.27 ALL : 0.15
CON : 0.10 ** CON : 0.23 ***
NON­CON : 0.27 NON-CON : 0.08
DISGUST
NATIONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION PERSONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION
ALL : 0.40 ALL : 0.34
CON : 0.28 ** CON : 0.17 **
NON­CON : 0.32 NON-CON : 0.26
NATIONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION PERSONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION
ALL : 0.35 ALL : 0.21
CON : 0.35 *** CON : 0.31 **
NON­CON : 0.25 NON-CON : 0.05
PLEASED
NATIONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION PERSONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION
ALL : 0.33 ALL : 0.26
CON : 0.03 CON : 0.14
NON-CON : 0.17 NON-CON : 0.15
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NATIONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION PERSONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION
ALL : 0.29 ALL : 0.06
CON : 0.14 CON : 0.00
NON--CON : 0.30 NON-CON : 0.01
UNEASY
NATIONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION PERSONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION
ALL : 0.30 ALL : 0.33
CON : 0.30 *** CON : 0.29 **
NON­-CON : 0.20 NON-CON : 0.24
NATIONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION PERSONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION
ALL : 0.33 ALL : 0.09
CON : 0.36 * CON : 0.18 *
NON--CON : 0.22 NON-CON : 0.07
PROUD
NATIONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION PERSONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION
ALL : 0.30 ALL : 0.31
CON : 0.12 CON : 0.27
NON­-CON : 0.17 NON-CON : 0.18
NATIONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION PERSONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION
ALL : 0.26 ALL : 0.00
CON : 0.27 CON : 0.00
NON--CON : 0.17 NON-CON : 0.09
AFRAID
NATIONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION PERSONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION
ALL : 0.36 ALL : 0.31
CON : 0.04 *** CON : 0.20 **
NON­-CON : 0.30 NON-CON : 0.21
NATIONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION PERSONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION
ALL : 0.37 ALL : 0.15
CON : 0.17 ** CON : 0.07 ***
NON­•CON ; 0.31 NON-CON : 0.04
RELAYED
NATIONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION PERSONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION
ALL : 0.24 ALL : 0.26
CON : 0.06 CON : 0.20
NON­■CON : 0. 09 NON-CON : 0.14
NATIONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION PERSONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION
ALL : 0.20 ALL : 0.09
CON : 0.10 CON : 0.19
NON­CON : 0.17 NON-CON : 0.04
(see over page)
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UNHAPPY
NATIONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION PERSONAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTION
ALL
CON
NON­CON :
0.34 
0.19 ** 
0.25
ALL
CON
NON-CON
: 0.25 
: 0.27 ** 
: 0.11
NATIONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION PERSONAL LEVEL PERCEPTION
ALL
CON
NON­CON :
0.33 
0.22 ** 
0.24
ALL
CON
NON-CON
: 0.14 
: 0.03 * 
: 0.03
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